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F.B.I. SAYS 12,000 FAULTY REPORTS ON SUSPECTS
ARE ISSUED EACH DAY
Copyright 1985 The New York Times Company
The New York Times
August 25, 1985, Sunday, Late City Final Edition
By David Burhham, Special to the New York Times
At least 12,000 invalid or inaccurate reports
on suspects wanted for arrest are transmitted each
day to Federal, state and local law-enforcement,
agencies, according to projections by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
The estimate of faulty reports was based on
a continuing series of F.B.I. audits, which have been
conducted in a dozen states. The audits also indicated
problems with about 7,000 reports transmitted each
day concerning stolen vehicles and license plates.
The inaccurate information is provided by
thousands of state and local law-enforcement
agencies to the bureau's National Crime Information
Center. The center was established to give police
officers speedy notice of whether a person stopped
for a traffic offense is wanted on criminal charges in
another jurisidiction or whether a particular car has
been reported stolen.
Dangers of System Cited
Law-enforcement and civil liberties experts
say that invalid or false information can endanger the
safety of individual officers, the ability of the police
to control crime and the freedom of citizens. The
F.B.I. said that such concerns have led the bureau to
push state and local officials for more accurate
records and that the audits are another step in that
direction.
More than 60,000 state and local agencies
provide most of the information to the National
Crime Information Center, which is now used by
law-enforcement officers nearly 400,000 times a day.
Dozens of specific cases have become known
in the last few years in which inaccurate information
including faulty warrants and wrong height, weight
and date of birth data has contributed to the arrest
and detention, sometimes for days, of innocent
individuals.
Two years ago, for example, Sheila Jackson
Stossier, an Eastern Airlines flight attendant, was
wrongfully jailed for almost three days by several
Louisiana law-enforcement agencies on the basis of
a Houston arrest warrant that had been placed into
the national communications network. The warrant
was for a suspect with a similar name, however, and
officials in Louisiana failed to check Miss Stossier's
passport and other identity papers that would have
shown she was not the person sought.
F.B.I. rules require computer records to be
checked with the original source of the information,
but apparently that was not done in the Stossier case.
In addition, the Houston warrant was for a
misdemeanor charge and should not have been
placed in the F.B.I. system; suspects cannot
normally be extradited from one state to another for
misdemeanors.
Miss Stossier, as well as individuals in
Michigan, California and New Jersey, have filed
suits charging that their constitutional rights have
been violated by law-enforcement actions prompted
by inaccurate or misleading information.
Although the F.B.I. is auditing the
communications system that transmits those records,
the bureau has not attempted to collect information
on the number of people who may have been
wrongly arrested or detained based on inaccurate
information.
#6 Percent Called Faulty
David Mitchell, the head of the F.B.I.'s new
auditing force, said the bureau did not have sufficient
data to provide absolute numbers about the
percentage of flawed reports being provided by state
and local agencies that then were transmitted to other
agencies by the F.B.I. He said, however, that the
available evidence indicated that on a national basis
approximately 6 percent of the 211,296 warrant
entries and 4.5 percent of 165,253 stolen vehicle
entries being transmitted through the network each
day had serious flaws.
Representative Charles E. Schumer,
Democrat of Brooklyn, said the faulty records are "a
gaping hole" in the criminal justice system and has
introduced legislation to provide states with Federal
funds to improve record keeping. "The most
effective way to improve society's ability to fight
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crime and to protect the lives of police officers and
the civil liberties of all citizens is to make sure these
records are accurate," he said.
The decision of the F.B.I. to make its audits
public marks the first time that the agency has
acknowledged the extent of the problem of faulty
records. In 1983, the Office of Technology
Assessment released a study by the National Crime
Information Center that included roughly similar
findings. At the time, however, F.B.I. officials
sharply attacked those findings, saying they were
based on poor research.
"Initially, we felt that the accuracy of the
information provided by state and local jursidictions
was beyond our control other than repeatedly urging
them to worry about data quality," Mr. Mitchell of
the F.B.I. said. "But several years ago, our advisory
board agreed we should do more than to just lead the
people to water."
Computer experts say that one of the most
persistent and hard to correct problems confronting
various businesses and government agencies in the
United States today is the poor quality of some of the
information contained in giant computer systems that
collect taxes, check credit worthiness and store
medical records.
Inaccurate information placed in such
systems can lead agencies or companies to take
inappropriate, harmful and sometimes
unconstitutional actions against individuals, the
experts say.
Why Problems Persist
Improving the accuracy of computerized
information is especially difficult in those cases,
including the F.B.I. system, where many different
agencies operating under the direction of many
different authorities are allowed to enter data into a
central computer.
Because of ambiguities of Federal law and
the sensitivities of the states, the F.B.I. did not start
its auditing program until more than fifteen years
after the system first began operating.
The first round of official audits made public
by the F.B.I., involving five states, found enormous
variation in the validity and accuracy of the warrant
and vehicle information, including these examples:
* In a 10-day period in March, 13.2 percent
of a sample of reports placed in the F.B.I. system by
Alabama agencies were invalid because the
underlying warrants had been dismissed or otherwise
acted upon. Another 8.7 percent had incorrect
information about the height, weight and date of
birth of the wanted person. Such information is
essential to help police avoid arresting the wrong
person. Concerning stolen car reports, 5.8 percent
were found to be invalid or inaccurate.
* In Oregon, slightly more than 3 percent of
a sample of reports about wanted persons, 11 percent
of the reports on missing persons and 2.6 percent of
the reports on stolen cars submitted by
law-enforcement agencies were found to have
various flaws during a check in October of 1984.
* A sample of wanted person entries
submitted in September 1984 by agencies in
Wisconsin, however, found that each item checked
by the F.B.I. was accurate. For stolen cars, 2.5
percent of the reports were invalid or inaccurate.
Audits of reports from Idaho and Wyoming
were also released by the F.B.I. Those audits were
the first group to have been completed and reviewed
by the affected states since the formal auditing
program got underway.
Court Records Checked
Mr. Mitchell said that in a typical F.B.I.
audit, investigators would sample reports submitted
by agencies in a state and check their validity and
accuracy against the records maintained by local
courts and prosecutors. He said that after the new
program had been approved by the network's
advisory board in November 1978, several states
with what were believed to be very accurate records
volunteered for initial experimental audits. These
states were Colorado, Florida, Virginia and
Pennsylvania.
"So far we've had a lot of cooperation from
the states," he said.
In 1984, the F.B.I. audited 12 states. In
1985, the Bureau's audit staff so far has completed
six such examinations, has two under way and plans
to undertake five more by the end of the year.
The first public acknowledgment of the
existence of the audit program came several months
ago when F.B.I. Director William H. Webster
informed the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights that the bureau had initiated
"an auditing system that is intended to try to identify
the quality of performance" of the information being
transmitted among the states and to Federal
law-enforcment agencies via the bureau's network.
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In response to a question from
Representative Schumer, Mr. Webster told the
subcommittee the auditors had found that the records
provided by one city were of such poor quality that
the F.B.I. "wiped out thousands of files" it had
placed in the national system. But when
Representative Schumer asked for the name of the
city, Mr. Webster turned him down on the grounds
that he did not want to single out any single location
"for trouble."
The F.B.I.'s Alabama audit showed the
jurisdiction in that state to which Mr. Webster
referred was the Mobile Police Department. The
report said that in a special examination of all 453
wanted person reports provided the national system
at the time of the audit, 338 entries listed the a
height of "7 feet 11 inches, the weight as 499
pounds, the hair as XXX" and 288 entries listed
made-up dates of births like "01/01/ 10." The audit
offered no explanation as to why such figures were
entered.
Another general problem identified by the
F.B.I. in several states was the use of certain kinds
of information for improper purposes. Under Federal
rules, for example, information about the past arrests
of individuals is supposed to be made available only
to other law-enforcement agencies. The auditors,
however, found that in Alabama and several other
states officials were violating national policy by
using criminal history information for general
licensing purposes.
Copyright o 1985 by The New York Times
Company. Reprinted by permission.
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JUSTICES RULE REPEAT OFFENDERS CAN'T CHALLENGE
'CAREER-CRIMINAL' SENTENCES
Copyright 1994 The New York Times Company
The New York Times
May 24, 1994, Tuesday, Late Edition
Linda Greenhouse, Special to The New York Times
In a decision that has implications for the
"three strikes and you're out" provision in the crime
bill before Congress, the Supreme Court ruled today
that Federal defendants who face stiff minimum
sentences as repeat offenders cannot ordinarily
challenge the validity of the earlier convictions that
place them in the "career criminal" category of a
1984 sentencing law.
Defendants have a constitutional right to
raise new challenges only to those convictions
obtained in violation of the right to counsel, the
Court ruled in a 6-to-3 opinion by Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist. Failure to appoint a lawyer
for an indigent defendant is a "unique constitutional
defect" that should be treated differently from other
errors at trial, the majority said.
The dissenting Justices, in an opinion by
Justice David H. Souter, said that even defendants
who had a lawyer should still be able to challenge
the validity of their earlier convictions on other
constitutional grounds, like the lawyer's inadequacy
or the validity of a guilty plea.
The decision upheld a ruling by a Federal
appellate court in Richmond on a question that has
divided the lower courts. About half the appeals
courts had applied the limit the Court set today.
Other courts had permitted somewhat broader
challenges to earlier convictions.
Link to Crime Bill
The ruling today addressed only one Federal
law, the Armed Career Criminal Act, which provides
a mandatory 15-year sentence for a person with three
previous convictions who is then convicted of
owning or transporting a gun. But the decision's
reasoning would also apply to the crime bill now
before Congress, which provides for an automatic
life sentence upon conviction of a third major
Federal crime.
Chief Justice Rehnquist made it clear that
Congress was free to provide explicitly for
challenges to earlier convictions, as it did in one
commonly used narcotics law that imposes longer
sentences on multiple offenders. But the Armed
Career Criminal Act is silent on the question, as is
the "three strikes" provision of the crime bill.
The Chief Justice said that in the absence of
a Congressional statement to the contrary, need for
"finality" and the interest in "ease of administration"
argued for preventing defendants from reopening
long-ago convictions at a Federal sentencing hearing.
Such challenges "would require sentencing
courts to rummage through frequently nonexistent or
difficult to obtain state court transcripts or records
that may date from another era, and may come from
any one of the 50 states," he said.
Justice Souter disputed this analysis in his
dissenting opinion. "It would not be sentencing
courts that would have to do this rummaging," he
said, "but defendants seeking to avoid enhancement,
for no one disagrees that the burden of showing the
invalidity of prior convictions would rest on the
defendants."
Justice Souter said there was no reason to
address the constitutional question in this case
because the Armed Career Criminal Act, in his
view, implicitly permitted challenges to prior
convictions.
Copyright c 1994 by The New York Times
Company. Reprinted by permission.
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SUPREME COURT DEFINES 'DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE'
Copyright 1994 New York Law Publishing Company
New York Law Journal
July 19, 1994, Tuesday
Martin A. Schwartz
AT LONG LAST the United States Supreme
Court has provided a definition of the deliberate
indifference standard employed in Eighth
Amendment prison-condition cases. In Farmer v.
Brennan,' the Court ruled that the Eighth
Amendment claim of a transsexual prisoner, who had
been beaten and raped by an inmate, was governed
by the deliberate indifference standard. The Court
went on to hold that liability could be imposed on a
prison official for the deliberately indifferent denial
of "humane conditions of confinement" only if it is
shown that: "the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk of inmate health or safety; the official
must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.2
Justice David Souter wrote the unanimous
decision for the Court. Justice Blackmun, Stevens
and Thomas each wrote a separate concurring
opinion.
Deliberate indifference first appeared in the
Supreme Court's decisional law in 1976 in Estelle v.
Gamble as the governing standard for prisoner
Eighth Amendment medical treatment claims." In
Wilson v. Seiter? the Court in 1991 extended Estelle
by adopting the deliberate indifference standard for
all Eighth Amendment attacks on prison conditions.6
In addition, the Court in City of Canton v. Harris'
in 1989 ruled that deliberate indifference is the
controlling standard for §1983 municipal liability
claims based upon inadequate training.'
Nevertheless, although deliberate indifference has
governed a large and expanding universe of
prisoners' rights and other claims brought under
§1983,' the Supreme Court prior to Farmer "never
paused to define the meaning of the term deliberate
indifference.' . . .'10
The plaintiff, Dee Farmer, "who is serving
a federal sentence for credit card fraud, has been
diagnosed by medical personnel as a transsexual . .
."" Farmer has a feminine appearance. Federal
prison authorities follow a practice of incarcerating
preoperative transsexuals like Farmer with prisoners
of the same biological sex.12 In 1989 Farmer was
transferred for disciplinary reasons from a federal
correctional institute in Wisconsin to the federal
penitentiary in Terre Haute, Ind. * Farmer alleged
that shortly after the transfer she was beaten and
raped in her cell by another inmate."
Knowledge of Violent Environment'
Farmer's federal court complaint asserted an
Eighth Amendment Bivensl4 claim against various
federal prison officials. She alleged that defendants
transferred her to the Terre Haute penitentiary or
placed "her in its general population despite
knowledge that the penitentiary had a violent
environment and a history of inmate assaults, and
despite knowledge that . . . as a transsexual who
projects feminine characteristics' [Farmer] would be
particularly vulnerable to sexual attack by . . . Terre
Haute inmates. This allegedly amounted to a
deliberately indifferent failure to protect [Farmer's]
safety and thus a violation of [her] Eighth
Amendment rights."'1
The district court granted summary judgment
to the defendants, finding that they were not
deliberately indifferent because they had no actual
knowledge of the potential danger to Farmer.'" The
Seventh Circuit "summarily affirmed without
opinion. " The Seventh Circuit in prior decisions
had ruled that deliberate indifference requires a
"subjective standard of recklessness" requiring the
plaintiff to show that the prison officials had actual
knowledge of the threatened injury.'" By contrast,
the Third and Ninth circuits had ruled "that a prison
official is deliberately indifferent when he knows or
should have known of a sufficiently serious danger
to an inmate.' 9 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict.
But before tackling the definition of
deliberate indifference, it first had to be determined
whether prison officials may be held liable under the
Eighth Amendment for their deliberate indifference
to inmate safety. The Constitution generally does not
impose affirmative obligations upon government to
assist individuals in need, even if the government
knows that an individual is threatened with harm.'
However, since the state has deprived prisoners of
their physical liberty and of the means to protect
themselves, prison officials have an Eighth
Amendment obligation to provide inmates with the
necessities of life -- "adequate food, clothing, shelter
and medical care, and must take reasonable measures
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to guarantee the safety of the inmates.'" 21 This
includes the duty to protect prisoners from being
assaulted by other inmates.
Although this has been the position of the
lower federal courts and "assumed" in Supreme
Court decisional law,' Farmer marks the first time
the Court has actually held that the Eighth
Amendment imposes an affirmative duty to protect
inmates from being assaulted by other inmates.
Although prison violence is unfortunately
rampant," "gratuitously allowing the beating or
rape of one prisoner by another serves no legitimate
penological [objective]'" and is simply not part of
the criminal offender's punishment.'
Condition of Confinement
The Court in Farmer next resolved that in
cases arising out of an assault upon an inmate by
another inmate, deliberate indifference is in fact the
proper constitutional standard. Prisoners who allege
excessive force by prison guards must under the
Eighth Amendment demonstrate that force was
applied "maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm." This rigorous standard
was imposed because prison officials frequently must
make split second decisions to employ force in tense,
rapidly evolving situations. The right to be free from
assault by other inmates, however, is a "condition of
confinement," and Wilson v. Seiter' resolved that
deliberate indifference is the governing standard
under the Eighth Amendment for prison condition
claims.
Wilson identified two requirements that
prisoners have to satisfy in order to prevail on a
condition of confinement claim. First, it is necessary
to show that from an objective viewpoint the
prisoner suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation.
Additionally, it must be shown that the official had
a culpable state of mind, meaning that the official
was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's healthy or
safety.
However, as the Court in Farmer
acknowledged, it had never before "paused" to
explain the meaning of "deliberate indifference."
This is truly amazing given the myriad contexts in
which the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have employed the deliberate indifference
standard. If we expect first-year law school students
to define their terms, should not the Supreme Court
"pause" and do the same?
Nor can it be said that the Supreme Court
failed to define deliberate indifference because its
meaning is obvious. Far from it. It is unclear
whether literally an individual can be both deliberate
and indifferent at the same time. As the Seventh
Circuit observed, this "seeming oxymoron" has
given the courts fits: "How do we honor both the
"deliberate" and "indifferent" aspects?27
The Farmer Court said that deliberate
indifference lies somewhere between negligent
conduct and conduct engaged in "for the very
purpose of causing harm or with the knowledge that
harm will result." Deliberate indifference is fairly
equivalent to recklessness: "acting or failing to act
with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm . . . is the equivalent of recklessly
disregarding that risk."
Awareness of Risk
Although, as it turned out, equating
deliberate indifference with recklessness helped to
narrow the issue, it was not a cure-all because the
term reckless also "is not self defining."' Plaintiff
urged that deliberate indifference should be defined
by reference to civil law recklessness under which a
person is subject to liability if she acted or failed to
act "in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm
that is either known or so obvious that it should be
known." The defendants urged the adoption of
criminal law recklessness that requires a finding that
the defendant "[disregarded] a risk of harm of which
he is aware." The different in these two definitions
is reflected in the split in the circuits in defining
deliberate indifference.
The Supreme Court in Farmer adopted the
defendants' argument that deliberate indifference
under the Eighth Amendment requires a showing that
the official had actual knowledge of the risk of harm.
The official must (1) be actually "aware of facts
from which an inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of harm exists"; (2) actually draw the
inference; but (3) nevertheless disregard the risk to
the inmate's health or safety.
In adopting the actual knowledge
requirement, the Court stressed that the Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit cruel and unusual
conditions but only cruel and unusual punishments.
An official's failure to remedy a risk of harm that he
should have known about, but of which he had no
actual knowledge, cannot be considered punishment.
And, a purely objective definition of deliberate
indifference is inconsistent with the subjective prong
established inWilson v. Seiter.
City of Canton v. Harris4 did not call for
a different result. There, it will be recalled, the
Court adopted the deliberate indifference standard
for §1983 muncipal liability claims based upon
inadequate training. In doing so, the Court said that
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there may be situations in which "the need for more
or different training is so obvious, and the
inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of
constitutional rights, that the policymakers [were]
deliberately indifferent to the need." This is an
objective test pursuant to which municipal liability
may attach when the policymakers have actual or
constructive notice of the need to train." The
Farmer Court, however, found that because City of
Canton involved an interpretation of §1983, it did
not govern the Eighth Amendment issue.
Putting Farmer and City of Canton together,
then, results in two different meanings of deliberate
indifference. For purposes of §1983 municipal
liability training claims, an objective "obviousness"
definition controls; for Eighth Amendment prison
condition cases, a subjective actual knowledge test
governs. Prison officials thus cannot be held liable
under the Eighth Amendment based on a showing
that the risk was so obvious that a "reasonable
official would have noticed it."07
The actual knowledge test adopted in Farmer
does not require a showing that the official believed
that an inmate would be harmed. Nor is the
plaintiff's failure to warn prison officials
dispositive. And, a prison official cannot escape
liability because he did not know that the plaintiff
was likely to be assaulted "by the specific inmate
who eventually committed the assault."3
Justice Souter stressed that whether the
official had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of
harm is a question of fact. Moreover, this knowledge
may be inferred from "any relevant evidence,'
including the obviousness of the risk as, for
example, where rape and other assaults upon inmates
is pervasive. Thus, from evidence that the official
should have known about the risk, the trier may,
though need not, infer that he did know about it.4
On the other hand, prison officials may avoid
liability by showing (1) that they did not know about
the facts creating the danger, or, (2) that while they
knew of the facts, they mistakenly believed that there
was no substantial risk of harm, or, (3) that they
knew about the risk and responded reasonably to it.
The concurring opinions of Justices Harry
Blackmun and John Paul Stevens expressed their
continued disagreement with Wilson v. Seiter's
establishment of the subjective prong for Eighth
Amendment prison condition cases. In their view,
the focus should be on the harm to the prisoner, not
what the official intended. Justice Clarence Thomas'
concurring opinion reiterates his position that the
Eighth Amendment was intended to reach only the
criminal sentence, not prison conditions. He stated
sarcastically that in its "attempt to rectify . . .
unfortunate [prison] conditions, the Court further
refines the "National Code of Prison Regulations,"
otherwise known as the Cruel and Unusual
PUnishment Clause.4 1 Most notably, Justice
Antonin Scalia did not join him this time.
To recapitulate, when Farmer is read
together with prior Supreme Court decisional law,
the following emerges:
1. Although claims that prison guards used
excessive force are governed by the "maliciously and
sadistically for the purpose of causing harm"
standard, deliberate indifference governs prisoner
claims arising from assaults by other inmates.
2. Although deliberate indifference for
§1983 municipal liability training claims is defined
by reference to an objective "obviousness" -- actual
or constructive notice -- standard, for Eighth
Amendment prison condition (including inmate
assault) cases, deliberate indifference is defined by
reference to an actual knowledge standard.
3. To be liable under the Eighth Amendment
a prison official must have (a) known the facts from
which an inference of substantial risk of harm exists,
(b) actually drawn the inference, but (c) failed to
take reasonable steps to alleviate the risk.
4. The official's actual knowledge, however,
may be inferred from any relevant evidence,
including the obviousness of the risk of harm.
Martin A. Schwartz is a professor at the Touro
College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. He is
co-author, with John Kirklin, of Section 1983
Litigation: Claims, Defenses and Fees, Second
Edition (John Wiley and Sons, 1991).
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DEATH ROW'S LAWYER-LESS GET HELP FROM JUSTICES
Prisoners' Right To Counsel For Appeals Upheld
Copyright 1994 The Washington Post
The Washington Post
July 1, 1994, Friday, Final Edition
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
By one vote, the Supreme Court ruled
yesterday that federal judges can stop the scheduled
execution of a state prisoner to give the prisoner
time to obtain a lawyer and challenge the
constitutionality of the sentence.
The 5 to 4 decision, in the case of a Texas
inmate who came within minutes of execution last
year, undercuts efforts in some states to schedule
executions for inmates who have been unable to
adequately appeal their cases for lack of a lawyer.
The opinion was written by retiring Justice
Harry A. Blackmun, whose last day on the bench
was yesterday as the court ended its 1993-94 term.
After almost two decades of support for capital
punishment, Blackmun declared in February that he
believed the death penalty is unconstitutional and
vowed never again to send a prisoner to death.
Yesterday, he stressed the importance of "promoting
fundamental fairness in the imposition of the death
penalty."
Mandy Welch, who had argued the case on
behalf of convicted murderer Frank McFarland, said
the ruling was an acknowledgment that condemned
inmates have trouble finding competent lawyers to
file formal papers.
But Texas Attorney General Dan Morales
said the court's action will enable death row
prisoners to continue stalling their jury-imposed
sentences. "This decision could add another year to
the 10-year average that recent capital murderers
spend in the appellate process," Morales said.
At issue are prisoners' efforts to get lawyers
to help them prepare federal "habeas corpus"
petitions. Latin for "you have the body," a habeas
writ is used by a court to determine whether a
prisoner was constitutionally sentenced and lawfully
imprisoned.
Federal law does give condemned state
prisoners the right to a court-appointed, federally
paid lawyer for habeas corpus petition. But lawyers
in this complicated and typically thankless field are
hard to find. Texas particularly has struggled with a
shortage of lawyers. Welch, of the Texas Resource
Center, said about 60 of some 370 condemned
prisoners there currently lack representation.
At issue was whether federal judges can
intervene and grant a stay of execution for an inmate
who has not filed a petition for federal court review,
in part because no lawyer is available to file the
petition.
Texas officials had argued that because
McFarland had no habeas petition pending in a
federal court, a federal judge had no power to stay
his execution or to appoint a lawyer. The state
contended that a prisoner should not be entitled to
stop an execution unless the prisoner raises "a
substantial showing of" a constitutional violation in
formal papers.
Welch said a prisoner cannot sufficiently
allege any constitutional violation without the help of
a lawyer.
A federal trial judge denied McFarland's
request for a lawyer, shortly before his scheduled
execution, on the ground that no federal appeal
actually was pending. A federal appeals court agreed
that federal courts lack authority to intervene.
Less than an hour before he was to die last
Oct. 26, the Supreme Court stayed the execution.
Soon after, it agreed to hear his quandary.
Blackmun acknowledged that federal courts
cannot stop state proceedings unless federal law
expressly authorizes it. But he concluded that once
a condemned prisoner even asks for a lawyer, which
is explicitly allowed under federal law, the federal
court can stay a scheduled execution.
If a court were able only to appoint a
lawyer, "this appointment would have been
meaningless unless McFarland's execution also was
stayed," he said.
Joining Blackmun in McFarland v. Scott
were Justices John Paul Stevens, Anthony M.
Kennedy, David H. Souter and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg. Dissenting were Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor,
Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia.
o 1994. The Washington Post. Reprinted with
permission.
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COURT: TELL JURIES WHEN 'LIFE' MEANS NO PAROLE
THE RULING CASTS DOUBT ON SOME DEATH SENTENCES IN PA., S.C. AND VA. IT
FURTHER PROTECTS INMATES
Philadelphia Inquirer
Saturday June 18, 1994
Final Edition; National Section; Page A03
Aaron Epstein, Inquirer Washington Bureau
Expanding the concept of truth in
sentencing, the Supreme Court ruled yesterday that
defense lawyers seeking to prevent a death penalty
generally have a right to inform the jury when the
alternative of "life imprisonment" really means no
parole.
The 7-2 ruling casts doubt on the
constitutionality of some death sentences in three
states - Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Virginia -
and is expected to provoke new legal challenges to
death penalties in Texas, which leads all states in
death-row population. In reversing a death sentence
in a South Carolina murder case, the justices added
another constitutional protection to a long list of
safeguards against imposing the death penalty
unfairly.
That development led the dissenters -
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas to observe
with dismay: "The heavily outnumbered opponents
of capital punishment have successfully opened yet
another front in their guerrilla war to make this
unquestionably constitutional sentence a practical
impossibility." The new safeguard amounts to this:
Whenever life imprisonment without parole
is the only alternative to a death penalty, and the
prosecutor argues that a convicted murderer is so
dangerous to society that he must be executed, the
defense lawyer must be allowed to inform the jury
that the defendant is not eligible for parole.
Justice David H. Souter argued that the trial
judge be required to convey the truth to the jury, but
failed to muster a majority.
Based on the new constitutional requirement,
the justices ordered a new sentencing trial for
Jonathan Dale Simmons, who beat and sexually
assaulted three elderly women - including his
grandmother - and then beat a fourth to death in her
home in Columbia, S.C., in 1990.
Under South Carolina law, Simmons was
ineligible for parole. But neither his lawyer nor the
judge was allowed to inform the jury of that fact.
The prosecutor argued that Simmons would
remain a threat to society if not put to death. The
defense lawyer replied that Simmons' future
dangerousness was limited to elderly women, so
there was no reason to expect him to be violent in
prison.
While deliberating, the jury sent a note to
the judge inquiring: "Does the imposition of a life
sentence carry with it the possibility of parole?"
Replied the judge: "You are instructed not to
consider parole or parole eligibility in reaching your
verdict. . . . The terms life imprisonment and death
sentence are to be understood in their plain and
ordinary meaning." Twenty-five minutes later, the
jury condemned Simmons to death.
A Supreme Court majority concluded
yesterday that the jury's inability to get a straight
answer violated Simmons' constitutional right to due
process of law.
Simmons' death sentence could have been
founded on the jury's belief that he was eligible for
parole and would be dangerous to society if not
executed, wrote Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the high
court's only death-penalty opponent.
Most of the 26 states that provide for
imprisonment without release as an alternative to
execution require that juries be informed that a
defendant is ineligible for parole. But three states -
Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Virginia - refuse
to inform juries of that fact. There are 170 death-row
prisoners in Pennsylvania, 55 in South Carolina and
46 in Virginia.
Richard Dieter, executive director of the
Death Penalty Information Center, which opposes
capital punishment, said "the next battleground"
would be in Texas, where 386 of the nation's 2,848
Death Row inmates reside. Texas does not have a
life-without-parole alternative to capital punishment.
But it prevents juries from learning that life
imprisonment means a dangerous defendant cannot
be released on parole for at least 40 years. Defense
lawyers expect to argue that the reasoning of the
Simmons case should cover severely limited parole
in Texas.
Copyright Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. 1994;
Reprinted by permission:
Tribune Media Services.
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NOTHING PERFUNCTORY IN THIS REVIEW
Copyright 1994 Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.
The Phoenix Gazette
June 6, 1994 Monday, Final
Local news reports rather perfunctorily
noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has now agreed
to hear the case of Arizona v. Evans. But there is
nothing perfunctory about what the court did in this
case.
First, some background:
According to appellate court records, on
Dec. 13, 1990, a Phoenix justice of the peace issued
a misdemeanor warrant for the arrest of Isaac Evans
after he failed to appear for several traffic violations.
But six days later, Mr. Evans did appear before a
judge pro tempore and the judge quashed the
warrant. There was no indication in Mr. Evans'
justice court file, however, that, in keeping with
standard procedure, a justice court clerk called the
Sheriff's Office to notify them of the quashed
warrant. Neither are there records in the Sheriff's
Office indicating that a telephone call was made with
information that the Evans arrest warrant had been
quashed.
Subsequently, Officer Bryan Sargent stopped
Mr. Evans for driving the wrong way on a one-way
street on Jan. 5, 1991, and asked him for his driver's
license. Mr. Evans said he did not have a license,
because it had been suspended, and after conducting
a records search, Officer Sargent found that the
license had in fact been suspended - and that there
was a valid misdemeanor warrant for Mr. Evans'
arrest.
While making the arrest, Officer Sargent had
difficulty handcuffing Mr. Evans. He asked him to
relax one of his hands. When Mr. Evans did, he
dropped a marijuana cigarette. Officer Sargent and
another officer then searched the passenger
compartment of the car and found a bag of marijuana
under the passenger seat. The officers also found a
package of cigarettes, rolling papers, and marijuana
residue in the purse of a passenger in the Evans car.
On Jan. 8, 1991, prosecutors filed a
complaint against Mr. Evans, charging him with
possession of marijuana, a Class 6 felony. He
responded by seeking to suppress all evidence seized
from him that Jan. 5, and Judge I. Sylvan Brown of
Maricopa County Superior Court agreed that the
marijuana could not be used as evidence against him.
Prosecutors appealed and the Arizona Court
of Appeals reversed Judge Brown's ruling, arguing
the marijuana was, in fact, admissible evidence. Mr.
Evans then appealed and the Arizona Supreme
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Thomas A.
Zlaket earlier this year, invoked the exclusionary
rule, which prohibits the use of evidence produced
through illegal police conduct.
"This warrantless arrest, based entirely as it
was on an erroneous computer entry, was plainly
illegal," Justice Zlaket wrote. "The fact that the
arresting officer acted in good faith is irrelevant."
In a lone, eloquent dissent, Justice Frederick
J. Martone said he, too, was "concerned with the
loss of 'human liberty.' But the exclusionary rule
will not restore liberty to the innocent and should not
restore it to the guilty."
Justice Martone said, "the court assumes that
the exclusionary rule applies to all unlawful
searches. It does not. The exclusionary rule is a
'judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional
right of the party aggrieved.' "
Then he added, "Not even the court suggests
that the police officer could have done anything other
than arrest the defendant. It would have been
misfeasance to ignore the warrant."
The purposeless application of the
exclusionary rule, he argued, defeats the
truth-finding process, frees the guilty, and generates
disrespect for the law and the administration of
justice with no offsetting benefits.
Indeed, it seems to have been Justice
Martone's singular argument, his singular vote, upon
which the U.S. Supreme Court built its decision to
hear the case and render a ruling some time before
July 1, 1995.
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court annually
receives approximately 7,000 petitions to review
particular cases - but grants only 100 of them - and
inasmuch as the court is unlikely to have granted a
review just to affirm the Arizona Supreme Court's
unfortunate finding, Arizona v. Evans seems to be
anything but perfunctory.
Reprinted with permission.
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GUNS AND COMMERCE AND COURTS
Copyright 1994 News World Communications, Inc.
The Washington Times
April 24, 1994, Sunday, Final Edition
With the agreement of the U.S. Supreme
Court to consider an appeal of a lower federal court
ruling on the constitutionality of a congressional gun
control law, the country may be approaching the
moment of truth - or at least the moment of
determining opinion - on the little matter of whether
gun control is constitutional at all. Historically, the
court has not ruled very clearly on the issue. Now,
the Court may be about to point in a definite
direction.
The case the Court has agreed to hear is that
of United States v. Lopez, which grows out of a
1990 federal law banning the possession of firearms
within 1,000 feet of a school. Lopez was arrested
carrying a handgun within that radius and sentenced
to a six-month prison term in Texas.
The constitutional issue in the case so far has
less to do with the Second Amendment, which
confers a constitutional right to keep and bear arms,
than it does with the Constitution's commerce clause,
which gives Congress the authority to regulate
interstate commerce. The federal court ruling of
Judge William L. Garwood of the Fifth Circuit that
found the "Gun Free School Zones Act"
unconstitutional held that Congress failed to specify
adequately in the law that it intended to rely on the
commerce clause to pass the law at all.
The commerce clause, of course, is a
constitutional bog into which wholearmies of laws
have vanished. Since the Constitution forbids
Congress from exercising powers not explicitly
granted to it, only by invoking and expanding the
commerce clause have proponents of vastly expanded
federal power discovered the authority to do what
they want. In general, courts have upheld this use of
the clause, with the result that Congress now tends
to feel that it can do just about anything it pleases,
regardless of constitutional limits on its authority.
The Gun Free School Zones Act is an example,
whereby the national legislature takes it upon itself
to outlaw what private citizens may do with legally
owned property in jurisdictions under state and local
control.
As Judge Garwood describes it, "The Gun
Free School Zones Act extends to criminalize any
person's carrying of any unloaded shotgun, in an
unlocked pickup truck gun rack, while driving on a
country road that at one turn happens to come within
950 feet of the boundary of the grounds of a
one-room church kindergarten located on the other
side of a river, even during the summer when the
kindergarten is not in session."
There you have it. It is essential that we
find ways to keep guns out of the nation's schools,
but as with so many other laws passed by Congress,
the Gun Free School Zones Act is pretty much
feel-good eyewash, designed to make voters think
Congress is doing something about school violence,
yet it is drawn so broadly and carelessly that it is
both useless for that purpose and dangerous to real
civil liberties to boot.
Unlike most laws passed under the
commerce clause, this law has absolutely nothing to
do with commerce, let alone interstate commerce.
This law forbids possession of a firearm - not sale or
purchase of one - in certain areas, and it would seem
logical that by passing such a law regulating
possession, Congress is implying something about
the right of citizens to "keep and bear arms." What
it is implying is that there is no such right, or at
least that Congress has authority to restrict it. In
other words, we are really talking about the Second
Amendment, and if the Gun Free School Zones Act
is upheld as constitutional, then Congress has the
authority to restrict the right to keep and bear arms.
That, it can be and has been argued, is
dubious on any serious reading of the plain language
of the Second Amendment, on the original intent of
the Framers and on any common sense understanding
of the legal and cultural status of guns throughout
American history.
Reprinted from The Washington Times.
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93-1660 ARIZONA v. EVANS
Exclusionary rule-Search and seizure-Arrest
based on erroneous computer record-Good-faith
exception.
Ruling below (ArizSupCt, 866 P.2d 869, 62
LW 2456, 54 CrL 1373):
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies
to evidence obtained during search incident to
arrest based on erroneous computer record that
did not reflect that warrant for arrest of defend-
ant had been quashed; even assuming that error
in computer record was fault of court rather than
police, good-faith exception to exclusionary rule,
announced in U.S. v- Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
does not apply to situation in which no warrant
existed at all.
Question presented: In case in which evidence
has been seized incident to arrest based upon
police computer record of open warrant that had
actually been quashed 17 days earlier, does exclu-
sionary rule require suppression of evidence re-
gardless of whether police personnel or court
personnel were responsible for quashed warrant's
continued presence in police computer record?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/13/94, by Rich-
ard M. Romley, Cty. Atty. for Maricopa Cty.,
Ariz., and Gerald R. Grant, Chief of Appeals
Bureau.
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STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellant, v. ISAAC EVANS, Appellee.
Supreme Court No. CR-92-0228-PR
SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
177 Ariz. 201; 866 P.2d 869; 1994 Ariz. LEXIS 8; 156 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 40
January 13, 1994, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CR 91-663. Maricopa County No. CR-91-00513. Appeal
from the Superior Court of Maricopa County. The Honorable I. Sylvan Brown, Judge. Opinion of the Court
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1024 (Ct. App. 1992). Vacated
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED.
COUNSEL: Richard M. Romley, Maricopa County Attorney, by Gerald R. Grant, Deputy County Attorney,
Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellant State of Arizona.
Dean W. Trebesch, Maricopa County Public Defender, by James H. Kemper, Deputy Public Defender,
Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellee Evans.
JUDGES: ZLAKET, FELDMAN, MOELLER, CORCORAN, MARTONE
JUSTICE THOMAS A. ZLAKET
The court of appeals, with one judge
dissenting, held that the trial court abused its
discretion in granting defendant's motion to
suppress. State v. Evans, 172 Ariz. 314, 836 P.2d
1024 (Ct. App. 1992). We disagree and vacate the
appellate court's opinion.
Defendant was stopped for a traffic violation
on January 5, 1991. At the time, he had a suspended
driver's license. Neither of these offenses, however,
precipitated his eventual arrest. The police officer
testified at the suppression hearing that he would not
have placed defendant under arrest if a computerized
records check had not indicated the existence of an
outstanding misdemeanor arrest warrant in his name.
While making the arrest, the officer found
part of a marijuana cigarette on defendant's person.
A subsequent search of his vehicle revealed a bag of
marijuana hidden under the passenger seat.
Defendant was charged with possession, a class 6
felony.
The computerized record was in error. In
fact, the arrest warrant had been quashed by the
issuing justice court several weeks earlier. For some
reason, it was not expunged from the computer. At
the suppression hearing, there was conflicting
evidence concerning whether this mistake was caused
by the court staff or law enforcement employees.
The trial court apparently concluded that it made
little difference who was at fault. Relying on State v.
Greene, 162 Ariz. 383, 783 P.2d 829 (Ct. App.
1989), which applied the exclusionary rule where
police personnel were negligent in maintaining
computer records, the judge granted defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence seized during the
arrest. Thereafter, the state dismissed the charges
without prejudice and brought this appeal.
The court of appeals ruled that the evidence
should not have been suppressed. The majority
concluded that Greene did not apply because the
mistake here, more probably than not, was made by
justice court employees instead of law enforcement
personnel. The appeals court relied primarily on
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S. Ct. 2357,
41 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1974) and United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677
(1984) in holding that "the exclusionary rule is
intended to deter police misconduct and not to punish
errors of judges and magistrates," and therefore
should not have been utilized in this case. 172 Ariz.
at 317, 836 P.2d at 1027.1
We do not agree that the trial court abused
its discretion under the facts presented. We are
unable to follow the lead of the court of appeals in
dismissing conflicting inferences raised by evidence
on the issue of whether fault rested with the justice
court, the police, or both. See id. at 316 n.1, 836
P.2d at 1026 n.1. Testimony at the suppression
hearing failed to clearly establish whether a
telephone call from the court to the police, advising
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that the warrant had been quashed, was made but not
entered in the record, or was never made at all. The
trial judge was concerned about this gap in the
proof, as evidenced by his questions during the
hearing. He ultimately made no express finding with
respect to responsibility for the error, apparently
concluding that it did not matter. But even assuming,
as did the appellate court majority, that responsibility
for the error rested with the justice court, it does not
follow that the exclusionary rule should be
inapplicable to these facts.
Tucker is of little value here. In that case,
the court was dealing with alleged violations of the
5th, 6th and 14th amendments arising from the
failure of police to have given "Miranda warnings"
as part of an interrogation that antedated the decision
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct.
1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
Leon is also not helpful. There, officers
obtained evidence on the basis of a facially valid
search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. The
warrant was later held invalid because it had been
issued on an insufficient showing of probable cause.
Such a situation is distinguishable from one like this,
where no warrant at all was in existence at the time
of the arrest. See State v. Peterson, 171 Ariz. 333,
830 P.2d 854 (Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 121 L.
Ed. 2d 373, 113 S. Ct. 465 (1992); see also I
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(g) at 77
(1986). This warrantless arrest, based entirely as it
was on an erroneous computer entry, was plainly
illegal.
The state argues that the police could have
arrested defendant for various traffic violations, and
this inevitably would have resulted in the discovery
of the contraband. The record clearly establishes,
however, that no arrest would have occurred in the
absence of the flawed computer record. At most,
defendant would have received a traffic citation.
The "good faith" analysis advanced by the
state is of questionable application here. This case is
not about the motives of the police. The fact that the
arresting officer acted in good faith is irrelevant. 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.5(d) at 24
(1986); see also People v. Fields, 785 P.2d 611
(Colo. 1990). The arrest was not the result of "a
reasonable judgmental error" concerning facts which
might constitute probable cause. A.R.S. §
13-3925(C)(1). It was the result of negligent record
keeping. Whether the erroneous computer record
was the fault of police or justice court personnel
should be of no consequence even though, as we
have noted, evidence on this point was by no means
as clear as the state now suggests.
This is also not a case involving a mere
"technical violation." A.R.S. § 13-3925(C)(2).
Defendant was arrested on the basis of a nonexistent
warrant, not one that was "later invalidated due to a
good faith mistake." Id. See also United States v.
Whiting, 781 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1986) (summarily
rejecting extension of Leon's good faith exception to
warrantless searches).
We cannot support the distinction drawn by
the court of appeals and the dissent between clerical
errors committed by law enforcement personnel and
similar mistakes by court employees. We are
concerned here with the performance of purely
ministerial functions, not the exercise of judicial
discretion. While it may be inappropriate to invoke
the exclusionary rule where a magistrate has issued
a facially valid warrant (a discretionary judicial
function) based on an erroneous evaluation of the
facts, the law, or both, Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.
Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), it is useful and
proper to do so where negligent record keeping (a
purely clerical function) results in an unlawful arrest.
Such an application will hopefully serve to improve
the efficiency of those who keep records in our
criminal justice system.
The dissent laments the "high costs" of the
exclusionary rule, and suggests that its application
here is "purposeless" and provides "no offsetting
benefits." Such an assertion ignores the fact that
arrest warrants result in a denial of human liberty,
and are therefore among the most important of legal
documents. It is repugnant to the principles of a free
society that a person should ever be taken into police
custody because of a computer error precipitated by
government carelessness. As automation increasingly
invades modern life, the potential for Orwellian
mischief grows. Under such circumstances, the
exclusionary rule is a "cost" we cannot afford to be
without.'
Even assuming that deterrence is the
principal reason for application of the exclusionary
rule, we disagree with the court of appeals that such
a purpose would not be served where carelessness by
a court clerk results in an unlawful arrest. It also
seems to us an anomalous rule, indeed, that would
prohibit the use of evidence illegally seized pursuant
to the clerical error of a police department clerk, but
would permit it if the same mistake was made
instead by a court clerk.
We hold that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion, and we vacate the court of appeals'
opinion.
THOMAS A. ZLAKET, Justice
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CONCURRING: STANLEY G. FELDMAN, Chief
Justice; JAMES MOELLER, Vice Chief Justice;
ROBERT J. CORCORAN, Justice
MARTONE, Justice, dissenting.
The court concludes that "whether the
erroneous computer record was the fault of police or
justice court personnel should be of no consequence
.... " Ante, at 5. Thus today the court holds that
the exclusionary rule serves to deter judicial error as
well as police misconduct. This proposition is
directly contrary to United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984).
Because I cannot agree with the court's expansion of
the exclusionary rule, I dissent.
The court assumes that the exclusionary rule
applies to all unlawful searches. It does not. The
exclusionary rule is a "judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.
Ct. 613, 620, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1972). Its
application "has been restricted to those areas where
its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served." State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 667, 832
P.2d 593, 684 (1992), quoting Calandra, 414 U.S.
at 348, 94 S. Ct. at 620. Specifically, "the rule's
primary purpose is to deter future unlawful police
conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures." Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347, 94 S. Ct.
at 619-20 (emphasis added). Thus the range of
application of the exclusionary rule is narrower than
the range of unlawful searches.
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104
S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), the Court
considered whether the exclusionary rule served to
deter judicial as well as police misconduct. In
concluding that it did not, the Court stated:
Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to
the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial
officers, they have no stake in the outcome
of particular criminal prosecutions. The
threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected
significantly to deter them. Imposition of the
exclusionary sanction is not necessary
meaningfully to inform judicial officers of
their errors, and we cannot conclude that
admitting evidence obtained pursuant to a
warrant while at the same time declaring
that the warrant was somehow defective will
in any way reduce judicial officers'
professional incentives to comply with the
Fourth Amendment, encourage them to
repeat their mistakes, or lead to the granting
of all colorable warrant requests.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 917, 104 S. Ct. at 3417-18. The
Court held the exclusionary rule inapplicable when
police officers act in objectively reasonable good
faith on a warrant later invalidated due to judicial
error because "penalizing the officer for the
magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth
Amendment violations." Id. at 921, 104 S. Ct. at
3419.
This case falls squarely within the rule of
Leon. The police officer who stopped defendant
found an outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest
when he ran a customary computer check. He
arrested defendant and found marijuana during the
search incident to the arrest. The computer gave no
indication that the warrant was invalid. The evidence
suggests that a justice court clerk failed to contact
police department employees to inform them that the
warrant had in fact been quashed. The police
department was not responsible for the error. The
officer arrested defendant in good faith on a facially
valid warrant. Indeed, not even the court suggests
that the police officer could have done anything other
than arrest the defendant. It would have been
misfeasance to ignore the warrant.
The court believes that Leon is
distinguishable because the officers in Leon relied on
a facially valid warrant while here "no warrant at all
was in existence at the time of the arrest." Ante, at
5. But the officer relied upon facially valid computer
information. When the computer shows an
outstanding arrest warrant, the officer is expected to
make an arrest. He is in the same position as one
who holds an arrest warrant in his hand. It makes no
difference whether, after issuance, a warrant is
quashed or otherwise invalid. In both cases the
warrant is without effect, yet it appears to the officer
to be facially valid. In either case, Leon controls.
The court also concludes that applying the
exclusionary rule is proper here because a court
employee, and not a judge, committed error. But
what does it matter? The exclusionary rule applies to
police misconduct, not judicial department error.
Finally, the court concludes that the police
cannot advance a "good faith" argument because the
arrest was not a "reasonable judgmental error" as
defined in A.R.S. § 13-3925. Section 13-3925 is
wholly inapplicable to this case. It expressly
addresses the exclusion of evidence "because of the
conduct of a peace officer in obtaining the
evidence." A.R.S. § 13-3925(A) (emphasis added).
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Here, the conduct of the arresting officer is not
challenged. Moreover, § 13-3925 was added to the
criminal code in 1982 to provide a statutory good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The United
States Supreme Court sanctioned the good faith
exception in 1984 when it decided Leon. After Leon,
we held "that the exclusionary rule to be applied as
a matter of state law is no broader than the federal
rule." State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 269, 689 P.2d
519, 528 (1984). Because our exclusionary rule
cannot be narrower than the federal rule, and
because we have held it to be no broader, we do not
read into § 13-3925(A) that which is not required by
the federal rule.
Leon requires us to determine who is
responsible for error before applying the
exclusionary rule. This is true for errors on police
car computers.' Both divisions of our court of
appeals recognize that the exclusionary rule is
properly limited to police misconduct.4 Today's
decision, holding that the source of error is
irrelevant, is a major departure from state and
federal law. If it is not clear whether the police or
court employees were responsible for the error, we
should remand for findings on this issue. We cannot
conclude that a dispositive issue is irrelevant.
To be sure, we should like to minimize
computer error.5 But the way to do this is through
education, training and rigorous standards. We limit
the exclusionary rule to police misconduct because
its costs are so high. "Highly probative and often
conclusive evidence of a criminal defendant's guilt is
withheld from the trier of fact." Duckworth v.
Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 208, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2882,
106 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Its purposeless application defeats the
truthfinding process, frees the guilty, and generates
disrespect for the law and the administration of
justice with no offsetting benefits. Atwood, 171
Ariz. at 667, 832 P.2d at 684.
I, too, am concerned with the loss of
"human liberty." Ante, at 6. But the exclusionary
rule will not restore liberty to the innocent and
should not restore it to the guilty. I dissent.
Frederick J. Martone, Justice
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held that the exclusionary rule was proper because "the
situation in the instant case reflects a matter within the
responsibility and control of police authorities who failed to
update their records to accurately reflect defendant's current
status." Id. at 1306.
4. In State v. Peterson, 171 Ariz. 333, 830 P.2d 854, our
court of appeals, Division 1, held that the exclusionary rule
was a proper remedy to deter computer error when "any
mistake was that of the police." Id. at 340, 830 P.2d at 861.
Division 2 also decided the exclusionary rule was properly
applied to suppress evidence found incident to an arrest
caused by computer error if the error was caused by the
police. State v. Greene, 162 Ariz. 383, 783 P.2d 829 (App.
1989). The court stated, "if police misconduct, whether it be
negligent or deliberate, caused or contributed to the arrest
notation being in the computer system, the police department
would be responsible for not keeping its computer entries up
to date." Id. at 384, 783 P.2d at 830. Thus the divisions are
not in conflict on this issue.
5. Today we deal with computer error, not intentional
misconduct. That "mischief," ante, at 6, is far more likely to
be deterred by the threat of a civil action for damages than by
the exclusion of evidence.
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93-1736 PUGH v. ILLINOIS
Guilty pleas-Effective assistance of counsel-
Erroneous advice concerning eligibility for death
penalty.
Ruling below (Ill SupCt, 157 Ill.2d 1, 623
N.E.2d 255):
Trial counsel's mistaken belief that conviction
of felony murder automatically made defendant
eligible for death penalty without finding of in-
tent of kill, which led counsel to advise defendant
to enter pleas of guilty to all counts of indictment
charging knowing and intentional murder, rob-
bery, and other offenses, did not prejudice de-
fendant at guilt phase of proceedings in light of
facts that, after accepting plea, trial court vacat-
ed judgment of guilt on knowing and intentional
murder count and entered judgment of guilt on
felony murder count, and intent to commit mur-
der is not element of felony murder count on
which defendant stands convicted; accordingly,
trial court did not err in denying defendant's
motion to withdraw guilty pleas on grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel; judgment of
guilt as to felony murder is affirmed, but his
death sentence is vacated and new hearings on his
eligibility for death sentence and on appropriate
sentence are ordered.
Questions presented: (1) Can state deprive de-
fendant of his right to trial when his guilty plea is
entered without any consideration in sentence
and is based upon trial counsel's erroneous advice
as to law? (2) Should this court's decision in
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), be
expanded to uphold plea when there is no consid-
eration in terms of sentencing or charges in re-
turn for plea and defendant maintains his inno-
cence to most serious of charges? (3) Is
all-or-nothing guilty plea to charges, entered into
due to misadvice by trial counsel and under
misapprehension of law, voluntary under Sixth
Amendment when defendant received no consid-
eration in terms of charges to which he pleaded or
sentence he received and protested his innocence
to most serious charges at sentencing hearing?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/28/94, by John
P. Buckley, Douglas R. Johnson, and Coflield,
Ungaretti & Harris, all of Chicago, Ill.
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JUSTICE NICKELS delivered the opinion of the
court:
On January 20, 1987, defendant, Willie C.
Pugh, Jr., was charged by indictment in Cook
County with two counts of murder (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1985, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2)), two counts of
felony murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par.
9-1(a)(3)), one count of armed robbery (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 18-2(a)), two counts of
forcible detention (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par.
10-4(a)(1)), one count of unlawful use of a weapon
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 24-1(a)(7)), and
three counts of aggravated unlawful restraint (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 10-3.1(a)). Defendant
subsequently entered blind pleas of guilty to all
counts. The trial court accepted defendant's guilty
pleas and entered findings of guilt on all counts.
Finding that certain counts merged with others, the
trial court entered judgment on felony murder (count
IV), armed robbery (count V), forcible detention
(counts VI and VII), and unlawful use of weapons
(count VIII). Defendant's convictions for intentional
and knowing murder were vacated. Defendant
waived his right to a jury at his death penalty
hearing. Defendant stipulated to his eligibility for the
death penalty. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par.
9-1 (b)(6).) After hearing evidence in aggravation and
mitigation, the court sentenced defendant to death on
the felony-murder conviction and to terms of
imprisonment on the remaining convictions.
Defendant's death sentence has been stayed pending
direct review by this court (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,
§ 4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rules 603, 609(a)).
Defendant raises the following issues on
appeal: (1) whether his guilty plea was involuntary
by reason of ineffective assistance of counsel; (2)
whether his guilty plea was involuntary due to his
inability to understand; (3) whether his claim of
accidental shooting during the sentencing hearing
indicated his plea was not voluntary; (4) whether the
finding of death penalty eligibility must be vacated
because he received ineffective assistance of counsel;
(5) whether the finding of death penalty eligibility
must be vacated due to insufficient admonishments;
(6) whether he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at all phases of the proceedings due to
defense counsel's failure to conduct a reasonable
investigation; (7) whether he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel; (8) whether the trial court
erred in refusing to consider additional evidence in
mitigation; (9) whether the death sentence is
excessive in his case; and (10) whether the death
penalty statute is unconstitutional.
As part of the factual basis for the pleas, the
State recited the proposed testimony of two South
Chicago Heights police officers. Sergeant Richard
Wolff would testify that at about 9:30 p.m. on
December 16, 1986, he proceeded to the Clark gas
station located at 2601 Chicago Road in South
Chicago Heights in response to a radio dispatch of
an alarm at the station. Upon entering the station,
Wolff saw defendant standing behind a counter and
next to a man, later identified as 19-year-old Brian
Douglas. Defendant pulled out a sawed-off shotgun
and pointed it at Wolff and then at Douglas.
Defendant said, "Don't push me, I want out."
Douglas indicated he was being robbed. Wolff
holstered his own revolver and told defendant not to
shoot anyone.
Officer Michael Haskins entered the station
and both he and Wolff told defendant not to shoot
and to let Douglas go. While holding Douglas with
one hand and the shotgun in the other, defendant
walked Douglas out of the front door toward 26th
Street. Defendant ordered Haskins and Wolff to stay
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inside the station. Wolff called for a backup. The
officers yelled to defendant to let Douglas go and the
officers would not follow him.
Wolff stayed in the station and Haskins
pursued defendant, who was walking around the
corner of the service station near a telephone booth.
Defendant had turned westward on 26th Street.
When defendant stopped, Haskins was about 100 feet
from him. Haskins observed defendant move about
1 1/2 steps backwards from Douglas, lower the
shotgun and fire a shot into Douglas' chest area.
Douglas was pronounced dead from the gunshot
wound at 10:20 p.m. Haskins chased defendant about
100 feet before losing him when defendant turned the
corner at 120 West 26th Street.
In an area southwest of the station, Wolff
found a purple school jacket with "Central" in white
lettering on the back. In the jacket sleeves he found
three cartons of cigarettes identified as property from
the gas station.
The victim's mother, Loretta Douglas,
would testify that the purple jacket belonged to her
son. She would also testify as a life-and-death
witness for Douglas. Haskins would testify that upon
entering the station he observed another male, later
identified as Ingram Rush, exit the station carrying
a coat similar to the one Wolff found. Anthony Sapit
of the Cook County sheriff's department would
testify that he took defendant into custody about
three quarters of a block west of Chicago Road at
26th Street.
Detective Larry Dujsik and Assistant State's
Attorney John Murphy would testify regarding
defendant's statement made about 4:15 a.m. on
December 17, 1986. After waiving his Miranda
rights, defendant said that Ingram Rush was the
"setup" man who was to distract the store attendant.
As Rush talked to Douglas, defendant picked up
some chips and soda pop. Defendant went to the
cash register, pulled out a gun and told Douglas to
give defendant the money and no one would get
hurt. Defendant saw Douglas push the alarm button.
Defendant said that when the police arrived he told
them to stay there. Defendant left the store with
Douglas, but had to tell the police to get back inside
the station.
Defendant said that he had the gun pointed
at the store as he walked with Douglas. Initially,
defendant said two other men were involved in the
crime and one of them shot Douglas. Defendant
changed this part of his statement and said only Rush
and he were involved. Defendant admitted shooting
Douglas and stated, "The gun went off while it was
in my hand."
Dujsik was directed by defendant to the
shotgun, a spent casing and a hat. The shotgun had
been dismantled-one part had been hidden under
some leaves and another part had been placed in a
car trunk. Testimony from a forensic expert, Karen
Vander Werff, would indicate the shell came from
the shotgun and pellets from Douglas' body were
consistent with being fired from the shotgun. State
testing showed the trigger pull was normal to
medium-heavy. Autopsy results would show Douglas
died from a gunshot wound to his chest about five
inches to the right of the midline.
Before the factual basis was presented, the
trial judge admonished defendant of the effects of his
guilty plea. Defense counsel frequently referred to
"technical" pleas of guilty until the trial judge
advised counsel that he did not know what a
"technical" plea was. At one point defendant stated
with respect to his right to remain silent, "Yes, I
understand, but I would like to testify in my own
behalf." Defendant's attorney then told the court,
"Phase 3." The judge later questioned defendant
regarding the voluntariness of his, pleas. The judge
noted the charges against defendant, including the
fact that the State would be seeking the death penalty
under section 9-1(b) (6) of the Criminal Code of 1961
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)). The
judge recited the provisions of section 9-1(b)(6) and
defendant acknowledged that he understood.
Following the recitation, defendant agreed that the
asserted facts were true. The trial judge accepted
defendant's guilty pleas and adjudged defendant
guilty of those offenses previously enumerated.
The trial judge moved immediately to the
first phase of the death penalty hearing, eligibility.
The assistant State's Attorney indicated that this
phase would be by way of stipulation. Then, the
following exchange occurred:
"MR. SIMMONS [Assistant State's
Attorney]: Judge, it will be stipulated that
the Court take judicial notice of the findings
of the blind plea that was just entertained by
the Court as to the murder, and the felonies
that the court entered judgment on. And it
would also be a stipulation between the
parties that the defendant is twenty-two
years of age at this time or twenty-one.
DEFENDANT: Twenty-two.
MR. SIMMONS: Twenty-two years of age.
THE COURT: So stipulated, Counsel?
MR. RAGO [Defense attorney]: So
stipulated.
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THE COURT: You understand what that
stipulation is?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right, the Court will find
the defendant eligible for the death penalty."
Aggravating and mitigating evidence was
presented in the second phase of the death penalty
hearing a few days later. In aggravation Officer
Haskins elaborated on his stipulated testimony
presented at the guilt phase. Particularly, he
described how defendant released Douglas, took
about two steps to the side, lowered the shotgun, put
his other hand under the stock and, about four
seconds later, shot Douglas. Officer Dujsik's
testimony and the stipulated testimony of Assistant
State's Attorney John Murphy showed that defendant
did not indicate, nor did it appear, that he was under
the influence of drugs or alcohol when he gave his
statements in the early morning hours of December
17, 1986. The State also presented the stipulated
testimony of Officers Wolff and Sapit, and Karen
Vander Werff.
Witnesses presenting mitigating evidence
included defendant's high school counselor, a family
friend, the probation officer who prepared the
pretrial investigation report, defendant's parents, and
defendant. Other than defendant, no other witnesses
testified regarding defendant's alcohol problem.
Defendant testified that he did not intend to kill
Douglas, but the gun discharged when defendant
turned away to run. He said he had been drinking all
day on December 16, 1986, and had smoked
marijuana laced with PCP. Defendant expressed
remorse over his actions. The pretrial investigation
report showed defendant had no juvenile or adult
criminal record. He completed 12 years of school
and had been employed from 1983 until December
1986. Defendant indicated in the report that he
consumed alcohol all day on December 16, 1986. He
said he drank 10 quarts of beer and a pint of gin
daily, but denied having an alcohol problem.
Additionally, defendant's mother collected over 200
signatures and over 20 letters asking for mercy for
defendant.
The trial judge sentenced defendant to death
on the felony-murder conviction, having vacated
defendant's convictions for intentional and knowing
murder, and imposed prison sentences on the
remaining convictions. The judge noted the lack of
corroborating evidence regarding defendant's alcohol
problem. A motion for reconsideration of sentence
was filed on January 21, 1988. Defendant filed a
motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and a request
for appointment of counsel other than the public
defender on February 18, 1988, alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel. Defendant's attorney
(hereinafter defense counsel) filed a motion to
withdraw on February 18,1988, which was granted
and new counsel was substituted.
On August 26, 1988, new counsel
(hereinafter post-trial counsel) filed motions for a
deposition and for production of the gun and access
to the crime lab for testing. These motions were
denied. Counsel filed a motion on September 13,
1988, for a physical examination of defendant; an
amended motion to vacate the convictions; an
amended motion to withdraw the guilty pleas; and an
amended motion for reconsideration of the sentences.
In general, it was alleged that defendant received
ineffective assistance of counsel in entering his plea
of guilty because his attorney did not understand that
in order for defendant to be eligible for the death
penalty for felony murder, defendant must have
intended to kill the victim; counsel failed to
investigate; and the trial court failed to properly
admonish defendant. Defendant presented the
September 23, 1988, affidavit of defense counsel in
support of defendant's motion to vacate his plea. The
affidavit provided that defendant consistently told
defense counsel that defendant did not intend to kill
Douglas, and the shooting was an accident. Defense
counsel advised defendant to plead guilty to the
indictment because he believed that a finding of
felony murder by itself was sufficient to render
defendant eligible for the death penalty. Defense
counsel also entered into the stipulation at the
eligibility phase of the death penalty hearing based
on this belief. He advised defendant not to challenge
the State's factual presentation or to oppose
stipulations in the first two phases, and to testify
only at phase III. Defense counsel would not have
advised defendant to enter a plea to the indictment
and further would not have entered into the
stipulation if he had realized that felony murder by
itself was insufficient for the death penalty.
Defendant's separate affidavit of November 4, 1988,
corroborated defense counsel's statements. The trial
court denied the motions.
In seeking to vacate the convictions,
post-trial counsel argued that there was a large
amount of mitigating evidence which defense counsel
failed to investigate. It was also argued that evidence
existed which would have raised a reasonable doubt
on defendant's eligibility for the death penalty as
well as affected the evidence in aggravation at
sentencing. When the trial court denied the motion,
defendant's post-trial counsel filed an offer of proof.
The offer of proof contained the proposed testimony
of defendant's defense counsel which indicated that
defendant had told him the gun trigger mechanism
may have been sensitive or defective and that
175
defendant was drunk at the time of the crime.
Defense counsel did not contact any person who
signed the petition, or any of 26 character witnesses
provided by defendant's mother, and only contacted
three of the 24 persons who wrote letters. He did not
obtain police photographs of the crime scene, nor did
he interview Officers Haskins or Wolff. Although
defendant had difficulty in paying attention, defense
counsel did not have him examined by a doctor.
The offer of proof included the proposed
testimony of five witnesses regarding defendant's
intoxicated state on December 16, 1986, three of
whom saw him that night. Mitigating evidence of
defendant's physical problems, defendant's mental
deficiencies, and other circumstances affecting
defendant preceding the crime were included in the
offer.
A second motion to withdraw the plea was
filed on December 2, 1988, wherein defendant
alleged that his plea was not voluntary due to deficits
in the cognitive areas of memory, attention and
concentration. The affidavit of clinical psychologist
Dr. Suraleah Michaels, attached thereto, indicated
she interviewed defendant on several occasions,
tested defendant, and reviewed the transcript of the
January 11, 1988, plea hearing. In her opinion
defendant's ability to understand and comprehend the
charges and admonitions was materially impaired.
Subsequent motions filed on June 1, 1989,
to vacate the death sentence based on the
unconstitutionality of the death penalty statute and
for a new sentencing hearing were denied. This
appeal followed.
First, defendant contends he received
ineffective assistance of counsel in entering his guilty
plea because defense counsel did not understand that
in addition to proving felony murder, the State also
had to prove defendant's intent to kill in order that
defendant be eligible for the death penalty. Based on
this misapprehension of the law, defense counsel
advised defendant to enter a blind plea of guilty to
the entire indictment which included intentional and
knowing murder counts (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38,
pars. 9-l(a)(1), (a)(2)). As a result defendant
contends his plea must be vacated because it was not
made voluntarily and intelligently.
The State initially responds to defendant's
claim by arguing that defense counsel did not
misapprehend the law, as evidenced by a motion to
preclude the death penalty filed on February 27,
1987. In that motion defense counsel claimed that
under Enmund v. Florida (1982), 458 U.S. 782, 73
L. Ed. 2d 1140, 102 S. Ct. 3368, involving felony
murder, defendant could not be sentenced to death
unless the State proved defendant intended to kill the
person who was killed. Claiming the motion and
defense counsel's affidavit are in direct
contradiction, the State makes the serious charge that
defense counsel is guilty of unethical behavior by
attempting to interject potentially reversible error
into the plea proceeding, a charge we reject in our
later discussion.
Assuming defense counsel did not
misapprehend the law, the State then claims that
defense counsel's advice was merely reasonable
strategy based upon the law and facts. According to
the State, the evidence of defendant's intent to kill or
knowledge that his conduct created a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(b)) was so
overwhelming that defendant's only hope was to
enter a blind guilty plea and throw himself on the
mercy of the court. When this calculated and
informed risk failed, the State contends, defense
counsel filed the affidavit.
The State cites Stewart v. Peters (7th Cir.
1992), 958 F.2d 1379, in support of its argument
that defendant's blind plea was only an attempt to
seek the mercy of the court. However, in Stewart,
the attorney was not operating under a
misapprehension of law, and the record established
that the plea was a calculated and informed risk that
failed.
Whether to permit a guilty plea to be
withdrawn is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. (People v. Hillenbrand (1988), 121 Ill. 2d
537, 545, 521 N.E.2d 900.) Such discretion should
be exercised liberally, particularly in capital cases,
in favor of life and liberty. (People v. King (1953),
1 Ill. 2d 496, 500, 116 N.E.2d 623.) When it
appears that the guilty plea was entered on a
misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or in
consequence of misrepresentations by counsel, or the
case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the
accused or where the accused has a defense worthy
of consideration by a jury or where the ends of
justice will be better served by submitting the case to
the jury, the court should permit withdrawal of the
guilty plea. (People v. Johnson (1993), 154 Ill. 2d
356, 361-62, 609 N.E.2d 294; People v. Morreale
(1952), 412 Ill. 528, 531-32, 107 N.E.2d 721.) A
defendant may enter a guilty plea because of some
erroneous advice by his counsel, but this fact alone
does not destroy the voluntary nature of the plea.
(People v. Correa (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 541, 548-49,
485 N.E.2d 307.) The resolution of the question of
whether the defendant's pleas, made in reliance on
counsel's advice, were voluntarily, intelligently, and
knowingly made depends on whether the defendant
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had effective assistance of counsel. Correa, 108 Ill.
2d at 549.
The proper standard for determining whether
defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel
in entering his guilty plea is set forth in Hill v.
Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 57, 88 L. Ed. 2d
203, 209, 106 S. Ct. . 366, 369-70. In Hill the
United States Supreme Court found that the two-part
test announced in Strickland v. Washington (1984),
466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims was
applicable to the plea process. (People v. Jones
(1991), 144 Ill. 2d 242, 254, 579 N.E.2d 829.) This
court has adopted the standard. (Jones, 144 Ill. 2d at
254; People v. Huante (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 61, 67-68,
571 N.E.2d 736.) To establish that a defendant was
deprived of effective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must establish both that his attorney's
performance was deficient and that the defendant
suffered prejudice as a result. Hill, 474 U.S. at 57,
88 L. Ed. 2d at 209, 106 S. Ct. at 369; Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at
2064; Huante, 143 Ill. 2d at 67-68.
In order to satisfy the "prejudice"
requirement in a plea proceeding, the defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial. (Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 210, 106
S. Ct. at 370.) The instant defendant argues that the
second prong of the Strickland standard has been met
herein as evidenced by defense counsel's and
defendant's attestations that defendant would not
have entered a guilty plea but for counsel's error.
The State correctly points out that under Hill, the
question of whether the error prejudiced the
defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than
to go to trial depends in large part on a prediction of
whether the defendant likely would have succeeded
at trial. (Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 210,
106 S. Ct. at 370-71; Jones, 144 Ill. 2d at 254-55;
see Huante, 143 Ill. 2d at 73.) The record should
demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that but for
the error, the defendant would have rejected the plea
arrangement. (See Huante, 143 Ill. 2d at 73.) As
under Strickland, we need not determine whether
counsel's performance was deficient before
examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as
a result of the alleged deficiencies. See People v.
Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 527, 473 N.E.2d
1246.
The State contends that defendant was not
prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to advise
defendant to proceed to trial on a theory of accident
because the likelihood that defendant would have
been acquitted on the intentional and knowing
murder counts is infinitesimal. The State dismisses
the additional evidence that post-trial counsel found
upon his investigation as either irrelevant or not
credible. The State also claims that accident, even if
proved, is not a defense to felony murder. People v.
Allen (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 536, 309 N.E.2d 544.
Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by
defense counsel's misapprehension of the law
because he pleaded guilty to intentional and knowing
murder, thus establishing the statutory aggravating
factors necessary for death penalty eligibility. He
claims that had his theory of accident been presented
at a trial, a reasonable doubt of his guilt would have
existed as to the intentional and knowing murder
counts.
We need not address whether defendant was
prejudiced with respect to his guilty pleas to
intentional and knowing murder because those
convictions were vacated by the trial court. When
multiple murder convictions have been entered for
the same act, the less culpable convictions must be
vacated. (People v. Pitsonbarger (1990), 142 Ill. 2d
353, 377, 568 N.E.2d 783.) Although an intentional
killing involves the more culpable mental state than
knowing and felony murder (People v. Mack (1984),
105 Ill. 2d 103, 137, 473 N.E.2d 880), the trial
court herein vacated the convictions for intentional
and knowing murder. The State has raised no error
with respect to the trial court's ruling. Therefore,
defendant stood convicted of only the felony murder
when the hearing to determine death sentence
eligibility began.
Defendant does not claim that he would have
succeeded at trial on a theory of accident with
respect to the felony-murder count. In his reply
brief, defendant concedes that accident is not a
defense to felony murder. (Allen, 56 Ill. 2d at
544-45.) Thus, even if defense counsel had presented
defendant's theory of accident at a trial on felony
murder, defendant would not have been acquitted of
that offense. Defendant suffered no prejudice at the
guilt phase of the proceedings due to defense
counsel's misapprehension of law. Defendant's plea
of guilty to felony murder stands.
We turn now to the sentencing phase of the
proceeding. Our first inquiry is whether defense
counsel's performance was deficient in that it "fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness."
(Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693,
104 S. Ct. at 2064; Huante, 143 Ill. 2d at 68.) The
standard for reasonableness in guilty plea cases
"'depends *** not on whether a court would
retrospectively consider counsel's advice to be right
or wrong, but whether that advice was within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in
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criminal cases."' Huante, 143 Ill. 2d at 68-69,
quoting McMann v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S.
759, 770-71, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763, 773, 90 S. Ct.
1441, 1448-49.
Defense counsel was incorrect in his belief
that defendant was eligible for the death penalty
based solely on a finding of felony murder. An
essential element which the State must prove besides
the felony murder is a culpable (intentional or
knowing) mental state. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38,
par. 9-1(b)(6)(b); People v. Ramey (1992), 151 Ill.
2d 498, 545, 603 N.E.2d 519.) The statutory
aggravating factor relied on in this case as the basis
for imposition of the death penalty is a narrow form
of the felony-murder rule. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch.
38, par. 9-1 (b)(6)(b); People v. King (1986), 109
M. 2d 514, 542, 488 N.E.2d 949.) To establish this
factor, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(f); see
Ramey, 151 111. 2d at 544) that the defendant acted
with the intent to kill or that he acted knowing his
conduct created a strong probability that the victim
would die or suffer great bodily harm (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(b); Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d
at 541; King, 109 Ill. 2d at 542). Death sentences
have been upheld when the evidence has been
sufficient to support a finding of the alternative
mental state, knowledge. King, 109 Ill. 2d at 542.
After examining the motion to preclude
imposition of the death penalty filed in the instant
case, we find it does not contradict defense counsel's
affidavit. We note that the motion was never ruled
on by the trial court or apparently presented for a
hearing by defense counsel. While both sides
theorize as to the reasons that counsel abandoned the
motion, we need not indulge in such speculation in
view of our determination.
In the motion defense counsel did not raise
the issue of lack of intent to kill, which intent was
required under the Illinois statutory aggravating
factor to impose the death penalty (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(b)). Rather, defense
counsel argued that under Enmund v. Florida (1982),
458 U.S. 782, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140, 102 S. Ct. 3368,
defendant could not be sentenced to death for felony
murder unless the State could prove defendant had
the intent to kill. Counsel claimed the State had no
evidence that defendant intended to kill in this case
and thus the State had no good-faith basis to seek the
death penalty; We also note that defense counsel did
not argue that the State lacked sufficient evidence to
prove that defendant acted knowingly. Ill. Rev. Stat.
1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(b).
Counsel cited People v. Jones (1982), 94 Ill.
2d 275, 447 N.E.2d 161, in the motion to preclude
as basic source material supporting the
necessity-of-intent proposition. Jones, however,
concerned a defendant sentenced to death under
section 9-1(b)(3) of the Criminal Code, murder of
two or more individuals. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch.
38, par. 9-1(b)(3).) The Jones court relied on
Enmund in vacating one of three death sentences.
Defense counsel's failure to rely upon
Illinois statutory law in the motion shows a lack of
knowledge or understanding of the law. This
indication is later confirmed, not contradicted, by his
affidavit. Counsel's stipulation to defendant's
eligibility for the death penalty further corroborates
counsel's mistaken belief that defendant had no
defense to death penalty eligibility because of the
felony-murder conviction.
Thus, the State's argument that defense
counsel exercised reasonable strategy based upon
Illinois law and the facts of this case is not supported
by the record. Defense counsel's advice to defendant
was attributable to counsel's misapprehension of the
law and not to tactics or strategy. (See People v.
Wright (1986), 111 111. 2d 18, 26-27, 488 N.E.2d
973; People v. Hayes (1992), 229 Ill. App. 3d 55,
62-63, 593 N.E.2d 739.) It is clear that counsel's
advice, based upon a misapprehension of the law,
fell outside the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases. Huante, 143 Ill. 2d at
68-69.
We do find that defendant was prejudiced by
defense counsel's misapprehension of the law at the
first phase of the sentencing proceeding, death
penalty eligibility. Since defense counsel did not
understand that in addition to proving felony murder
the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant possessed the culpable mental state of
intent or knowledge, defense counsel stipulated to
defendant's eligibility for the death penalty. The
State argues that the exchange between the court and
the parties set out earlier in this opinion was not a
stipulation to death penalty eligibility. First, defense
counsel's affidavit indicates it was such a stipulation.
Second, the trial court understood and accepted it as
a stipulation to death penalty eligibility. At the
sentencing hearing on January 14, 1988, the judge
stated, "And the second phase is stipulated that
defendant is eligible for the death penalty." The
judge later said "that the factors in aggravation,
which would allow the imposition of the death
penalty were stipulated to." Obviously the trial court
had not merely taken judicial notice of the facts and
made his own determination nor had he improperly
relied on the vacated convictions of intentional and
knowing murder to find defendant eligible for the
death penalty. Thus, defendant waived a hearing on
the issue of death penalty eligibility and stipulated to
178
his eligibility for such penalty based on counsel's
misapprehension of law.
After examining the entire record, there is a
reasonable probability that but for counsel's error,
defendant would have rejected the stipulation to
death penalty eligibility because defendant's evidence
pointed to an accidental shooting. (See Huante, 143
M. 2d at 73.) None of defendant's evidence was
presented by defense counsel at the first phase of
sentencing because counsel believed such evidence
was irrelevant once felony murder was established.
It is apparent from post-trial counsel's
investigation that evidence existed to discredit
Officer Haskins as the only eyewitness to the
shooting. First, Office Wolff's police report indicates
that Haskins was ordered inside by defendant, but it
fails to mention that Haskins went outside again.
While defendant argues that the report contradicts
Haskins' testimony that he was outside when
defendant shot Douglas, we find it does not
corroborate Haskins' account. This fact is still
significant.
Other evidence revealed by post-trial counsel
likely would have discredited Haskins' testimony,
thus eliminating the only eyewitness to the shooting.
Although the State contends this evidence is either
irrelevant or corroborative of Haskins' testimony, we
disagree. First, Haskins said he was about 100 feet
away. The diagram of the scene shows lights around
the station; however, some of the lights were
deflected toward the station. Lights aimed at Haskins
would have impaired his ability to see rather than
assist it. Photographs also indicate that Haskins was
looking out into an area of darkness where the
shooting occurred. Photographs show that without
the aid of police lighting, the location of the shooting
was dark. The report of Officer Wolff shows he had
to use his flashlight to determine that Douglas was
shot. There were also obstacles between the station
and the shooting which could have impaired Haskins'
view further.
Haskins said he chased defendant about 100
feet as defendant ran west and then turned north.
Defendant actually ran south. The State points out
that at a hearing on Ingram Rush's motion to
suppress, Haskins thought defendant ran north
because he lost sight of defendant. While this point
alone would not be sufficient to discredit Haskins,
the impeachment evidence taken as a whole would
have cast sufficient doubt on his testimony.
We also note that the gunshot wound to the
right of Douglas' chest corroborates defendant's
story that the gun went off as defendant ran away.
The State claims this fact could be due to Douglas'
movement; however, this argument contradicts
Haskins' statement that Douglas did not move. The
State posits that a sawed-off shotgun is not accurate,
but defendant was only a few feet from Douglas.
The State asserts that the wound was consistent with
Haskins' testimony at sentencing that defendant
stepped to the side of Douglas. However, Haskins'
police report and his stipulated testimony at the plea
hearing indicated that defendant stepped backwards
from Douglas and not to the side.
While defendant told his attorney the trigger
pull was sensitive, defense counsel failed to test the
gun. Once again the State assumes that defendant
was not prejudiced by this in view of the State's
findings that the trigger pull was normal to
medium-heavy. The State implies that counsel made
an informed choice not to test the gun, when the
overall circumstances surrounding this case show
that counsel did not investigate defendant's defense
to death penalty eligibility due to counsel's
misapprehension of the law.
The failure to investigate and present this
evidence prejudiced defendant and cannot be
dismissed, as the State suggests, as merely a
different manner of impeachment (see People v.
Flores (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 66, 538 N.E.2d 481). The
State, relying on People v. Del Vecchio (1985), 105
Ill. 2d 414, 475 N.E.2d 840, argues that defendant
was not prejudiced because the trial court rejected
his defense after the sentencing hearing. The opinion
in Del Vecchio merely indicates that after hearing
evidence of the defendant's insanity claim, the court
rejected it. In the case at bar, the trial court was only
presented with defendant's testimony as to his claim
of accident. It did not hear all the evidence at the
sentencing hearing because defense counsel had not
presented it. The State correctly notes that the trial
court found the police officers credible; however, the
court made this finding in the absence of the
impeachment evidence. Since defense counsel failed
to present all the evidence at the sentencing hearing,
we do not find the court's imposition of the death
penalty a reliable indication that defendant was not
prejudiced at the death penalty eligibility phase of
the hearing.
The State contends that even in the absence
of an intent to kill, defendant was death penalty
eligible based on knowing murder by his own
account. The fact that defendant admitted sawing off
the shotgun goes to his intent to commit armed
robbery. While defendant said he "waved" the
shotgun, he said he did this while in the gas station.
Defendant emphatically denied pointing the shotgun
at Douglas or holding it in his direction at the time
of the shooting. Unlike People v. King (1986), 109
Ill. 2d 514, 488 N.E.2d 949, wherein the defendant
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pushed the victim while holding a loaded gun to his
head, defendant herein claimed not to have pointed
the gun at Douglas at the time of the shooting.
Evidence did show the shotgun had to be cocked
first, but testimony indicated it could remain cocked
until the trigger was pulled.
Similarly, the defendants in People v. Owens
(1984), 102 M. 2d 88, 464 N.E.2d 261, and People
v. Eddmonds (1984), 101 M. 2d 44, 461 N.E.2d
347, were engaged in conduct at the time of the
victim's death from which a knowing mental state
could be inferred. Defendant herein had always
maintained that he was fleeing when the gun went
off accidentally. In the absence of credible
eyewitness testimony to the contrary, we cannot
conclude that defendant would have been found
eligible for the death penalty beyond a reasonable
doubt. The State relies on People v. McEwen
(1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 222, 510 N.E.2d 74,
regarding accident and felony murder. A close
reading of McEwen shows the case concerned a
conviction of felony murder and did not involve the
death penalty. And, in People v. Barker (1980), 83
Ill. 2d 319, 415 N.E.2d 404, the defendant fired a
shotgun in the direction of police officers which was
sufficient to find attempted murder. Here, defendant
claimed the firing of the gun was accidental.
The State is correct in its claim that accident
would not relieve defendant of guilt for the
felony-murder count. (See People v. Chandler
(1989), 129 Ill. 2d 233, 248, 543 N.E.2d 1290;
Allen, 56 Ill. 2d 536, 309 N.E.2d 544.) However,
the statutory aggravating factor necessary to impose
the death penalty is not proved by a conviction of
felony murder alone. (See People v. Holman (1984),
103 111. 2d 133, 159, 469 N.E.2d 119.) Thus,
defendant was prejudiced by counsel's
misapprehension of the law with respect to the first
phase of the death penalty sentencing hearing. The
ineffectiveness of defense counsel requires that
defendant's death sentence be vacated and the cause
remanded for a new death qualifying and sentencing
hearing.
Next, defendant contends that his ability to
comprehend the charges and admonishments during
the guilt phase of the plea proceeding was materially
impaired. He relies on the opinion of Dr. Michaels,
who tested and interviewed defendant many months
after his conviction and sentence. Defendant claims
that based on that evidence the trial court should
have vacated his plea or ordered an evidentiary
hearing.
A defendant is competent to plead guilty if
he is capable of understanding the proceedings and
assisting in his own defense even if he may be
mentally or emotionally disturbed. (People v. Van
Ostran (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 517, 522 N.E.2d
851.) Whether a bona fide doubt has been raised is
a decision resting largely within the discretion of the
trial court. (See People v. Murphy (1978), 72 Ill. 2d
421, 381 N.E.2d 677.) The trial court, unlike a
court of review, is in a position to observe the
defendant and evaluate his conduct. (Murphy, 72 Ill.
2d at 431.) The mere fact that a psychologist
expressed the opinion that defendant was not
competent did not mandate a similar finding by the
trial court, as the ultimate issue is for the trial court,
not the experts, to decide. People v. Bleitner (1990),
199 Ill. App. 3d 146, 556 N.E.2d 819.
The trial judge observed defendant's conduct
and demeanor at the time of the guilty plea. It is
clear from the record that defendant was competent
to enter a guilty plea. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to conduct an evidentiary
hearing or vacate the guilty plea.
In the third issue, defendant contends that by
claiming at the sentencing hearing that the shooting
was accidental, his guilty plea was vitiated. (See
Brady v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 25 L.
Ed. 2d 747, 90 S. Ct. 1463.) He argues that when
he denied an intentional shooting by claiming he
accidentally shot Douglas, the trial judge had a duty
to inquire whether defendant understood the nature
and consequences of his plea, and the stipulation to
death penalty eligibility. Due to the judge's failure to
so inquire, defendant claims his plea and stipulation
must be vacated.
In Illinois, a court is not precluded from
accepting a plea of guilty, in spite of a defendant's
claim of innocence, if the record reflects a factual
basis from which a jury could find the defendant
guilty of the offenses to which the plea was entered.
(People v. Barker (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 319, 415
N.E.2d 404.) We have already noted the fact that
defendant's convictions for intentional and knowing
murder were vacated. Defendant's claim of an
accidental shooting did not vitiate his guilty plea with
respect to his felony-murder conviction, as accident
is not a defense to that offense. The court did not
abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to
withdraw defendant's plea of guilty. Defendant's
death sentence has been vacated on other grounds by
this court.
Defendant attacks the death penalty
eligibility phase of the proceeding on another
ground. He claims that the stipulation was
tantamount to a guilty plea and thus he should have
received admonishments by the trial court. (See
People v. Smith (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 236, 319 N.E.2d
760; People v. Stepheny (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 237, 306
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N.E.2d 872.) Defendant improperly argues in a
footnote that he was not apprised of his right to
testify at phase two. Since we have determined that
defendant must receive a new death penalty
eligibility hearing due to ineffectiveness of defense
counsel, we do not address this issue.
Defendant asserts that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at all phases of the proceedings
due to defense counsel's failure to conduct a
reasonable investigation. Particularly defendant
argues that defense counsel did not properly
investigate defendant's claim of accidental shooting
or seek information to discredit Officer Haskins. He
contends that his attorney failed to investigate and
present evidence in mitigation at the second phase of
defendant's sentencing hearing. In view of our
holding that defendant is to receive a new sentencing
hearing, we do not address this issue.
Based on our holding, we find it unnecessary
to address defendant's other issues concerning an
evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel; the court's failure to consider
additional evidence in mitigation; or whether the
death sentence is excessive in this case. While
defendant argues that the Illinois death penalty
statute is unconstitutional, he provides no citation of
authority to support his argument, nor does he
attempt to address this court's prior holdings on the
matter. This court has previously rejected
defendant's arguments, and we see no reason to
disturb those decisions. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 498, 603
N.E.2d 519.
For the reasons stated, defendant's
convictions are affirmed, but his sentence of death is
vacated. The cause is remanded to the circuit court
of Cook County for a new hearing to determine
defendant's eligibility for the death penalty; as well
as a new sentencing hearing. We direct that the
hearing be held before a different trial judge.
Convictions affirmed; death sentence
vacated; cause remanded with directions.
JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
Based on his counsel's advice, defendant
pled guilty to counts of intentional, knowing and
felony murder. The trial court entered judgment on
only one count of felony murder. This was
improper. Because all counts involved the same
homicide and because intentional murder involves a
more culpable mental state and is a more serious
crime than felony murder, the trial court should have
entered a judgment of conviction only for intentional
murder and vacated defendant's convictions for
knowing and felony murder. See People v.
Pitsonbarger (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 353, 377-78, 568
N.E.2d 783; People v. Lego (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 323,
344, 507 N.E.2d 800; People v. Guest (1986), 115
Ill. 2d 72, 104, 503 N.E.2d 255.
Although the majority concedes that
counsel's advice was based upon a misapprehension
of the law, it concludes that defendant did not sustain
prejudice at the guilt phase of the proceedings as a
result of counsel's misguidance because defendant's
claim of accident would not have prevented his
conviction for felony murder and, based on the trial
court's error, judgment was in fact entered for
felony murder. Contrary to the majority, I do not
believe that errors committed by the trial court,
regardless of the windfall they may bestow upon a
defendant, should be considered in determining
whether that defendant was prejudiced by his
counsel's ineffective assistance. Here, but for the
trial court's error, defendant would be
death-qualified based upon his counsel's advice to
plead guilty to all counts. Had the defendant been
fully advised, he would have realized to what extent
he was placed in jeopardy by the plea. Under these
circumstances, it is difficult to understand how it
would have been to his advantage to plead guilty to
counts of intentional, knowing and felony murder.
Therefore, I would hold that there was a "reasonable
probability" that, but for defense counsel's mistaken
belief that felony murder alone was sufficient to
qualify defendant for the death penalty, defendant
would have rejected the plea arrangement. Hill v.
Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 59, 88 L. Ed. 2d
203, 210, 106 S. Ct. . 366, 370; see also People v.
Huante (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 61, 73, 571 N.E.2d 736.
While the majority is correct in noting that
accident would not relieve defendant of guilt for
felony murder (People v. Allen (1974), 56 Ill. 2d
536, 545, 309 N.E.2d 544), the statutory
aggravating factor necessary to impose the death
penalty is not proved by a conviction of felony
murder alone (see People v. Holman (1984), 103 Ill.
2d 133, 159, 469 N.E.2d 119). Intent or knowledge
must also be established. If defendant had gone to
trial and been acquitted on the intentional and
knowing murder counts, the State would have been
precluded from seeking the death penalty. Instead,
defendant followed counsel's advice, pled guilty to
those counts and stipulated to the requisite statutory
aggravating factor necessary for the death penalty.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6).
It is therefore clear that defendant gained
nothing in entering a guilty plea, despite the presence
of evidence which the majority admits may relieve
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him of guilt for intentional and knowing murder.
Further, it cannot be concluded that defendant made
an informed decision that his interest required entry
of a guilty plea despite his belief he did not
intentionally kill Brian Douglas. (See People v.
Barker (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 319, 332, 415 N.E.2d 404
(discussing North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400
U.S. 25, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 91 S. Ct. . 160).)
Defendant's guilty plea was based on ineffective
assistance of counsel and should be vacated. I would
therefore reverse and remand the judgment of the
circuit court. While I realize that defense counsel's
misapprehension of the law went to the death penalty
aspect of this case, counsel's ineffectiveness so
infected defendant's defense that the ends of justice
would be better served by permitting defendant to
withdraw his entire guilty plea.
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93-1679 BRITENBACH v. U.S.
Sentencing-Federal guidelines-Career offend-
ers-Conspiracy-Denial of trial motion for
continuance.
Ruling below (U.S. v. Heim, CA9, 15 F.3d
830):
In devising "career offender" provisions of fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines, Sections 411.1 and
411.2, U.S. Sentencing Commission relied not
only upon 18 USC 994(h), which directs commis-
sion to provide sentences at or near statutory
maximum for persons who have repeatedly com-
mitted crime of violence or "offense described in
section 401 of Controlled Substances Act (i.e.
substantive drug offenses in violation of 21 USC
8411," but also upon commission's authority un-
der 28 USC 994(a)(2) to promulgate general
rules regarding other aspects of sentencing that
are "consistent with" Congress' directives; com-
mission's decision to include conspiracy to com-
mit drug offense among predicate crimes that
make defendant eligible for sentencing as career
offender was proper exercise of authority under
Section 994(a)(2), even though conspiracy to
commit drug offense does not fall within category
of offenses described in Section 994(h); commis-
sion's decision to go beyond mandate of Section
994(h) is also consistent with legislative history
making clear that Section 994(h) was not intend-
ed to be ceiling for establishing career offender
provisions.
Ruling below (U.S. v. Heim, CA 9, 1/24/94,
unpublished):
Record shows that, although trial court men-
tioned that defense counsel had voluntarily un-
dertaken representation when it denied defense
motion for continuance grounded on fact that
counsel had been appointed only 44 days earlier,
trial court carefully weighed other legitimate fac-
tors-such as difficulty in trying particular case
and judicial economy-before deciding to deny
continuance motion; defendant's attempt to show
prejudice from denial of continuance motion by
pointing out instances in which counsel failed to
object to admission of certain hearsay statements
fails in light of conclusion that additional trial
preparation would not have aided counsel in iso-
lating which of co-conspirator's hearsay state-
ments were in furtherance of conspiracy-and
thus admissible-and which were mere narrative.
Questions presented: (1) Did Sentencing Com-
mission exceed its jurisdictional authority in des-
ignating conspiracy to commit narcotics offense
as predicate for application of "career offender"
guideline? (2) Did court below err in validating
trial court's refusal of defendant's trial continu-
ance motion?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/25/94, by Nicho-
las DePento, of San Diego, Calif.
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FARRIS, Circuit Judge:
Wayne Rodney Heim, Dwayne Keith Fitzen,
Dyan Jones and Steven R. Britenbach appeal their
convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled
substances in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
and 846. Britenbach also appeals his convictions on
six counts of violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1952. All four defendants appeal their sentences. We
have jurisdiction over their appeals pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291. The convictions of all four
co-defendants and the sentences of Heim, Fitzen and
Jones are affirmed in a separate unpublished
disposition. In this opinion, we affirm Britenbach's
sentence.
I. FACTS
The evidence at trial established that
defendants Heim, Fitzen, Jones and Britenbach
conspired to distribute controlled substances in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. During
the course of the conspiracy, Fitzen, Heim and Jones
resided in Pocatello, Idaho while Britenbach operated
in Southern California. Britenbach and, to a lesser
extent, co-defendant Mike Luce (who pleaded guilty)
supplied cocaine and marijuana to the Pocatello
co-conspirators.
The district court sentenced Britenbach as a
career offender under § 4B1.1 of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. Section 4B13.1 provides that
a defendant is a career offender if
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years
old at the time of the instant offense, (2) the
instant offense of conviction is a felony that
is either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense, and (3) the defendant has
at least two prior felony convictions of
either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The
commentary to § 4Bl.2 states that the term
"controlled substance offense" includes the
offense of conspiring to commit a controlled
substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2
comment. (n.1).
In finding that Britenbach was a career
offender, the district court relied on two prior
controlled substance felony convictions (a 1975
conviction for importation of controlled substances
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and a 1985 conviction for possession of narcotics
with the intent to distribute) and the instant
conspiracy conviction.
II. Use of Conspiracy Conviction Toward Career
Offender Status
Britenbach argues that the United States
Sentencing Commission exceeded its statutory
authority by including conspiracy within the
definition of a "controlled substance offense." He
relies on United States v. Price, 301 U.S. App. D.C.
97, 990 F.2d 1367 (D.C.Cir. 1993) for this
proposition. We reject his argument. The Sentencing
Commission properly included conspiracy within the
definition of "controlled substance offense."'
We review the legality of a sentence de
novo. United States v. Fine, 975 F.2d 596, 599 (9th
Cir. 1992) (en banc). The commentary to § 4B1.1
explains that "28 U.S.C. § 994(h) mandates that the
Commission assure that certain 'career' offenders, as
defined in the statute, receive a sentence of
imprisonment 'at or near the maximum term
authorized.' Section 4B13.1 implements this
mandate." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, comment. (backg'd).
The pertinent language in § 994(h) provides that the
Commission shall assure that the guidelines specify
a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the
maximum term authorized for categories of
defendants in which the defendant is eighteen years
old or older and . . . has been convicted of a felony
that is . . . a crime of violence[,] or an offense
described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances
Act (21 U.S.C. § 841) . . . and . . . has previously
been convicted of two or more prior felonies, each
of which is . . . a crime of violence[,] . . . or an
offense described in section 401 of the Controlled
Substances Act . . . . 28 U.S.C. § 994 (h). Section
401 of the Controlled Substances Act prohibits
substantive controlled substance offenses, but makes
no mention of conspiracy. 21 U.S.C. § 841. In
Price, the court reasoned that "[a] conspiracy to
commit a crime involves quite different elements
from whatever substantive crime the defendants
conspire to commit" and therefore conspiracy to
violate the Controlled Substances Act "cannot be said
to be one of the offenses 'described in"' § 401 of the
Act. Price, 990 F.2d at 1369. The court held that
because the Commission had relied on § 994(h) as
the enabling statute for adopting §§ 4B1.1 and
4B1.2, the Commission had offered a "legally
invalid" reason for including conspiracy within the
definition of "controlled substance offense." Id. at
1370.
The commentary to § 4B 1.1 should be read
less restrictively. It indicates that the career offender
guidelines were intended to "implement[ ] the
mandate" of § 994(h). The language means what it
says - the Commission intended to implement the
mandate of § 994(h). Nowhere in the commentary to
§ 4B13.1 does the Commission suggest that it
considered § 994(h) to be the sole legal authority for
promulgating the career offender guidelines. Cf.
United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 866-67 (3d
Cir. 1992) (holding that definition of "crime of
violence" in career offender guidelines is not
restricted to definition contained in § 994(h)).
Elsewhere in the Guidelines, the Commission has
explained that "the guidelines and policy statements
promulgated by the Commission are issued pursuant
to Section 994(a) of Title 28, United States Code."
U.S.S.G., Ch. 1, Part A, § 1. Section 994(a)(2)
provides that the Commission shall promulgate
"general policy statements regarding application of
the guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing or
sentence implementation that in the view of the
Commission would further the purposes set forth in
section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code
. . ." 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2). Therefore, in deciding
to include conspiracy within the definition of
"controlled substance offense" for purposes of
determining the offense level of career offenders, the
Commission was lawfully exercising its authority
under § 994(a)(2).'
The Commission's decision to go beyond the
mandate of § 994(h) is also consistent with the
legislative history to § 994(h). The Senate Report
made clear that § 994(h) was not intended as a
ceiling for establishing career offender guidelines:
"[Section 994(h) is] not necessarily intended to be an
exhaustive list of types of cases in which the
guidelines should specify a substantial term of
imprisonment, nor of types of cases in which terms
at or close to authorized maxima should be
specified." S.Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
307 (1983), in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3359.
We hold that the Sentencing Commission did
not exceed its statutory authority in including
conspiracy within the definition of "controlled
substance offense" in §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2.
III. Inclusion of Britenbach's 1975 Offense
Britenbach also asserts that the district court
erred in counting the earlier of his two prior felony
convictions (the 1975 conviction for importation of
cocaine) toward career offender status.
The district court's application of the
Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed de novo. United
States v. Fagan, 996 F.2d 1009, 1017 (9th Cir.
1993). Factual findings in the sentencing phase are
reviewed for clear error. United States v. Chapnick,
963 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Prior felony convictions can count toward
career offender status if they resulted in a prison
sentence in excess of one year and one month and if
the defendant was incarcerated for that sentence
during the 15 year period preceding defendant's
involvement in the instant offense. See U.S.S.G. §§
4B1.2 comment. (n.4), 4A1.2(e)(1).
Britenbach was arrested in New York for
importation of controlled substances in 1975. While
he was released on bond for that arrest, he was
arrested in Mexico on drug charges. He was
incarcerated in Mexico until 1978 when he was
returned to New York on a prisoner exchange. The
New York charges were then resolved by crediting
him for time served in Mexico and requiring him to
serve the balance of his term in a New York prison
until 1980. Britenbach argues that he should not have
been attributed career offender status because he was
unable to resolve the charges from his New York
arrest in 1975 (potentially over 15 years before his
involvement in the instant conspiracy).
Britenbach's argument lacks merit. Under
the Guidelines, a conviction for which a defendant is
serving a sentence during the applicable 15 year
period counts toward career offender status. The
ultimate resolution of the New York charges resulted
in Britenbach's serving time in New York from
1978-1980 and he was given credit for time served
in Mexico. The district court made the factual
finding that Britenbach first became involved in the
instant conspiracy in January 1991 (11 years after his
1980 release date). Britenbach would have been
within the fifteen year statutory range even if he had
only served a one year sentence in New York
beginning in 1975. The district court properly
included the 1975 controlled substance offense as a
.prior felony" conviction under § 4B1.1.
IV. The District Court's Failure to Depart
Downward
Britenbach argues that the district court
failed to realize that it had the authority to depart
downward based on his age and medical condition.
The record fails to suggest that the district court was
under the impression that it could not depart
downward if it chose to do so. A district court's
discretionary refusal to depart from the Sentencing
Guidelines is not reviewable on appeal. United States
v. Morales, 972 F.2d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 123 L. Ed. 2d 283, 113 S. Ct. 1665
(1993).
AFFIRMED
ENDNOTES
1. Other Circuits have accepted the inclusion of conspiracy as
a predicate offense under the career offender guidelines. See
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2. The Price court noted that the Commission "may well be
free" to include conspiracy within the definition of controlled
substance offense pursuant to the Commission's broad
mandate in 28 U.S.C. § 994(a). Price, 990 F.2d at 1369.
However, there is no indication that the Price court
considered the Commission's explanation that the Guidelines
were, in fact, promulgated pursuant to the Commission's
general authority in § 994(a).
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93-1734 STEPHENS v. MILLER
Evidence-Rape shield statutes-Right to tes-
tify-Exclusion of defendant's comments during
sexual act regarding complainant's past sexual
conduct.
Ruling below (CA 7 (en banc), 13 F.3d 998, 54
CrL 1398):
Habeas corpus petitioner's constitutional right
to testify was not violated when, at his state trial
on rape charge, trial court ruled that rape shield
statute's ban on evidence concerning victim's past
sexual conduct barred petitioner from testifying
as to substance of remark he claimed to have
made to complainant during sex act-to effect
that third party had given him information con-
cerning complainant's sexual likes and dislikes-
which remark, according to petitioner, caused
complainant to become angry and to fabricate
rape claim; by permitting petitioner to testify that
he had said "something" that irked complainant
and caused her to fabricate claim, trial court both
allowed petitioner to meaningfully exercise his
constitutional right to testify and also served
interests protected by state rape shield law; peti-
tioner's argument that testimony regarding sub-
stance of remark was admissible as res gestae of
offense is rejected as being inconsistent with deci-
sion upholding rape shield statutes, Michigan v.
Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 59 LW 4443 (1990), and
with modern trend recognizing res gestae as obso-
lete concept with no significance in federal consti-
tutional law.
Question presented: Does application of Indi-
ana rape shield statute, I.C. 35-37-4-4, to bar
criminal defendant from testifying as to what
occurred at time and place of alleged offense
violate defendant's right to testify under Four-
teenth. Fifth, and Sixth Amendments?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/6/94, by Robert
G. Forbes, and Forcum and Forbes, both of
Hartford City, Ind.
93-1633 SWAN v. PETERSON
Confrontation-Hearsay statements of child sex
abuse victim-Indicia of reliability.
Ruling below (CA 9, 6 F.3d 1373):
Findings of state courts and federal district
court that hearsay statements of victims of child
sex abuse-offered for admission pursuant to
state child sex abuse hearsay exception-were
spontaneous, indicated sexual knowledge inappro-
priate for victims' young ages, and were made
with no motive to lic are not clearly erroneous
and support conclusion that children's hearsay
statements bore indicia of reliability adequate to
satisfy Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
as interpreted in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805.
58 LW 5036 (1990); although both state courts
and district court incorrectly engaged in boot-
strapping by also considering fact that children's
hearsay statements were consistent with prior
statements, this reliance on consistency did not
undermine courts' conclusions regarding reliabil-
ity; argument that trial judge's finding that child
witness was incompetent to testify barred later
finding that child's hearsay statements could be
sufficiently trustworthy for admission pursuant to
child sex abuse hearsay exception was rejected in
Wright; Confrontation Clause does not mandate
threshold determination of credibility of reporters
of statements admitted pursuant to child sex
abuse hearsay exception, order denying petition
for federal habeas corpus relief from state convic-
tions of child sex abuse is affirmed.
Questions presented: (1) Could hearsay state-
ments admitted pursuant to statutory hearsay
exception that were made by two 31/2-year-old
children, who were ruled incompetent and, there-
fore, unable to testify at trial, be found to have
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
based solely upon their consistency with prior
statements, and if so. would this violate anti-cor-
roboration bootstrapping prohibition of Idaho v.
Wright and Sixth Amendment? (2) Did court
below fail to follow this court's decision in Wright
when it found child hearsay statements describ-
ing sexual abuse to be trustworthy based solely
upon consistency of these statements with other
statements? (3) In case in which child makes
concededly false accusation of abuse to detective
and prosecutor in context of investigation, should
this be considered in calculation of whether her
other hearsay statements were trustworthy? (4)
In case in which finding of incompetence to
testify is based on young child's inability to speak
truthfully, can finding that her earlier state-
ments, made when she was only 3 years old,
possess particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness required by Wright, be sustained? (5) Is
admission of hearsay statements made by two
3 -year-old children, who did not testify at trial,
violative of Confrontation Clause, in case in
which reporters of hearsay were predisposed to
find sexual abuse, in which successive hearsay
statements that were admitted were made over
period of six months after initial disclosure, and
in which children had been tainted by earlier
interviews? (6) Is Sixth Amendment's Confronta-
tion Clause violated in case in which criminal
defendant is convicted solely on basis of hearsay
testimony?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/18/94, by David
Allen, Todd Maybrown, Richard Hansen, and
Allen, Hansen & Maybrown, all of Seattle.
Wash.
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WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:
When the crime is child sexual abuse, one of
the more difficult to detect and prosecute, a
conviction hinges often on the words of children.
What makes this case troubling is that the children
did not testify at trial. On the basis of hearsay
statements, supported by minimal corroborating
evidence at best, a state jury convicted William and
Kathleen Swan of sexually abusing their
three-year-old daughter and her friend. The Swans
have exhausted their state court remedies and appeal
the district court's denial of their habeas corpus
petition.
Our main issue is whether admission of the
children's hearsay statements violated the Swan's
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. The
Swans also argue that the state withheld information
that a key reporting witness had once been sexually
abused, that newly discovered medical evidence
indicated that their daughter was not molested and
that they received ineffective assistance of counsel.
We affirm the dismissal of the habeas petition.
I. BACKGROUND
The sexual abuse charges stemmed from
statements made by the Swans' daughter, B.A., and
her three-year-old friend, R.T., to day-care center
workers. The two children attended a day-care
facility managed by Cindy Bratvold. She had hired
Lisa Conradi as the center's new part-time assistant.
The disturbing allegations arose on Conradi's second
day of work. She told B.A. to keep her dress
covered over her tights, reminding her that no one
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should look at or touch her "private parts." Conradi
said that B.A. responded "Uh-huh, Mommy and
Daddy do." After further questioning, the child
allegedly told Conradi about games with her parents
involving sexual acts.
Conradi alerted Bratvold, who called Child
Protective Services, a state agency. Bratvold then
spoke with B.A., who allegedly told her that the
games sometimes included her friend, R.T. Two
CPS caseworkers arrived and talked with B.A., but
the interview was inconclusive. They ended it when
Kathleen Swan arrived to take her daughter home.
R.T. came to the center the next day, but
B.A. did not. Bratvold asked R.T. about the Swans
and what types of games they played together. R.T.
allegedly described activities similar to what B.A.
had disclosed, including genital touching and oral
sex.
These initial statements to the day-care
workers were the most damaging. The Washington
Supreme Court reviewed in detail the trial testimony
about these events. State v. Swan, 114 Wash. 2d
613, 790 P.2d 610, 616-618 (Wash. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1046, 112 L. Ed. 2d 772, 111 S.
Ct. 752 (1991). We need not repeat those findings,
except to say that the implications are grave and
alarming. The children demonstrated precocious
sexual knowledge, describing multiple episodes of
abuse by the Swans, which, if believed by a jury,
would warrant conviction.
After interviews with a CPS caseworker, the
police were called and the children placed in
protective custody. The state charged both Swans
with two counts of statutory rape. Superior Court
Judge Ellington conducted pretrial hearings to
determine whether the young girls were competent to
testify. After observing them, the judge concluded
that, because of their youth and inability to answer
questions in court, they could not satisfy the
competency requirements. The Swans do not contest
this ruling.
The state introduced the children's
statements to the day-care workers under
Washington's statutory child sexual abuse hearsay
exception, RCW § 9A.44.120.' Under the same
exception, the state introduced other disputed hearsay
evidence, including the children's disclosures to the
caseworker, B.A.'s statements to her foster mother
and R.T.'s statements to her father and a police
detective.
Before the admission of each statement,
Judge Ellington, assisted by counsel, conducted
extensive preliminary examinations of the reporting
witnesses outside the presence of the jury. Once
satisfied that a statement met the reliability and
corroboration requirements of the statutory
exception, the court allowed it into evidence. The
jury returned guilty verdicts.
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the statements lacked sufficient
corroboration as required by the hearsay statute. The
State Supreme Court disagreed and reinstated the
convictions.
The Swans petitioned the district court for a
writ of habeas corpus, arguing that: (1) the
admission of the hearsay statements violated the
Confrontation Clause; (2) the state withheld
favorable Brady evidence; namely, that day-care
worker Conradi had been sexually abused; (3) newly
discovered evidence showed that their daughter's
hymen is intact; and (4) they received ineffective
assistance by retained counsel. The court adopted the
Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge
and denied the petition on summary judgment.
II. ANALYSIS
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. Standard of Review and the Presumption of
Correctness
We begin our analysis mindful that this is a
habeas corpus proceeding, not direct review of a
criminal conviction. The Swans have already had the
opportunity to litigate their claims in the state courts.
Washington's highest court upheld their convictions.
Different principles apply on collateral review,
constraining the role of a federal appellate court. As
the Supreme Court recently reminded us, we may
not second-guess the state courts:
Direct review is the principal avenue for
challenging a conviction. "When the process
of direct review . . . comes to an end, a
presumption of finality and legality attaches
to the conviction and sentence. The role of
federal habeas proceedings, while important
in assuring that constitutional rights are
observed, is secondary and limited. Federal
courts are not forums in which to relitigate
state trials."
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353, 113 S.
Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880, 887, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1090, 103 S. Ct.
3383 (1983)).
We review de novo the decision to deny the
habeas petition and, to the extent we need to review
the district court's factual findings, the clearly
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erroneous standard applies. Hendricks v. Zenon, 993
F.2d 664, 668 (9th Cir. 1993).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we accord a
presumption of correctness to the state courts' factual
findings. But this presumption does not apply to the
state courts' resolution of mixed questions of law and
fact. Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 954 F.2d 581, 585
(9th Cir. 1992). Whether the hearsay statements
were sufficiently reliable to be admitted without
violating the Confrontation Clause is a mixed
question. See United States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750,
757-58 (9th Cir. 1986) (admission of hearsay
statement by assault victim who later suffered
memory loss), rev'd on other grounds, 484 U.S.
554, 98 L. Ed. 2d 951, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988); see
also Myatt v. Hannigan, 910 F.2d 680, 685 (10th
Cir. 1990) (hearsay declarations of child sexual
abuse victim).
Consequently, we accord deference to the
state courts' factual findings regarding the timing,
manner and circumstances of the hearsay statements.
We review de novo the ultimate determination that
the Swans' Confrontation Clause rights were not
violated.
B. Sufficient Indicia of Reliability
The Confrontation Clause and the hearsay
rule are not coextensive. Although both protect
similar values, each sets independent prohibitions on
admissibility. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
62-65, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980).
The Clause does not necessarily bar the admission of
hearsay statements. Most evidence that falls under a
recognized hearsay exception may be admitted
without confrontation because of its presumed
trustworthiness. But the Clause may prohibit
introducing some evidence that otherwise would be
admissible under a hearsay exception. Idaho v.
Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 813-14, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638,
110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
A statement falling under an exception will
also be admissible under the Clause if the
prosecution demonstrates the unavailability of the
declarant and that the statement bears adequate
"indicia of reliability." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
The Swans do not contest the trial court's
determination that the children were incompetent to
testify and "unavailable" for hearsay purposes.2 The
crux of this appeal is whether the incriminating
statements bore sufficient "indiciation of reliability"
to withstand scrutiny under the Clause.
The reliability requirement is satisfied if a
statement falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay
exception" or if it is supported by "a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
Wright, 497 U.S. at 818. The trial court admitted
the statements under Washington's child sexual abuse
hearsay exception. Enacted in 1982, this exception is
relatively new and not firmly rooted.
As the statements were admitted under a
nontraditional exception, the state, as proponent of
the evidence, had the burden to demonstrate
reliability by showing "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." The proof is based on consideration
of the totality of the circumstances but "the relevant
circumstances include only those that surround the
making of the statement and that render the declarant
particularly worthy of belief." Id. at 819.
The Supreme Court, in Wright, identified
several factors bearing on the reliability of a child's
hearsay statements: (1) spontaneity and consistent
repetition; (2) mental state of the declarant; (3) use
of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age;
and (4) lack of motive to fabricate. Id. at 821-22
(citing cases). But no mechanical test prevails and
"courts have considerable leeway in their
consideration of appropriate factors." Id. at 822.'
Despite this latitude, other corroborating
evidence may not be considered in assessing the
hearsay's reliability. This would permit "admission
of a presumptively unreliable statement by
bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other
evidence at trial." Id. at 823. It also presents dangers
because of the problem of selective reliability.'
C. Initial Statements About Abuse
1. Relevant factors and impermissible bootstrapping
We consider first the girls' initial statements
to the day-care workers. In evaluating the
admissibility of these remarks, the trial court made
three reliability findings of the type explicitly
approved by the Court in Wright: (1) neither girl had
a motive to lie; (2) both girls described sexual acts
in specific terms, using age-appropriate language;
and (3) most of the statements were spontaneous
responses to open-ended questions or to no questions
at all. The court also found that the girls had a
reputation for truthfulness and that the disclosures
were made to adults who had relationships of trust
with the girls. These latter factors do not seem
inappropriate, given Wright's emphasis that trial
courts have considerable leeway in making reliability
determinations.
But the court relied improperly upon one
additional factor. It observed that the girls "made the
statements on two consecutive days without the
190
children having discussed the matter and giving
basically the same content to the statements, I think
is a strong indicator of reliability." This is
impermissible bootstrapping as the court referenced
other evidence in finding cross-corroboration of each
child's statements.' "To be admissible under the
Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to
convict a defendant must possess indicia of
reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness,
not by reference to other evidence at trial." Id. at
822 (emphasis added).
We do not analyze separately the findings of
the Washington Supreme Court as it agreed generally
with the trial court's determinations. See Swan, 790
P.2d at 628-630. The district court conducted an
independent review of the transcripts. It agreed with
the state courts that (1) the statements were
spontaneous; (2) neither girl had a motive to lie; (3)
they did not have a tendency to lie; and (4) most
significant to the district court, the statements
included "a description of oral intercourse which was
so specific, and showed such inappropriate and
precocious knowledge, that it would be difficult to
see this knowledge as anything other than the result
of personal experience."
But the court also made the same
bootstrapping mistake as did the state courts. It
found relevant that "the allegations made by the girls
were consistent, both with one another's reports and
with each girl's later reports of the same activities."
(emphasis added).
Nevertheless, we do not conclude that the
bootstrapping errors of the state courts and the
district court tainted their reliability determinations.
Neither the state courts nor the district court
indicated that cross-corroboration was a primary
reason for finding the statements reliable; indeed, the
district court found most significant the knowledge of
sexual acts unexpected of children of that age.
2. Spontaneity
We turn next to the other reliability findings.
In particular, the Swans dispute that the statements
were spontaneous. They say that the day-care
workers prompted the girls' initial remarks.
According to her preliminary testimony, Conradi
told B.A. that no one should touch her private parts
and the girl responded "Mommy and Daddy do."
Although this statement did not come out of the blue,
it was not made in response to any question posed by
Conradi. Other statements made by B.A. at that time
seemed impulsive, such as when, while playing a
game of peekaboo, the girl said that "My daddy puts
his penis in my mouth and icky milk comes out."
Similarly, R.T.'s statements were made in
response to Bratvold's open-ended questions, such as
"What kinds of games do you play with Bill
[Swan]?" This contrasts with the leading questions
the Supreme Court criticized in Wright. See 497
U.S. at 810 ("Do you play with daddy? Does daddy
play with you? Does daddy touch you with his
pee-pee? Do you touch his pee-pee?").6 We find no
clear error in the state and district courts'
spontaneity determinations.
3. No motive or tendency to lie
We also find no clear error in the finding
that the girls had no motive to lie. The Swans do not
suggest any motive. They contend instead that the
day-care workers, and particularly Conradi, were
biased. That, however, does not suggest that the girls
themselves had a reason to lie.
Next, the Swans argue that the courts erred
in finding that the girls were generally not prone to
lie. They note that R.T.'s father testified that she
occasionally had make-believe companions and
pretended to have gone somewhere the day before
when she had not. And she told the police that
"Jerry," possibly a reference to her father Gerald,
put "marbles" in her genital area. She said that she
had related the same information to Bratvold, who
denied that R.T. had made such a statement to her.
The testimony of R.T.'s father is not
dispositive. Children pretend. This does not reveal a
tendency to prevaricate. R.T.'s later statement about
"Jerry" suggests a possible problem with lying.
Whether the Swans may rely on a later statement to
undermine the reliability of R.T.'s earlier statements,
however, is unclear. Wright forbids using other
corroborating evidence at trial to show that an initial
hearsay statement is reliable. The issue here is subtly
different: can arguably noncorroborating evidence be
used to demonstrate the unreliability of a hearsay
statement? Wright's caution against reference to
other evidence at trial suggests not.'
Regardless, the district court considered this
later statement but discounted it. The court reasoned
that the accusation was ambiguous and that, by that
time, several adults had questioned R.T. and the
spontaneity surrounding her answers had faded. This
determination was not clearly erroneous.
4. Effect of child declarant's incompetence
The Swans say that R.T.'s faulty
performance at the competency hearing precludes a
finding that her hearsay statements had sufficient
guarantees of trustworthiness. 8
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The Supreme Court rejected a similar
argument in Wright. Id. at 825 ("the Confrontation
Clause does not erect a per se rule barring admission
of prior statements of a declarant who is unable to
communicate to the jury at the time of trial"). The
Swans would distinguish Wright, arguing that there
the trial court found the child incapable only of
communicating to the jury but here the incompetency
problems were broader and more damaging.
The trial court recognized the distinction
between R.T.'s ability to testify in a courtroom
setting and to tell the truth at the time of the
declarations. It clearly considered her incompetent
only as to the former. We defer to its finding.
5. Credibility of the reporting witness
The Swans say that the statements were
unreliable because the day-care workers, especially
Conradi, were predisposed to find child abuse.
Amicus supports this position. Amicus essentially
makes a policy argument that in cases involving
nontraditional hearsay exceptions, the trial court
should be vigilant in assessing reliability by making
a preliminary evaluation of the reporting witness'
credibility. Whatever the merits of this view, a
federal habeas court may not prescribe evidentiary
rules for the states. We may grant relief only if there
is serious constitutional error.
We do not read the Confrontation Clause as
mandating a threshold assessment of the reporting
witness's credibility before the admission of hearsay
evidence. The Supreme Court has limited the
reliability inquiry required by the Clause to whether
the circumstances surrounding the making of the
statement "render the declarant particularly worthy
of belief." Id. at 820 (emphasis added). Unlike
the declarant, the reporting witness is subjected to
cross-examination and the requirements of an oath.
See United States v. Hinkson, 632 F.2d 382, 385
(4th Cir. 1980) (discussing trustworthiness
requirement included in the analogous residual
hearsay exception, Fed. R. Evid. 803(24)). See also
John E.B. Myers, Evidence in Child Abuse and
Neglect, § 7.45, at 249, 262, 264 (2d ed. 1992)
(reporting witness' credibility not a reliability factor
that surrounds the making of the statement). The
jury, not the trial judge, must weigh the reporting
witness's credibility.
Obviously the trial court must make some
inquiries, such as deciding whether a witness is
competent to testify. But the Confrontation Clause
does not require the court to take basic credibility
determinations from the jury.
D. Later Hearsay Statements
1. Statements to CPS caseworker
In admitting the girls' statements to the CPS
caseworker, the trial court found indicia of reliability
because (1) more than one person was present when
the statements were made; (2) some responses were
spontaneous; (3) neither girl had a motive to lie and
they had relationships of trust with the adults. It
noted that leading questions had been asked of B.A.
but concluded that direct questions are sometimes
appropriate for difficult child witnesses and that the
girl's answers were consistent with her other
spontaneous statements. The district court agreed
with these findings.
Although we are troubled by the use of
leading questions,' this does not necessarily render
B.A.'s responses untrustworthy. See United States v.
George, 960 F.2d 97, 100 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992);
Myers, supra, § 4.5 at 229-239. The consistency of
the girl's statements with her earlier statements is the
critical reliability factor here. We conclude that it
provided a particularized guarantee of
trustworthiness.
2. Statements to R.T.'s father and to police detective
These statements had a low level of
reliability because, when allegedly made, several
adults had already questioned the girls. But we agree
with the district court that any error in admitting the
statements was harmless because the evidence was
"insignificant in impact when compared to the initial
disclosures of the girls, and did not add anything
new."
3. Statements to B.A.'s foster mother
In admitting this hearsay evidence, the trial
court found indicia of reliability because (1) B.A.
had no motive to lie; (2) she had the character for
truthfulness; and (3) the statements were "basically
spontaneous." The district court made similar
findings.
The spontaneity of the statements is
questionable. They occurred some five months after
B.A.'s initial disclosure and after many interviews.
We are not persuaded by the district court's
reasoning that attention surrounding the earlier
allegations had faded. Among other things, B.A. had
been seeing a therapist and doubtless was asked
about the earlier events, even if indirectly.
But again the critical factor is the
consistency of the statements with B.A.'s earlier
allegations. Under the totality of the circumstances,
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we find that it provided an adequate sign of
reliability.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Amicus argues that "a criminal defendant
cannot be convicted on the basis of hearsay alone."
Even if hearsay can pass the admissibility threshold,
says Professor Nesson, it is inherently deficient,
without other corroborating evidence, for reaching a
conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
We decline to address this argument because
it is raised for the first time on appeal and not by the
Swans. Although they challenged properly the
sufficiency of the evidence in the trial court by a
motion to dismiss at the close of the evidence, they
did not raise this issue in their habeas petition.
Generally, we do not consider on appeal an
issue raised only by an amicus. Sanchez-Trujillo v.
INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1581 n.9 (9th Cir. 1986)
(amicus may not frame the issues for appeal);
Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851,
862 (9th Cir. 1982) (same). Discretionary exceptions
exist where a party attempts to raise the issue by
reference to the amicus brief. See United States v.
Van Winrow, 951 F.2d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 1991);
Toussaint v. McCarthy. 801 F.2d 1080, 1106 n.27
(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 95 L.
Ed. 2d 871, 107 S. Ct. 2462 (1987). And we have
reached the issue where it involves a jurisdictional
question or touches upon an issue of federalism or
comity that could be considered sua sponte. See
Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968
F.2d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1992) (federalism and
comity), cert. denied, 122 L. Ed. 2d 358, 113 S. Ct.
1050 (1993); Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of
Labor and Industry, 694 F.2d 203, 204 (9th Cir.
1982) (jurisdiction); Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408,
411-12 (9th Cir. 1980) (same), aff'd, 462 U.S. 919,
77 L. Ed. 2d 317, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).1o
The Swans did not adopt amicus' argument
by reference in their brief and none of the other
exceptions apply. The issue has been waived."
BRADY VIOLATION
The Swans contend that the state violated
their due process rights when it suppressed evidence
that Conradi, the day-care worker who was the key
reporting witness, had been sexually abused. The
district court rejected this contention without a
hearing. It found no evidence that the state knew
Conradi had been sexually abused, and concluded
that this was not a material fact of exculpatory value.
During a pretrial deposition, defense counsel
asked Conradi whether she had ever been abused.
The prosecutor advised her not to answer unless
relevancy could be shown. No attempt was made
either to show relevancy or to require an answer to
the question. The Swans argue that the prosecutor's
advice demonstrates that the state knew of Conradi's
past victimization or, at least, that the court should
have granted an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the prosecutor knew, but did not disclose,
that she had been abused.
The Swans were entitled to an evidentiary
hearing only if they alleged facts that, if proved,
would entitle them to relief and if they did not
receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in the state
court. See Greyson v. Kellam, 937 F.2d 1409, 1412
(9th Cir. 1991). We review for an abuse of
discretion the decision to deny an evidentiary
hearing. Id.
The government must disclose evidence
favorable to a defendant and material to either guilt
or punishment. United States v. Streit, 962 F.2d
894, 900 (9th Cir.) (citing United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 674, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 105 S. Ct.
3375 (1985) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963)), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 431 (1992). Evidence is
"material" only if a reasonable probability exists
that, had it been disclosed, the result would have
been different. United States v. Kennedy, 890 F.2d
1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1008, 108 L. Ed. 2d 484, 110 S. Ct. 1308 (1990).
Evidence undermining the credibility of a
government witness must be disclosed when the
reliability of the witness may be determinative of the
defendant's guilt or innocence. United States v.
Brumel-Alvarez, 991 F.2d 1452, 1458 (9th Cir.
1993).
The defense learned of the abuse from a
post-trial interview of Conradi conducted by a
defense investigator posing as a journalist. In the
interview, Conradi said that she saw abuse
everywhere in her neighborhood. She also claimed to
have called Child Protective Services and "turned in
at least 20 kids," who were abusing other children.
Although information about Conradi's abuse
was not before the jury, it heard similar evidence
undermining her credibility. She testified that her
own children had been sexually abused and that she
took a seminar to learn more about the subject, in
part, because of their experience. During
cross-examination, she admitted that she saw
evidence of abuse "everywhere." On redirect, she
clarified the statement by saying that she meant that
child sexual abuse can be found in all social strata.
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Both defense attorneys argued in closing that she was
predisposed to find sexual abuse because of her
personal experience with it.
The jury knew that Conradi's children were
sexually abused and heard argument that she was
biased as a result. But apparently it credited her
testimony. There is no reasonable likelihood that
additional evidence of Conradi's own abuse would
have altered the verdict.
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
Almost five years after the trial, Dr. Richard
Soderstrom conducted a routine gynecological
examination of B.A. The Swans argue that his
findings, that she had a normal, intact hymen and
that her introital opening (the opening into the
vagina) could not previously have been 1 to 1.2
centimeters, constitutes newly discovered evidence
justifying a new trial. They add that the evidence
presented at trial regarding this issue was false and
they were denied due process.
Newly discovered evidence is a ground for
federal habeas corpus relief only when it bears on
the constitutionality of an applicant's conviction,
Herrera v. Collins, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203, 113 S. Ct.
853, 860 (1993), and would "'probably produce an
acquittal,'" Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1523
(9th Cir. 1990) (inner quotation omitted), cert.
denied, 117 L. Ed. 2d 501, 112 S. Ct. 1275 (1992).
We agree with the state that this new
evidence is insignificant. The Swans were convicted
of the statutory rape of R.T. even though physical
evidence of sexual abuse as to her was nonexistent.
The convictions were based upon the evidence of
oral sex,12 which was substantially the same for
B.A. as for R.T.
True, the jury may have convicted the
Swans of raping B.A. based upon the physical
evidence, but convicted them of raping R.T. because
her out-of-court statements paralleled those of B.A.
But even under this unlikely scenario, evidence about
the intact hymen probably would not have produced
an acquittal.
Nurse Practitioner Theodore Ritter said that
when he examined B.A. he did not notice the
presence or absence of the hymen. He said,
however, that ordinarily an examiner cannot see into
the vagina due to the presence of the hymen, but that
he was able to see into B.A.'s vagina. He estimated
that her introital opening was 1 to 1.2 centimeters,
though he did not measure it. Another state witness,
Dr. Carol Jenny, testified that Ritter's observations
meant only that Ritter could see through the hymenal
opening, and that an accurate measurement of the
vaginal introitus is obtainable only with a measuring
device, which Ritter did not use.
Dr. Lawrence Parris also testified for the
state. He said that he examined B.A. and found no
evidence of physical injury to her genitalia. He also
said that he did not notice the presence or absence of
a hymen.
Contrary to the Swans' contentions, the
newly discovered evidence does not contradict
materially the evidence presented at trial. At most,
it could have been used to impeach Ritter's
testimony concerning the size of the introital
opening. It does not demonstrate that the state's
evidence was false. It was merely equivocal.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The Swans argue that their trial attorneys'
failure to discover that the state's medical evidence
regarding B.A. was false constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel.
They must show deficient performance and
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-90, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
In light of our conclusion that the new medical
evidence would not with reasonable likelihood have
altered the result, the Swans cannot show prejudice.
Their ineffective assistance claim fails.
AFFIRMED.
ENDNOTES
1. At the time, RCW § 9A.44.120 read:
A statement made by a child when under the age of
ten describing any act of sexual contact performed with or on
the child by another, not otherwise admissible by statute or
court rule, is admissible in evidence in criminal
proceedings ... if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside
the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and
circumstances of the statement provide sufficient
indicia of reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) Testifies at the proceeding; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness: Provided,
That when the child is unavailable as a
witness, such statement may be admitted
only if there is corroborative evidence of
the act.
2. We have no reason to decide whether White v. Illinois,
116 L. Ed. 2d 848, 112 S. Ct. 736, 741 (1992), limits the
unavailability requirement to cases involving the admission of
prior testimony.
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3. The Washington Supreme Court has identified a similar list
of factors bearing on the reliability of a child sexual abuse
victim's hearsay statements. State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d
165, 691 P.2d 197, 205 (Wash. 1984); State v. Parris, 98
Wash. 2d 140, 654 P.2d 77, 80 (Wash. 1982).
4. For example, corroboration of a child's allegations of
sexual abuse by medical evidence may tend to show that
abuse occurred but it sheds no light on the allegations of the
identity of the abuser. A jury might rely on the partial
corroboration to mistakenly infer the trustworthiness of the
entire statement. Wright, 497 U.S. at 824.
5. The court probably emphasized other corroborating
evidence because of the requirements of the Washington child
sexual abuse hearsay statute. It requires a trial court to make
separate determinations of reliability and corroboration
before admitting a hearsay statement when the child is
unavailable to testify. Swan, 790 P.2d at 615. The trial court
did not make separate determinations but instead apparently
blended the inquiries. Id. at 616.
6. Somewhat troubling is Bratvold's admission that she began
to cry upon hearing R.T.'s allegations about Kathy Swan, but
continued interviewing the girl. This at least raises the
question whether the day-care worker's change in demeanor
may have, in a subtle way, prompted R.T.'s additional
statements. Cf. Wright, 497 U.S. at 826-827 (if there "is
evidence of prior interrogation, prompting, or manipulation
by adults, spontaneity may be an inaccurate indicator of
trustworthiness"). Bratvold was not trained professionally to
interview child sexual abuse victims. But we decline to
speculate endlessly from a cold reading of the record. We
defer to the trial court's conclusions that Bratvold did not
direct the girl's answers.
7. Because Wright holds that the consistency of a child
witness's allegations bears on the reliability of an initial
hearsay statement, arguably a later inconsistent statement
should also be evaluated in making the reliability
determination. This does not mean, however, that R.T.'s later
allegation undermines the reliability of her earlier statements.
The statement about "Jerry" was not necessarily inconsistent
because it may have referred to entirely different events than
those involving the Swans.
8. Among other remarks, R.T. said that she had been in the
courtroom 40 times (she had never been there before), she
had seen defense counsel four days earlier (she had not) and
her dress was "blue, sort of, but it's pink" (it was blue).
9. See, e.g., Wright, 497 U.S. at 826; Stephen Ceci &
Maggie Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A
Historical Review and Synthesis, 113 Psychol. Bull. 403
(1993); Daniel Goleman, Studies Reveal Suggestibility of
Very Young as Witnesses, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1993, at
Al, A9.
10. In United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.
1988), an anomalous case, we addressed an issue raised on
appeal only by an amicus. We did so because the issue was
purely legal and involved interpretation of a new statute. Id.
at 1001 n.8. But the authority Sherbondy relied upon
concerned only when a party, as opposed to an amicus, may
raise an issue for the first time on appeal. See Abex Corp.
v. Ski's Enters., Inc., 748 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir. 1984).
11. We also note that whether the Swans' convictions rested
on hearsay alone is unclear. The Washington Supreme Court
found the medical evidence regarding B.A. and also, to a
lesser extent, R.T.'s play with an anatomically correct doll,
somewhat corroborative. See Swan, 790 P.2d at 624.
12. The statute under which the Swans were convicted,
former RCW § 9A.44.070, defined sexual intercourse to
include oral sex.
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93-7659 HARRIS v. ALABAMA
Death sentence-Disregard of jury recommenda-
tion-Absence of standards for court's discretion.
Ruling below (Ala SupCt, 632 So.2d 543):
Sentence of death by electrocution, imposed on
capital murder defendant by trial judge despite
jury's recommendation of life without parole, is
affirmed.
Questions presented: (1) Is death sentence in-
valid when trial court overrides constitutionally
protected jury verdict of life without parole and
imposes death, when court relies on no norm or
standard for limiting its discretion to override and
when it gives no reason as to why jury verdict is
improper? (2) Does capital sentencing scheme in
which trial courts are free to reject jury life-
without-parole verdicts without regard to any
articulated standard or norm, and in which rejec-
tion of those verdicts results in haphazard and
inconsistent application of death penalty, violate
Eighth Amendment?
Petition for certiorari filed 1/26/94, by Bryan
A. Stevenson, of Montgomery, Ala., and Ruth E.
Friedman, of Atlanta, Ga.
In forma pauperis and certiorari granted
6/27/94. See 62 LW 3860.
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JUDGES: HOUSTON, Hornsby, Maddox, Shores, Almon, Adams
OPINION: HOUSTON, JUSTICE.
This is a capital murder case. A detailed
statement of the facts appears in the opinion of the
Court of Criminal Appeals, Harris v. State, 632 So.
2d 503 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992).
Louise Harris was convicted of capital
murder; the jury recommended a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole. The trial court
overrode the jury's recommendation and sentenced
Harris to death by electrocution. Judge Bowen,
writing for the Court of Criminal Appeals, affirmed
Harris's conviction with a lengthy opinion, from
which Judge Montiel dissented. The Court of
Criminal Appeals overruled Harris's application for
rehearing and denied her Rule 39(k), Ala.R.App.P.,
motion, without opinion. We then granted certiorari
review pursuant to Rule 39(c), Ala.R.App.P.
Having carefully read and considered the
record, together with Harris's 141-page brief, the
state's 237-page brief, and Harris's 18-page reply
brief, we conclude that the Court of Criminal
Appeals correctly resolved the issues discussed in its
opinion. We do note, however, the issue on which
Judge Montiel dissents -- whether Harris had an
absolute right to be present at "all pretrial
proceedings relating to [her] case" (i.e., proceedings
involving questions of law, questions of procedure,
or questions regarding the removal of Harris's
counsel), pursuant to the guarantees of the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and because every
criminal defendant, particularly a defendant in a
capital murder case, has the fundamental right to
participate in the preparation of her defense. Suffice
it to say, without further discussion, that after
thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable
law, we are satisfied that the Court of Criminal
Appeals adequately addressed and correctly resolved
this issue.
We note also that Harris has raised in this
Court several issues that were either not presented to
or not addressed by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Because this Court may consider any issue in a
capital case concerning the propriety of the
conviction and the death sentence, and, more
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importantly, because a person's life hangs in the
balance, we have fully considered each of the
additional issues Harris has raised. Furthermore, we
have independently searched the record for error, as
did the Court of Criminal Appeals. However, after
carefully researching the applicable law and after
exhaustively scouring the record for error, we find
no reversible error in the proceedings below.
We do feel, however, that the following
issue, raised by Harris in this Court, warrants
further discussion: Whether the absence of a full
transcript of the voir dire examination of the jury
and all bench conferences denied Harris a
fundamentally fair trial in violation of state law and
in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and thus constituted reversible error.
Harris bases her argument on Rule 19.4(a),
Ala.R.Crim.P., which requires:
"In all capital cases (criminal trials
in which the defendant is charged with a
death penalty offense), the court reporter
shall take full stenographic notes of voir
dire of the jury and of the arguments of
counsel, whether or not such is ordered by
the judge or requested by the prosecution or
defense. This duty may not be abrogated by
the judge or waived by the defendant."
(Emphasis added.)
This case was commenced before the adoption of
Rule 19.4; therefore, Rule 19.4 is not applicable in
this case. Rather, Temporary Rule 21,
Ala.Temp.R.Crim.P., governs this case; it read, in
part, as follows:
"(a) In all capital cases (criminal
cases in which the defendant is charged with
a death penalty offense), the court reporter
shall take full stenographic notes of the
arguments of counsel whether or not such is
ordered by the judge or requested by the
prosecution or defense. This duty may not
be abrogated by the judge or waived by the
defendant." (Emphasis added.)
Under Temporary Rule 21(a), there was no
requirement that the voir dire examination of the jury
be stenographically recorded; and the requirement
that the court reporter take "full stenographic notes"
of "the arguments of counsel" -- which appeared in
Temporary Rule 21(a) and also appears in the
current Rule 19.4(a) -- does not require the court
reporter to transcribe every incidental discussion
between counsel and the trial judge that occurs at the
bench unless counsel so requests or the court so
directs. Instead, the phrase "arguments of counsel"
refers to opening and closing arguments of counsel.
See, e.g., Ex parte Godbolt, 546 So. 2d 991 (Ala.
1987); Webb v. State, 539 So. 2d 343
(Ala.Crim.App. 1987); Reeves v. State, 518 So. 2d
168 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987); see Ala. Code 1975, §
12-17-275.
In this case, the items or statements omitted
from the record were not transcribed because they
occurred out of the hearing of the court reporter.
However, Harris's trial counsel had moved the trial
court to "order the official court reporter to record
and transcribe all proceedings in all phases [of the
case], including pretrial hearings, legal arguments,
voir dire and selection of the jury, in-chambers
conferences, any discussions regarding jury
instructions, and all matters during the trial and in
support thereof ... "; and the court had granted the
motion. After granting the motion, the court had the
duty to see that the entire proceedings were
transcribed; we must conclude that the failure to
record and transcribe a portion of the voir dire
examination of the jury and certain portions of the
bench conferences, in light of the fact that Harris
was represented on appeal by counsel other than the
attorney at trial, constituted error. See Ex parte
Godbolt, 546 So. 2d 991 (Ala. 1987).l Thus, the
question becomes whether that error constituted
reversible error.
"'When, [as in this case], a criminal
defendant is represented on appeal by
counsel other than the attorney at trial, the
absence of a substantial and significant
portion of the record, even absent any
showing of specific prejudice or error, is
sufficient to mandate reversal. The wisdom
of this rule is apparent. When a defendant is
represented on appeal by the same attorney
who defended him at trial, the court may
properly require counsel to articulate the
prejudice that may have resulted from the
failure to record a portion of the
proceedings. Indeed, counsel's obligation to
the court alone would seem to compel him
to initiate such disclosure. The attorney,
having been present at trial, should be
expected to be aware of any errors or
improprieties which may have occurred
during the portion of the proceedings not
recorded. But when a defendant is
represented on appeal by counsel not
involved at trial [as in this case], counsel
cannot reasonably be expected to show
specific prejudice. To be sure, there may be
some instances where it can readily be
determined from the balance of the record
whether an error has been made during the
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untranscribed portion of the proceedings.
Often, however, even the most careful
consideration of the available transcript will
not permit us to discern whether reversible
error occurred while the proceedings were
not being recorded. In such a case, to
require new counsel to establish the
irregularities that may have taken place
would render illusory an appellant's right to
[have the reviewing court] notice plain
errors or defects....
"'We do not advocate a mechanistic
approach to situations involving the absence
of a complete transcript of the trial
proceedings. We must, however, be able to
conclude affirmatively that no substantial
rights of the appellant have been adversely
affected by the omissions from the
transcript. When ... a substantial and
significant portion of the record is missing,
and the appellant is represented on appeal by
counsel not involved at trial, such a
conclusion is foreclosed....'
Ex parte Godbolt, 546 So. 2d at 997. (Citations
omitted; emphasis added.) (Quoting with approval
United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 1303, 1305-06 (5th
Cir. 1977)).
We have carefully reread those portions of
the record where each omission occurred and have
reread the several pages before and the several pages
after those omitted portions, to ascertain, if possible,
the content and substance of the discussions not
transcribed, so as to determine whether "a substantial
and significant portion of the record" is missing and
to determine whether we could "conclude
affirmatively that no substantial rights of [Harris]
have been adversely affected by the omissions from
the transcript." Id.
From this extensive review, and given the
particular facts of this case, we have concluded that
the untranscribed portions of the proceedings did not
constitute "a substantial and significant portion of the
record" and we have "concluded affirmatively that
no substantial rights of [Harris] have been adversely
affected by the omissions from the transcript."
Rather, we have concluded that the trial court's
rulings related to certain omitted portions of the
proceedings were adverse to the state and that the
content or substance of the other discussions that
occurred out of the hearing of the court reporter was
general in nature and had no effect on the outcome
of the case. We conclude, under the facts of this
case, that the error in failing to ensure that the entire
proceedings were transcribed was harmless.
Therefore, Harris's conviction was properly
affirmed.
We note for the Bench and Bar that our
holding that the failure to ensure a complete
transcript of the proceedings was harmless error is
strictly limited to the facts of this case and to the
record before us; we are not to be understood as
holding that in all cases such an error will be
considered harmless. Rather, each case will be
limited to and determined on its own facts.
AFFIRMED.
Hornsby, C. J., and Maddox and Shores, JJ.,
concur.
Almon, J., concurs in the result.
Adams, J., dissents.
DISSENT: ADAMS, JUSTICE (dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent from the majority
opinion. In my view, the defendant, under Alabama
law as it has developed since Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712
(1986), was entitled to require the prosecutor to
explain the reasons for her peremptory challenges of
black veniremembers. The venire consisted of 17
black members and 33 white members. During the
selection process, the prosecutor challenged 12 of the
black veniremembers with her 19 allotted peremptory
strikes. Thus, she challenged 71 % of the black
veniremembers, but only 21 % of the white
veniremembers.
These facts, standing alone, are sufficient to
raise an inference of discrimination, but the inference
is further strengthened by an additional fact. As the
Court of Criminal Appeals observed, this prosecutor
"has a history of using peremptory challenges to
discriminate against black jurors." Harris v. State,
632 So. 2d 503 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting
Hood v. State, 598 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1991)). "An example of what appears to be a
systematic practice of discrimination is a relevant
factor to'be considered both at the trial level and on
review in assessing the strength of the defendant's
prima facie case." Ex parte Bird, 594 So. 2d 676,
681 (Ala. 1991).
Notwithstanding these factors, the Court of
Criminal Appeals determined that the defendant had
failed to present a prima facie case of racial
discrimination in jury selection, and, consequently,
that the prosecutor was not required to justify her
challenges. That court's disposition of this issue is
inexplicable and erroneous, as is this Court's
majority opinion, which, sub silentio, concurs in that
court's conclusion.
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The readiness of the judiciary to guard
against inroads into constitutional guarantees must
not depend on its assessment of the merits of the
underlying case. I cannot, therefore, justify the
conclusion that the facts presented by the defendant
do not require us to remand this cause for further
proceedings at which the State would be required to
explain its challenges. Consequently, I must
respectfully dissent.
ENDNOTE
1. Neither Temporary Rule 21, Ala.Temp.R.Crin.P., nor
Rule 19.4,Ala.R.Crim.P., was in effect when this Court
decided Ex parte Godbolt. Nonetheless, the rationale of Ex
parte Godbolt is applicable to the facts of this case.
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93-1260 US. v. LOPEZ
Possession of firearm within 1,000 feet of
school-Commerce Clause.
Ruling below (CA 5, 2 F.3d 1342, 62 LW
2173, 53 CrL 1533):
In absence of congressional findings regarding
link to interstate commerce, federal statute that
makes it crime to possess firearm within 1,000
feet of school, 18 USC 922(q), exceeds Congress'
authority under Commerce Clause and is, there-
fore, unconstitutional; defendant's conviction of
violating Section 922(q) is reversed.
Question presented: Does Commerce Clause
empower Congress to enact Section 922(q),
which makes it federal offense to possess firearm
within 1,000 feet of school?
Petition for certiorari filed 2/2/94, by Drew S.
Days III, Sol. Gen., Jo Ann Harris, Asst. Atty.
Gen., William C. Bryson, Dpty. Sol. Gen., and
Ronald J. Mann, Asst. to Sol. Gen.
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DISPOSITION: For the reasons stated, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the case is remanded with
directions to dismiss the indictment. REVERSED
COUNSEL: For Plaintiff-Appellee: RONALD F. EDERER, USA, Richard L. Durbin, Jr., AUSA, San
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JUDGES: Before REAVLEY, KING and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges.
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
The United States Constitution establishes a
national government of limited and enumerated
powers. As James Madison put it in The Federalist
Papers, "The powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite." The
Federalist No. 45, at 292 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
Madison's understanding was confirmed by the
Tenth Amendment. It is easy to lose sight of all this
in a day when Congress appropriates trillion-dollar
budgets and regulates myriad aspects of economic
and social life. Nevertheless, there are occasions on
which we are reminded of this fundamental postulate
of our constitutional order. This case presents such
an occasion.
Proceedings Below
On March 10, 1992, defendant-appellant
Alfonso Lopez, Jr., then a twelfth-grade student
attending Edison High School in San Antonio,
Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38
caliber handgun. Based upon an anonymous tip,
school officials confronted Lopez, who admitted that
he was carrying the weapon. Although the gun was
unloaded, Lopez had five bullets on his person. After
being advised of his rights, Lopez stated that
"Gilbert" had given him the gun so that he (Lopez)
could deliver it after school to "Jason," who planned
to use it in a "gang war." Lopez was to receive $40
for his services.
Lopez was charged in a one-count indictment
with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), which makes it
illegal to possess a firearm in a school zone.' After
pleading not guilty, Lopez moved to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that section 922(q) "is
unconstitutional, as it is beyond the power of
Congress to legislate control over our public
schools." His brief in support of the motion further
alleged that section 922(q) "does not appear to have
been enacted in furtherance of any of those
enumerated powers" of the federal government. The
district court denied the motion, concluding that
section 922(q) "is a constitutional exercise of
Congress' well-defined power to regulate activities in
and affecting commerce, and the 'business' of
elementary, middle and high schools . . . affects
interstate commerce." Lopez thereafter waived his
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right to a jury trial and was tried to the bench upon
stipulated evidence. The court found Lopez guilty
and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment to be
followed by two years' supervised release. Lopez
now appeals his conviction and sentence. Lopez's
sole objection to his conviction is his constitutional
challenge to section 922(q); he does not otherwise
contest his guilt. We now reverse.
Overview
So far as we are aware, the constitutionality
of section 922(q), also known as "the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990," is a question of first
impression in the federal courts.2 Section
922(q)(1)(A) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place
that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to
believe, is a school zone. " Section 922(q)(1)(B)
then carves out several limited exceptions, none of
which are applicable here.4 Section 922(q)(2) makes
it illegal, again with some exceptions, to
intentionally or recklessly discharge a firearm in a
known school zone. Section 922(q)(3) disclaims any
intent on the part of Congress to preempt state law.
Violations are punishable by up to 5 years'
imprisonment and a $ 5,000 fine. 18 U.S.C. §
924(a)(4).
"As every schoolchild learns, our
Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty
between the States and the Federal Government."
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 115 L. Ed. 2d 410, 111 S. Ct.
2395, 2399 (1991). Justice O'Connor's observation
is particularly apt in the context of this case, which
pits the states' traditional authority over education
and schooling against the federal government's
acknowledged power to regulate firearms in or
affecting interstate commerce. Lopez argues that
section 922(q) exceeds Congress' delegated powers
and violates the Tenth Amendment. 5 The
government counters that section 922(q) is a
permissible exercise of Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause.6 In actuality, the Tenth
Amendment and Commerce Clause issues in this
case are but two sides of the same coin. As Justice
O'Connor has explained:
"In a case like this one, involving the
division of authority between federal and
state governments, the two inquiries are
mirror images of each other. If a power is
delegated to Congress in the Constitution,
the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims
any reservation of that power to the States;
if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty
reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is
necessarily a power the Constitution has not
conferred on Congress."
New York v. United States, 120 L. Ed. 2d 120, 112
S. Ct. 2408, 2417 (1992).
Thus, even if Lopez is correct that section 922(q)
intrudes upon a domain traditionally left to the states,
it is constitutional as long as it falls within the
commerce power. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S.
Ct. at 2400 ("As long as it is acting within the
powers granted it under the Constitution, Congress
may impose its will on the States."). This is not to
say, however, that the Tenth Amendment is
irrelevant to a Commerce Clause analysis. Our
understanding of the breadth of Congress' commerce
power is related to the degree to which its
enactments raise Tenth Amendment concerns, that is
concerns for the meaningful jurisdiction reserved to
the states. At a more textual level, the Tenth
Amendment, though it does not purport to define the
limits of the commerce power, obviously proceeds
on the assumption that the reach of that power is not
unlimited, else there would be nothing on which the
Tenth Amendment could operate.
A good place to begin our analysis is the
case of United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S.
Ct. 515, 30 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1971). At issue in Bass
was the felon in possession provision of the Omnibus
Crime Control Act of 1968, which made it unlawful
for any felon to "receive[], possess[], or transport[]
in commerce or affecting commerce" any firearm. 18
U.S.C. former § 1202(a)(1). Because the "in
commerce or affecting commerce" language might be
read to apply only to the crime of transporting a
firearm, the question for the Court was whether, in
pure possession cases, the government had to prove
a connection to commerce or whether section 1202
reached the mere possession of firearms. The best
evidence for the government's position that the
statute reached mere possession without any
commerce nexus was the floor statements of Senator
Long, who introduced section 1202, and the formal
findings contained in Title VII of this 1968 act.7
While conceding that this legislative history lent
"some significant support" for the government's
view, id. at 521, the Court was not convinced. Were
section 1202 read to punish mere possession without
a commerce nexus, the Court argued, it would
intrude upon an area of traditional state authority and
would push Congress' commerce power to its limit,
if not beyond. Because Congress had not clearly
expressed its intent to do so, the Court therefore
adopted the narrower construction of the statute:
"Unless Congress conveys its purpose
clearly, it will not be deemed to have
significantly changed the federal-state
balance. Congress has traditionally been
reluctant to define as a federal crime
conduct readily denounced as criminal by
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the States. . . . [Thus] we will not be quick
to assume that Congress has meant to effect
a significant change in the sensitive relation
between federal and state criminal
jurisdiction." Id. at 523 (footnotes omitted).
Significantly, the Bass Court noted that "in light of
our disposition of the case, we do not reach the
question whether, upon appropriate findings,
Congress can constitutionally punish the 'mere
possession' of firearms." Id. at 518 n.4. In a
subsequent case, the Court held that to satisfy former
section 1202's commerce nexus, it need only be
shown that the possessed firearm had traveled at
some time in interstate commerce. See Scarborough
v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 97 S. Ct. 1963,
1965, 52 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1977).8 However,
Scarborough did not purport to answer the question
left open in Bass' footnote 4.
The government argues that section 922(q)
is no different from a number of other federal
firearms crimes. We are not persuaded. With the
exception of a few relatively recent, special case
provisions, federal laws proscribing firearm
possession require the government to prove a
connection to commerce, or other federalizing
feature, in individual cases. For example, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g), the successor to former section 1202,
makes it unlawful for felons and some other classes
of persons to "possess [a firearm] in or affecting
commerce." Because a commerce nexus is an
element of the crime defined by section 922(g), each
application of that statute is within the commerce
power. See United States v. Wallace, 889 F.2d 580,
583 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1006,
110 S. Ct. 3243, 111 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1990) (holding
that section 922(g) "reaches only those firearms that
[have] traveled in interstate or foreign commerce and
is thus constitutional"). Section 922(q), lacking such
a nexus requirement, is not on an equal footing with
statutes like section 922(g). The government points
to several firearm proscriptions not requiring the
specific firearm to have traveled in commerce, such
as: 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (false statement in
acquisition of firearm from licensed dealer,
manufacturer, or importer); id. § 922(b)(1) & (2)
(sale or delivery by licensed dealer, manufacturer, or
importer to a minor or in violation of state law); id.
§ 922(b)(4) (sale or delivery by licensed dealer,
manufacturer, or importer of certain specified
weapons, such as machine guns or short-barrelled
rifles); id. § 922(m) (recordkeeping violations by
licensed dealer, manufacturer, or importer).
However, not only do all these proscriptions pertain
to essentially commercial actions involving the
firearms business, as opposed to mere simple
possession by any individual, cf. United States v.
Nelson, 458 F.2d 556, 559 (5th Cir. 1972)
("acquisition of firearms is more closely related to
interstate commerce than mere possession"), but each
is also expressly tied to the dealer, manufacturer, or
importer in question being federally licensed. 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(9), (10), & (11).9
Historical Outline, Federal Firearms Legislation
We now digress to outline at some length the
major developments in the history of presently
relevant federal firearms control legislation.
General federal domestic legislation in this
area may be traced to two enactments, first, the
National Firearms Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1236-1240,
originally codified as 26 U.S.C. § 1132, now
codified, as amended, as chapter 53 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872,
and, second, the Federal Firearms Act of 1938, 52
Stat. 1250, originally codified as former 15 U.S.C.
§ 901-910, now repealed, the provisions of which, as
amended and supplemented, have been carried
forward to chapter 44 of Title 18, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921
et seq.' 0
The National Firearms Act of 1934
The National Firearms Act, applicable only
to a narrow class of firearms such as machine guns,
"sawed-off" shotguns and rifles, silencers, and the
like, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)," is grounded on
Congress' taxing power under Article I, Section 8,
Clause 1. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506,
57 S. Ct. 554, 81 L. Ed. 772 (1937); United States
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S. Ct. 816, 83 L. Ed.
1206 (1939). Its prohibitions are keyed to the
imposition of an excise tax on the business of dealing
in such weapons and on transfers of them, together
with related requirements for registration of the
dealer, the transfers, and the weapons. See
Sonzinsky; Miller; Haynes v. United States, 88 S.
Ct. 772 (1968); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S.
601, 91 S. Ct. 1112, 1115-1117, 28 L. Ed. 2d 356
(1971). However, section 922(q), which concerns us
here, has no roots or antecedent in the National
Firearms Act, is in no way related or tied to taxation
or any character of registration or reporting, and is
applicable to all firearms. Accordingly, the National
Firearms Act, and its history and development, are
essentially irrelevant to our present inquiry, and we
turn our attention to the Federal Firearms Act and its
successors. 12
The Federal Firearms Act of 1938
The Federal Firearms Act of 1938 applied to
all firearms, former 15 U.S.C. § 901(3), and
prohibited "any manufacturer or dealer" not licensed
thereunder from transporting, shipping, or receiving
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any firearm or ammunition "in interstate or foreign
commerce," id. § 902(a), and also prohibited "any
person" from receiving any firearm or ammunition
"transported or shipped in interstate or foreign
commerce in violation of" section 902(a). Id. §
902(b). Licensed dealers and manufacturers could
ship firearms interstate only to other licensed dealers
and manufacturers and to those who had or were not
required to have a license under state law to
purchase the firearm, id. § 902(c). Licensed dealers
and manufacturers were required to keep records of
firearms transactions. Id. § 903(d). It was made an
offense for "any person" to ship or transport "in
interstate or foreign commerce" any stolen firearm
or ammunition, id. § 902(g), and for "any person to
transport, ship, or knowingly receive in interstate or
foreign commerce" any firearm with an altered or
removed serial number. Id. § 902(i). It was also
made unlawful for "any person" to ship or transport
"in interstate or foreign commerce" any firearm or
ammunition to any felon, person under felony
indictment, or fugitive from justice, 3 id. § 902(d);
and, felons, those under felony indictment, and
fugitives, could not "ship" or "transport" any firearm
or ammunition "in interstate or foreign commerce."
Id. § 902(e). Further, felons and fugitives could not
"receive any firearm or ammunition that had been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce." Id. § 902(f). The latter section included
a provision that "possession of a firearm or
ammunition by any such person shall be presumptive
evidence that such firearm or ammunition was
shipped or transported or received, as the case may
be, by such person in violation of this chapter."
Id.14 In Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.
Ct. 1241, 87 L. Ed. 1519 (1943), this presumption
was held invalid on due process grounds as applied
to whether the weapon "was received by" the
defendant "in interstate or foreign commerce" or
after the effective date of the act. Id. at 1244, 1245.
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
The Federal Firearms Act remained
otherwise in force without significant change until
the enactment in June 1968 of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, P.L. 90-351,
90th Cong. 2d Sess. (1968) 82 Stat. 197. Title IV(Q§ 901-907) of P.L. 90-351 repealed the Federal
Firearms Act (id. § 907) and enacted a new chapter
44 ("Firearms") of Title 18 (18 U.S.C. § 921-928),
which incorporated, with some amendments, almost
all the provisions of the Federal Firearms Act,' 5
and added further firearms offenses.
Unlike the Federal Firearms Act, this
legislation required a federal license "for any person
. . . to engage in the business of importing,
manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or
ammunition" even though the business did not
operate in interstate commerce. P.L. 90-351, § 902;
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1). See also id. § 923(a). The
relevant committee report states that new section
922(a)(1) "makes it clear that a license is required
for an intrastate business as well as an interstate
business. The present Federal Firearms Act (15
U.S.C. § 902(a)) merely prohibits the interstate or
foreign shipment or receipt of firearms by a
manufacturer or dealer unless he has a license." Sen.
Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1968 U.S.CC.A.N. 2112 at 2202.16
Public Law 90-351 § 901(a) contains, among
others, the following express Congressional findings,
viz:
"(1) that there is a widespread traffic in
firearms moving in or otherwise affecting
interstate or foreign commerce, and that the
existing Federal controls over such traffic do
not adequately enable the States to control
this traffic within their own borders through
the exercise of their police power; . . .
(3) that only through adequate
Federal control over interstate and foreign
commerce in these weapons, and over all
persons engaging in the businesses of
importing, manufacturing, or dealing in
them, can this grave problem be properly
dealt with, and effective State and local
regulation of this traffic be made possible;
. . ." (emphasis added). 7
These Congressional findings may properly
be understood as saying that federal regulation of all
firearms dealers and manufacturers, not just those
conducting an interstate business, was necessary in
order to control firearms traffic "moving in or
otherwise affecting interstate or foreign commerce."
In Nelson, 458 F.2d at 559, we quoted the above
set-out section 901(a)(3), and observed that "if
Congress is to effectively prevent the interstate use
of guns for illegal purposes it must control their
sources: manufacturers, dealers, and importers."
This reasoning from the quoted Congressional
findings in support of the requirement that all
firearms manufacturers and dealers be federally
licensed is analogous to the reasoning we employed
in United States v. Lopez, 459 F.2d 949 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Llerena v. United States, 409
U.S. 878, 93 S. Ct. 130, 34 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1972),in sustaining federal regulation of intrastate as well
as interstate narcotics traffic. See id. at 951-53(relying on express Congressional findings "that
intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled
substances . . . had a substantial and direct effect on
interstate commerce" and "swelled the interstate
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traffic in such substances," that "it was impossible to
distinguish between substances manufactured and
distributed intrastate from those manufactured and
distributed interstate," and thus "that control of the
intrastate incidents of traffic in controlled substances
was essential to control of interstate incidents of that
traffic").
However, it is significant that, apart from
the license requirement for all firearms dealers and
manufacturers, all the numerous proscriptions of
chapter 44 of Title 18, as thus enacted, were
expressly tied either to interstate commerce or to the
regulation of the conduct of, or dealings with,
federally licensed dealers, manufacturers, or
importers, or to both. This was true not only for the
proscriptions that were carried over from the Federal
Firearms Act," but also for the added
proscriptions .
In Title VII of P.L. 90-351 Congress also
enacted what came to be codified as 18 U.S.C. App.
§§ 1201 through 1203 (now repealed). Title VII was
added on the Senate floor, "hastily passed, with little
discussion, no hearings, and no report," and "never
received committee consideration in" either chamber.
Bass, 92 S. Ct. at 520 & n.11. Section 1202(a)
criminalized any felon (or person discharged other
than honorably from the Armed Forces, or adjudged
a mental incompetent, or who had renounced United
States citizenship, or was an alien unlawfully in the
country) "who receives, possesses, or transports in
commerce or affecting commerce . .. any firearm."
Section 1201 contained Congressional findings "that
the receipt, possession, or transportation of a firearm
by felons" (and by the other categories of persons
covered by section 1202(a)) "constitutes (1) a burden
on commerce or threat affecting the free flow of
commerce," and "a threat to the safety of the
President . . . and Vice-President" and to the
continued effective operation of the federal and all
state governments, and "an impediment or a threat"
to the exercise of First Amendment rights. In the
Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, P.L.
99-308, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 104 Stat. 449, other
aspects of which we consider in more detail below,
all of Title VII (including section 1201 and all its
findings) was repealed, P.L. 99-308, § 104(b), and
most of the substantive provisions of Title VII (e.g.,
§§ 1202 & 1203) were essentially incorporated into
section 922. P.L. 99-308, § 102.
Gun Control Act of 1968
In October 1968, Congress enacted the Gun
Control Act of 1968, P.L. 90-618, 90th Cong. 2d
Sess., 82 Stat. 1213. Title I of this legislation
reenacted all of chapter 44 of Title 18 (Q§ 921-928),
but with what are for present purposes essentially
only minor changes from the version thereof enacted
earlier that year by Title IV of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.2" Among
these changes were, for example, removal or
narrowing of most of the exemptions that Title IV
had made for rifles and shotguns (see note 20, supra,
and note 23, infra), additional coverage of
transactions in ammunition in certain instances where
Title IV dealt only in firearms, and adding unlawful
users of federally regulated narcotics and adjudicated
mental defectives to felons, fugitives, and indictees
as persons concerning whom certain firearm
transactions were prohibited." Title I also added
certain new prohibitions on licensees, including a
new section 922(c) prohibiting licensees from selling
firearms to those who are not licensees unless the
purchaser either appeared in person on the licensee's
premises or furnished a sworn statement as to his
eligibility and seven days' notice was given the chief
law enforcement officer of the transferee's residence
prior to delivery or shipment. Other provisions
relaxed some of the restrictions of section 922(a)(3)
& (5) as enacted by Title IV of P.L. 90-351.' In
sum, the Gun Control Act of 1968 maintained the
same essential jurisdictional bases of the earlier 1968
legislation, namely -- apart from the license
requirement for all dealers and manufacturers -- an
express nexus either to interstate commerce or to the
conduct of, or dealings with, federally licensed
dealers or manufacturers, or to both. The legislative
history is consistent with this approach." The
House committee report explains the purpose of the
Gun Control Act of 1968 (which originated as H.R.
17735) in relevant part as follows:
"PURPOSE
The principal purpose of H.R.
17735, as amended, is to strengthen Federal
controls over interstate and foreign
commerce in firearms and to assist the
States effectively to regulate firearms traffic
within their borders.
GENERAL STATEMENT
The increasing rate of crime and
lawlessness and the growing use of firearms
in violent crime clearly attest to a need to
strengthen Federal regulation of interstate
firearms traffic.
The subject legislation responds to
widespread national concern that existing
Federal control over the sale and shipment
of firearms [across] State lines is grossly
inadequate.
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Handguns, rifles, and shotguns have
been the chosen means to execute
three-quarters of a million people in the
United States since 1900. The use of
firearms in violent crimes continues to
increase today.
The committee is persuaded that the
proposed legislation imposes much needed
restrictions on interstate firearms traffic and,
at the same time, does not interfere with
legitimate recreational and self-protection
uses of firearms by law-abiding citizens.
The committee urges its enactment."
H.R. Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410 at 4411-13,
4415 (emphasis added).
Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986
This basic jurisdictional structure -- the
licensing of all firearms dealers and manufacturers,
based on Congress' express finding (in the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, P.L.
90-351, § 902(a)(3)) to the effect that such was
necessary to adequate federal control of interstate
and foreign commerce in firearms, and in all other
instances an express nexus either to interstate
commerce or to the activity of, or dealings with,
federally licensed dealers or manufacturers, or to
both' -- has continued to the present, with only a
few, discrete exceptions, the first of which arose in
1986, in the Firearms Owners' Protection Act, P.L.
99-308, 99 Cong., 2d Sess., 100 Stat. 449-461.
Section 102(5)(A) of the Firearms Owners'
Protection Act, 100 Stat. 451-52, amended section
922(d), as explained in the relevant committee
report, "by extending the prohibition on transferring
firearms to disqualified persons [e.g., felons,
fugitives, etc.] from only licensees to private
individuals as well." H.R. Rep. No. 99-495, 99
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1327 at 1341. The explanation for this particular
amendment appears in an "assessment" of the bill by
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(BATF) that appears in full as a part of this
committee report, and states "This proposal would
close an existing loophole whereby qualified
purchasers have acquired firearms from licensees on
behalf of prohibited persons." Id. 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1343.' This amendment to
section 922(d) does not render it analogous to section
992(q), which is presently before us. To begin with,
section 922(d) deals with transfers, not mere
possession, and, as we said in Nelson, "acquisition
of firearms is more closely related to interstate
commerce than mere possession." Id. 458 F.2d at
559. Moreover, the above quoted legislative history
indicates that Congress determined that relegation of
all transferors to disqualified persons, not just federal
licensee transferors, was necessary to prevent
evasion of the regulation of federal licensees (a
regulation with independent legitimacy, see note 9,
supra). This is consistent with the approach we took
in Lopez in sustaining federal regulation of
intrastate, as well as interstate, narcotics trafficking.
Id. 459 F.2d at 951-53. See also Nelson, 458 F.2d
at 559 (relying on Congressional finding in P.L.
90-351, § 901(a)(3), and observing that "if Congress
is to effectively prevent the interstate use of guns for
illegal purposes it must control their sources:
manufacturers, dealers and importers"). Finally, the
overall structure and history, as well as the title, of
the Firearms Owners' Protection Act suggest no
Congressional determination that mere possession of
ordinary firearms implicates interstate commerce or
other federal concerns. Indeed, Congress in that
legislation expressly found, inter alia, "that (1) the
rights of citizens -- (A) to keep and bear arms under
the second amendment to the United States
Constitution; . . .; and (D) against unconstitutional
exercise of authority under the ninth and tenth
amendments; require additional legislation to correct
existing firearms statutes and enforcement policies."
P.L. 99-308 § 1(b). 2 7
Further, this legislation amended several
provisions of section 922 and section 924 that
contained express interstate commerce nexus
requirements without diluting those requirements.
This was true, for example, with respect to the
amendments to section 922(g), prohibiting felons
(and other disqualified persons) from shipping or
transporting any firearms "in interstate or foreign
commerce," from receiving any firearm "which has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce" and, as added by the amendment, from
possessing any firearm "in or affecting commerce."
P.L. 99-308 § 102(6). As we explained in Wallace,
889 F.2d at 583, the legislative history of this
amendment clearly showed that the phrase "in or
affecting commerce" meant "interstate" commerce,
and that accordingly the possession offense of thus
amended section 9 2 2(g) "reaches only those firearms
that traveled in interstate or foreign commerce and is
thus constitutional. " (Emphasis added). Similarly, the
legislation enacted a new section 922(n), P.L. 99-308
§ 102(8), which proscribed those under felony
indictment -- whom the same legislation removed
from sections 9 22(g) and (h) -- from shipping or
transporting any firearm "in interstate or foreign
commerce" and from receiving any firearm "which
has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce."" Also, the express federal
nexus was retained where the Firearms Owners'
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Protection Act amended sections 924(c) and 929(a)
to add "drug trafficking crime" to the offenses
concerning which firearm (or certain ammunition)
use was proscribed, while retaining the requirement
that the offense in any event be one that could "be
prosecuted in a court of the United States." See note
25, supra. Similarly, the amendment made to section
922(a)(3), concerning a non-licensee's transportation
into or receipt within his state of residence of a
firearm "obtained by such person outside that state"
broadened to all types of firearms an exception
previously limited to shotguns and rifles, but retained
the "obtained by such person outside that state"
language. P.L. 99-308 § 102(3). Likewise, the
restriction on licensed dealer sales to non-residents
of the state of the licensee's business location was
amended but without altering the interstate character
of the subject matter. Id. § 102(4). And, the
legislation left unchanged other provisions of section
922 expressly requiring an interstate commerce
nexus, such as, for example, section 922(a)(5),
generally prohibiting non-licensee transfers of
firearms to other non-licensees residing in a state
other than that of the transferor's residence.
The other Firearms Owners' Protection Act
change relevant in this connection is its section
102(9), 100 Stat. 452-53, adding a new section
922(o) making it unlawful for "any person to transfer
or possess a machine gun" except for any "lawfully
possessed before the date this subsection takes
effect." There is no committee report, and sparse
legislative history, concerning this provision, as it
was added on the House floor. The only apparent
explanation for it is the statement of its sponsor,
Representative Hughes, that "I do not know why
anyone would object to the banning of machine
guns." See Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041,
1044-45 (11th Cir. 1990). While section 922(o) is a
closer parallel than others to section 922(q) presently
before us, as both sections denounce mere possession
with no express tie either to interstate commerce or
other federalizing element, we decline to read into
section 922(o) any implied Congressional
determination that possession of firearms generally,
or within one thousand feet of any school grounds,
affects interstate commerce. Section 922(o) is
restricted to a narrow class of highly destructive,
sophisticated weapons that have been either
manufactured or imported after enactment of the
Firearms Owners' Protection Act,' which is more
suggestive of a nexus to or affect on interstate or
foreign commerce than possession of any firearms
whatever, no matter when or where originated,
within one thousand feet of the grounds of any
school.
The only two circuit courts that have
addressed a constitutional challenge to section
922(o), United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1018
(8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 123 L. Ed. 2d 174,
113 S. Ct. 1614 (1993); United States v. Evans, 928
F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1991), have sustained it in
reliance on Congressional findings that appear to us
to be inapplicable in the present context, whatever
relevance they might have to section 922(o).' Hale
states that, "The legislative history of section 922(o)
indicates that Congress considered the relationship
between the availability of machine guns, violent
crime, and narcotics trafficking. See H.R. Rep. No.
495, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1-5, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1327-31." Id. at 1018. The
only portion of the cited passage of the H.R. Rep.
No. 495 that relates to machine guns -- and it will be
recalled that neither section 922(o) nor anything
comparable to it was included in the bill (H.R. 4332)
there being considered -- is a discussion of the
history of the legislation, including various earlier
bills that did not become law. One of the earlier bills
discussed was H.R. 3135, introduced August 1,
1985, and H.R. Rep. No. 495 observes that H.R.
3135 "prohibited the transfer and possession of
machine guns, used by racketeers and drug
traffickers for intimidation, murder and protection of
drugs and the proceeds of crime. The bill allowed
possessors of lawfully registered machine guns to
continue their lawful possession." 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1330. Whatever this may say about
machine guns, it says nothing about the mere
possession of ordinary firearms. Given the formal
Congressional findings contained in the Firearms
Owners' Protection Act (see note 27, supra), which
avow a purpose to enhance Second and Tenth
Amendment rights and express solicitude for the
freedom of citizens to possess ordinary firearms, it
would be entirely inappropriate to consider the
above-quoted portions of the committee report as
having any relevance beyond machine guns and
similar destructive weapons.
Section 922(o) is not before us, and we
intimate no views as to it. However, we do not
regard Hale and Evans as persuasive respecting
either the validity of section 922(q) or the existence
of express or implied Congressional findings
supportive thereof.
The Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988
We note two firearms provisions enacted in
1988. The Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988, P.L.
100-649, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 Stat. 3816,
added to Title 18 § 922(p) making it unlawful for
any person to "manufacture, import, ship, deliver,
possess, transfer, or receive" any firearms either not
as detectable "by walk-through metal detectors" as
an exemplar to be developed by the Secretary of the
Treasury or which "when subjected to inspection by
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the type of x-ray machines commonly used at
airports, does not generate an image that accurately
depicts the shape of" any major component thereof.
Section 922(p)(1). Exempted were "any firearm
manufactured in, imported into, or possessed in the
United States before the date of the enactment" of
the act. Section 922(p)(6). Although there is no
express requirement of an interstate nexus for the
section 922(p) possession offense, we reject the
government's argument that this legislation is
analogous to section 922(q). Section 922(p)'s
employment of the standard of "x-ray machines
commonly used at airports" plainly reflects the act's
interstate commerce related purpose and nexus. This
is confirmed by the legislative history, as the
relevant committee report notes "the threat posed by
firearms which could avoid detection at security
checkpoints: airports, government buildings, prisons,
courthouses, the White House." H.R. Rep. No.
100-612, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5359.
Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act of 1988
The other 1988 firearms legislation is
subtitle G (§§ 6211-6215) of Title VI ("Anti-Drug
Abuse Amendments Act of 1988") of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, P.L. 100-690, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess., 102 Stat. 4181, 4359-62. Subtitle G added to
Title 18 sections 924(f) and (g) and 930. P.L.
100-960, §§ 6211, 6215. Section 924(g) denounces
"whoever knowingly transfers a firearm, knowing
that such firearm will be used to commit a crime of
violence (as defined in subsection (c)(3)) or drug
trafficking crime (as defined in subsection (c)(2))."
There is no requirement that the transfers have an
interstate character or that the firearms have been in
interstate commerce. While "drug trafficking crime"
is limited to federal offenses -- and this limitation
was maintained even though the same legislation
slightly amended the definition thereof in section
924(c)92) and section 929(a)(2)33 -- "crime of
violence" is not so limited. Section 924(c)(3). Our
attention has not been called to legislative history
suggesting an explanation for this seeming
anomaly.' It seems anomalous in several respects.
There is no apparent reason why the drug
trafficking crime must be federal, but not the crime
of violence. Further, no amendment was made to
section 924(b), denouncing the shipment, transport,
or receipt of a firearm "in interstate or foreign
commerce" with "knowledge or reasonable cause to
believe that" a felony "is to be committed
therewith"; nor to section 924(c)(1) denouncing use
or carrying of a firearm during or in relation to "any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for
which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States. "3 The seemingly unusual result is that
anyone who transfers intrastate a firearm (which has
not been in interstate commerce) knowing it will be
used in a crime of violence in that state commits a
federal crime even though the crime of violence is
not a federal offense, but the party perpetrating the
crime of violence with the firearm in that same state
violates federal law only if the crime of violence is
one "for which he may be prosecuted in a court of
the United States." A possible inference from this is
that transfer is deemed more related to the regulation
of interstate commerce than mere use or possession.
Cf. Nelson, 458 F.2d at 559 ("acquisition of
firearms is more closely related to interstate
commerce than mere possession ).3
The 1988 legislation, like that before it,
demonstrates neither a pattern of regulation that
abjures any express nexus to interstate commerce or
other federal element nor any express or implied
Congressional finding about mere possession of
ordinary firearms absent such a nexus.
Crime Control Act of 1990
At long last, we turn to the Crime Control
Act of 1990, P.L. 101-647, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
104 Stat. 4789-4968, which included, as part of its
XVII ("General Provisions"), section 1702, 104 Stat.
9844-45, the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990,
that enacted the new section 922(q)." Preliminarily,
we note that the Crime Control Act of 1990 also
contained a Title XXII ("Firearms Provisions"), P.L.
101-647, § 2201-2205, 104 Stat. 4856-58, which
revised other portions of chapter 44 of Title 18.
These other revisions all retained or provided for an
express interstate commerce (or other federal
jurisdiction) nexus for the various Title 18, chapter
44, offenses the provisions of which were being
amended."
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,
now section 922(q), was introduced in the Senate by
Senator Herbert Kohl as S. 2070 and a virtually
identical bill with the same title was introduced in
House by Representative Edward Feighan as H.R.
3757. The Senate version was eventually enacted as
part of Title XVII of the Crime Control Act of 1990,
P.L. 101-647 § 1702, 104 Stat. 4844-45. The House
Report accompanying the Crime Control Act broadly
declares that the intent of the Crime Control Act was
"to provide a legislative response to various aspects
of the problem of crime in the United States." H.R.
Rep. No. 101-681(I), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 69
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472,
6473. However, this report makes no mention
whatsoever of the impact upon commerce of firearms
in schools. Nor does the report even mention the
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Gun-Free School Zones Act. Although S. 2070 has
no formal legislative history that we know of, a
House subcommittee hearing was held on H.R.
3757. Witnesses told this subcommittee of tragic
instances of gun violence in our schools, but there
was no testimony concerning the effect of such
violence upon interstate commerce. Indeed, the
noticeable absence of any attempt by Congress to
link the Gun-Free School Zones Act to commerce
prompted the Chief of the Firearms Division of the
BATF and the BATF's Deputy Chief Counsel, to
testify as follows:
"Finally, we would note that the
source of constitutional authority to enact
the legislation is not manifest on the face of
the bill. By contrast, when Congress first
enacted the prohibitions against possession
of firearms by felons, mental incompetents
and others, the legislation contained specific
findings relating to the Commerce Clause
and other constitutional bases, and the
unlawful acts specifically included a
commerce element." Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 3757 Before
the Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., at 10 (1990) (statement of Richard
Cook and Bradley Buckles) (hereinafter,
House Hearings).
Although both the House and Senate sponsors of the
Gun-Free School Zones Act made fairly lengthy
floor statements about it, neither congressman had
anything to say about commerce in their remarks.
See 136 Cong. Rec. S17595 (1990) (statement of
Sen. Kohl); 136 Cong. Rec. S766 (1990) (same);
135 Cong. Rec. E3988 (1989) (inserted statement of
Rep. Feighan).
The failure of section 922(q) to honor the
traditional division of functions between the Federal
Government and the States was commented upon by
President Bush when he signed the Crime Control
Act of 1990:
"I am also disturbed by provisions in S.
3266 that unnecessarily constrain the
discretion of State and local governments.
Examples are found in Title VIII's 'rural
drug enforcement' program; in Title XV's
'drug-free school zones' program; and in
Title XVIII's program for 'correctional
options incentives.' Most egregiously,
section 1702 inappropriately overrides
legitimate State firearms laws with a new
and unnecessary Federal law. The policies
reflected in these provisions could
legitimately be adopted by the States, but
they should not be imposed on the States by
the Congress." Statement by President
George Bush upon Signing S. 3266, 26
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1944 (Dec. 3,
1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6696-1 (emphasis added)."
Commerce Power
We are, of course, fully cognizant and
respectful of the great scope of the commerce power.
It is generally agreed that in a series of decisions
culminating in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63
S. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1942), the Supreme Court
fixed the modern definition of the commerce power,
returning it to the breadth of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824). As stated in
one treatise:
"After Wickard, the tests for proper exercise
of the commerce power were settled. First,
Congress could set the terms for the
interstate transportation of persons,
products, or services, even if this constituted
prohibition or indirect regulation of single
state activities. Second, Congress could
regulate intrastate activities that had a close
and substantial relationship to interstate
commerce; this relationship could be
established by congressional views of the
economic effect of this type of activity.
Third, Congress could regulate -- under a
combined commerce clause-necessary and
proper clause analysis -- intrastate activities
in order to effectuate its regulation of
interstate commerce."
Rotunda & Nowack, Treatise on Constitutional Law;
Substance and Procedure 2nd, § 4.9 at 404-5.
Board as the commerce power is, its scope is not
unlimited, particularly where intrastate activities are
concerned. As the Court said in Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183, 88 S. Ct. 2017, 2024, 20 L. Ed. 2d
1020 (1968):
"This Court has always recognized that the
power to regulate commerce, though broad
indeed, has limits. Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall paused to recognize those limits in
the course of the opinion that first staked out
the vast expanse of federal authority over
the economic life of the new Nation.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 9 Wheat. 1,
194-195, 6 L. Ed. 23.
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Chief Justice Marshall explained in Gibbons v.
Ogden:
"The subject to which power is next applied,
is to commerce 'among the several states.'.
. . Comprehensive as the word 'among' is,
it may very properly be restricted to that
commerce which concerns more states than
one. . . . The enumeration of the particular
classes of commerce to which the power
was to be extended, would not have been
made had the intention been to extend the
power to every description. The
enumeration presupposes something not
enumerated; and that something, if we
regard the language or the subject of the
sentence, must be the exclusively internal
commerce of a state. The genius and
character of the whole government seem to
be, that its action is to be applied to all the
external concerns which affect the states
generally; but not to those which are
completely within a particular state, which
do not affect other states, and with which it
is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose
of executing some of the general powers of
the government. The completely internal
commerce of a state, then, may be
considered as reserved for the state itself."
Id., 9 Wheat. at 194-95, 6 L. Ed. at 69-70.
Similarly, in Wickard v. Filburn, the Court stated:
"But even if appellee's activity be local and
though it may not be regarded as commerce,
it may still, whatever its nature, be reached
by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce and
this irrespective of whether such effect is
what might at some earlier time have been
defined as 'direct' or 'indirect."' Id., 63 S.
Ct. at 89 (emphasis added).
This passage has been quoted with approval many
times. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 85 S. Ct. 377, 383, 13 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1964);
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 91 S. Ct.
1357, 1360, 28 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1971). In United
States v. American Building Maintenance Industries,
422 U.S. 271, 95 S. Ct. 2150, 2156, 45 L. Ed. 2d
177 (1975), the Court speaks of the "full Commerce
Clause power" as extending to "all activity
substantially affecting interstate commerce"
(emphasis added). Analogously, in United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 62 S. Ct.
523, 526, 86 L. Ed. 726 (1942), Chief Justice
Stone's opinion for a unanimous Court states that the
commerce power "extends to those intrastate
activities which in a substantial way interfere with or
obstruct the exercise of the granted power"
(emphasis added).'" Justice Harlan, writing for the
Court in Maryland v. Wirtz, made the message
explicit: "Neither here nor in Wickard [v. Filburn]
has the Court declared that Congress may use a
relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse
for broad general regulation of state or private
activities." Id., 88 S. Ct. at 2024 n.27. Indeed, it
could not be otherwise as the chain of causation is
virtually infinite, and hence there is no private
activity, no matter how local and insignificant, the
ripple effect from which is not in some theoretical
measure ultimately felt beyond the borders of the
state in which it took place. Hence, if the reach of
the commerce power to local activity that merely
affects interstate commerce or its regulation is not
understood as being limited by some concept such as
"substantially" affects, then, contrary to Gibbons v.
Ogden, the scope of the Commerce Clause would be
unlimited, it would extend "to every description" of
commerce and there would be no "exclusively
internal commerce of a state" the existence of which
the Commerce Clause itself "presupposes" and the
regulation of which it "reserved for the state itself."
We recognize, of course, that the imprecise
and matter of degree nature of concepts such as
"substantially," especially as applied to effect on
interstate commerce, generally renders decision
making in this area peculiarly within the province of
Congress, rather than the Courts. And, the Supreme
Court has consistently deferred to Congressional
findings in this respect, both formal findings in the
legislation itself and findings that can be inferred
from committee reports, testimony before Congress,
or statutory terms expressly providing for some
nexus to interstate commerce. Relatively recent
examples of statutes upheld against Commerce
Clause attacks on the basis of formal Congressional
findings include EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,
103 S. Ct. 1054, 1058, 75 L. Ed. 2d 18 & n.3
(1983) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act);
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 102 S. Ct.
2126, 2135, 72 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1982) (Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act); Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining, 452 U.S. 264, 101 S. Ct. 2352, 2361, 69 L.
Ed. 2d 1 (1981) (Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act); Perez, 91 S. Ct. at 1358 n.1,
1362 (Consumer Credit Protection Act).4' In other
cases, the Court has looked to the legislative history
and the terms of the challenged statute itself to
identify and sustain findings of a sufficient effect on
interstate commerce. For example, in McClung the
Court upheld section 201(b)(2) and (c) of Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the terms of which
covered any restaurants "if their operations affect
commerce" and presumed that any did "'if . . . it
serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a
substantial portion of the food which it serves . . .
211
has moved in commerce."' Id. at 381. In so ruling,
despite the absence of "formal findings," the Court
relied on the wording of the statute itself, which
amounted to an express finding of the requisite effect
on commerce under certain facts, and on the
legislative history showing the extensive evidence
before Congress implicating interstate commerce.
Thus the Court noted that
"The record is replete with testimony of the
burdens placed on interstate commerce by
racial discrimination in restaurants. . . .
Moreover, there was an impressive array of
testimony that discrimination in restaurants
had a direct and highly restrictive effect
upon interstate travel by Negroes." Id. at
381.
"We believe that this testimony
afforded ample basis for the conclusion that
established restaurants in such areas sold
less interstate goods because of the
discrimination, that interstate travel was
obstructed directly by it, that business in
general suffered and that many new
businesses refrained from establishing there
as a result of it." Id. at 382.
". . . Congress has determined for itself that
refusals of service to Negroes have imposed
burdens both upon the interstate flow of
food and upon the movement of products
generally." Id. at 383.
In sustaining the statute the Court concluded by
stating:
"The appellees urge that Congress, in
passing the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the National Labor Relations Act, made
specific findings which were embodied in
those statutes. Here, of course, Congress
has included no formal findings. But their
absence is not fatal to the validity of the
statute, [citation omitted] for the evidence
presented at the hearings fully indicated the
nature and effect of the burdens on
commerce which Congress meant to
alleviate.
"Confronted as we are with the facts
laid before Congress, we must conclude that
it had a rational basis for finding that racial
discrimination in restaurants had a direct
and adverse effect on the free flow of
interstate commerce. Insofar as the sections
of the Act here relevant are concerned, H§
201(b)(2) and (c), Congress prohibited
discrimination only in those establishments
having a close tie to interstate commerce,
i.e., those, like the McClungs', serving food
that has come from out of the State. We
think in so doing that Congress acted well
within its power to protect and foster
commerce in extending the coverage of Title
II only to those restaurants offering to serve
interstate travelers or serving food, a
substantial portion of which has moved in
interstate commerce." Id. at 384 (footnote
omitted).42
Where Congress has made findings, formal
or informal, that regulated activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, the courts must defer "if
there is any rational basis for" the finding. Preseault
v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 914, 924, 108 L.
Ed. 2d 1 (1990); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
101 S. Ct. 2352, 2360, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1981); Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 85 S. Ct. 348, 358, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964);
McClung, 85 S. Ct. at 383. Practically speaking,
such findings almost always end the matter.43 This
means that the states, and the people, must largely
look to their representatives in Congress to fairly and
consciously fix, rather than to simply disregard, the
Constitution's boundary line between "the completely
internal commerce of a state . . . reserved for the
state itself" and the power to regulate "Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States."
Courts cannot properly perform their duty to
determine if there is any rational basis for a
Congressional finding if neither the legislative
history nor the statute itself reveals any such relevant
finding." And, in such a situation there is nothing
to indicate that Congress itself consciously fixed, as
opposed to simply disregarded, the boundary line
between the commerce power and the reserved
power of the states. Indeed, as in this case, there is
no substantial indication that the commerce power
was even invoked.'
Congressional enactments are, of course,
presumed constitutional. But in certain areas the
presumption has less force. Cf. United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 58 S. Ct.
778, 783, 82 L. Ed. 1234 n.4 (1938) ("There may
be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten
Amendments . . . ."). Here the question is
essentially a jurisdictional one, and any expansion of
federal power is at the expense of the powers
reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment,
which is, after all, as much a part of the Bill of
Rights as the First."6 Both the management of
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education, and the general control of simple firearms
possession by ordinary citizens, have traditionally
been a state responsibility, and section 922(q)
indisputably represents a singular incursion by the
Federal Government into territory long occupied by
the States. In such a situation where we are faced
with competing constitutional concerns, the
importance of Congressional findings is surely
enhanced.'
We draw support for our conclusion
concerning the importance ofCongressional findings
from recent holdings that when Congress wishes to
stretch its commerce power so far as to intrude upon
state prerogatives, it must express its intent to do so
in a perfectly clear fashion. In Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 2273, 105 L.
Ed. 2d 1 (1989) (plurality opinion), the Court held
that Congress could use its commerce power to
abrogate the sovereign immunity guaranteed to the
States by the Eleventh Amendment only if its intent
to do so is "unmistakably clear." Id. at 2277
(quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3147, 87 L. Ed. 2d 171
(1985)). In another case decided the same day, the
Court explained that this rule exists because
"abrogation of sovereign immunity upsets the
fundamental constitutional balance between the
Federal Government and the States, placing a
considerable strain on the principles of federalism
that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine."
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 109 S. Ct. 2397,
2400, 105 L. Ed. 2d 181 (1989) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Two years later,
in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court held that the Age
Discrimination inEmployment Act (ADEA) did not
sweep away the Missouri Constitution's provision for
the mandatory retirement of state judges at age
seventy. Arguing that a State's power to set the
qualifications for its judiciary "is a decision of the
most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity," 111 S.
Ct. at 2400, the Court held that the ADEA did not
bespeak a sufficiently clear intent to annul this state
prerogative:
"Congressional interference with this
decision of the people of Missouri, defining
their constitutional officers, would upset the
usual constitutional balance of federal and
state powers. For this reason, 'it is
incumbent upon the federal courts to be
certain of Congress' intent before finding
that federal law overrides' this balance." Id.
at 2401 (quoting Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at
3147).'"
We recognize that the rule being applied in
those cases is one of statutory construction.
Nevertheless, Gregory, Union Gas, and Bass
establish that Congress' power to use the Commerce
Clause in such a way as to impair a State's sovereign
status, and its intent to do so, are related inquiries.
Thus, in Gregory, Congress' power to trump the
Missouri Constitution was unquestioned but its intent
to do so was unclear; hence the Court held that the
State's Tenth Amendment interests would prevail.
Here, Congress surely intended to make the
possession of a firearm near a school a federal
crime, but it has not taken the steps necessary to
demonstrate that such an exercise of power is within
the scope of the Commerce Clause.
In 1985, the Supreme Court held that the
Tenth Amendment imposes no internal limitation
upon the Commerce Clause; as long as Congress acts
within the commerce power it cannot violate the
Tenth Amendment. See Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 83 L. Ed. 2d
1016, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985) (overruling National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S. Ct.
2465, 49 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1976)). The Garcia Court
sought to assuage the fears of four dissenting Justices
by arguing that, as a body of state representatives,
Congress would respect the sovereignty of the
several States and could be trusted to police the
constitutional boundary between the Tenth
Amendment and the Commerce Clause. See Garcia,
105 S. Ct. at 1017-19. By expecting Congress to
build a more sturdy foundation for the exercise of its
commerce power than it has done in this case, we
hope to "further[] the spirit of Garcia by requiring
that decisions restricting state sovereignty be made in
a deliberate manner by Congress, through the
explicit exercise of its lawmaking power to that end.
. . . To give the state-displacing weight of federal
law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade
the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia
relied to protect states' interests." L. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law § 6-25, at 480 (2d ed.
1988) (footnote omitted).
The Gun Free School Zones Act extends to
criminalize any person's carrying of any unloaded
shotgun, in an unlocked pickup truck gun rack, while
driving on a county road that at one turn happens to
come within 950 feet of the boundary of the grounds
of a one-room church kindergarten located on the
other side of a river, even during the summer when
the kindergarten is not in session. Neither the act
itself nor its legislative history reflect any
Congressional determination that the possession
denounced by section 92 2(q) is in any way related to
interstate commerce or its regulation, or, indeed, that
Congress was exercising its powers under the
Commerce Clause. Nor do any prior federal
enactments or Congressional findings speak to the
subject matter of section 922(q) or its relationship to
interstate commerce. Indeed, section 922(q) plows
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thoroughly new ground and represents a sharp break
with the long-standing pattern of federal firearms
legislation."'
The district court sustained section 922(q) on
the basis that the "'business' of elementary, middle
and high schools . . . affects interstate commerce."
However, as noted, there is no finding, legislative
history, or evidence to support section 922(q) on this
basis. The management of education, of course, has
traditionally been a state charge, as Congress has
expressly recognized. See 20 U.S.C. § 3401(4)
("The Congress finds that . . . in our Federal
system, the primary public responsibility for
education is reserved respectively to the States and
the local school systems and other instrumentalities
of the States."). We are unwilling to ourselves
simply assume that the concededly intrastate conduct
of mere possession by any person of any firearm
substantially affects interstate commerce, or the
regulation thereof, whenever it occurs, or even most
of the time that it occurs, within 1000 feet of the
grounds of any school, whether or not then in
session. If Congress can thus bar firearms possession
because of such a nexus to the grounds of any public
or private school, and can do so without supportive
findings or legislative history, on the theory that
education affects commerce, then it could also
similarly ban lead pencils, "sneakers," Game Boys,
or slide rules.
The government seeks to rely on the rule
that "where the class of activities is regulated and
that class is within the reach of the federal power,
the courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial,
individual instances' of the class." Perez, 91 S. Ct.
at 1361 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,
88 S. Ct. 2017, 2022, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (1968)).
This theory has generally been applied to the
regulation of a class of activities the individual
instances of which have an interactive effect, usually
because of market or competitive forces, on each
other and on interstate commerce. A given local
transaction in credit, or use of wheat, because of
national market forces, has an effect on the cost of
credit or price of wheat nationwide. Some such
limiting principle must apply to the "class of
activities" rule, else the reach of the Commerce
Clause would be unlimited, for virtually all
legislation is "class based" in some sense of the
term. We see no basis for assuming, particularly in
the absence of supporting Congressional findings or
legislative history, that, for example, ordinary citizen
possession of a shotgun during July 900 feet from
the grounds of an out-of-session private first grade in
rural Llano County, Texas, has any effect on
education even in relatively nearby Austin, much less
in Houston or New Orleans. Nor can we assume that
elementary education in Houston substantially affects
elementary education in Atlanta. As noted, any such
holding would open virtually all aspects of
education, public and private, elementary and other,
to the reach of the Commerce Clause.5 '
We hold that section 922(q), in the full reach
of its terms, is invalid as beyond the power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause.5 2 Whether
with adequate Congressional findings or legislative
history, national legislation of similar scope could be
sustained, we leave for another day. Here we merely
hold that Congress has not done what is necessary to
locate section 922(q) within the Commerce Clause.
And, we expressly do not resolve the question
whether section 922(q) can ever be constitutionally
applied. Conceivably, a conviction under section
922(q) might be sustained if the government alleged
and proved that the offense had a nexus to
commerce. 5  Here, in fact, the parties stipulated
that a BATF agent was prepared to testify that
Lopez's gun had been manufactured outside of the
State of Texas. Lopez's conviction must still be
reversed, however, because his indictment did not
allege any connection to interstate commerce. An
indictment that fails to allege a commerce nexus,
where such a nexus is a necessary element of the
offense, is defective. See Stirone v. United States,
361 U.S. 212, 80 S. Ct. 270, 273, 4 L. Ed. 2d 252
(1960) (Hobbs Act); United States v. Hooker, 841
F.2d 1225, 1227-32 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(RICO); United States v. Moore, 185 F.2d 92, 94
(5th Cir. 1950) (FLSA). This is true even though the
language of section 922(q) contains no such
requirement. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S.
749, 82 S. Ct. 1038, 1047-48, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240
(1962); 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal
Procedure § 19.2, at 452 (1984). Finally, because an
indictment, unlike a bill of information, cannot be
amended, the failure to allege each element is fatal.
Cf. United States v. Garrett, 984 F.2d 1402, 1415
(5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Mize, 756 F.2d
353, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1985).
For the reasons stated, the judgment of
conviction is reversed and the cause is remanded
with directions to dismiss the indictment.5
REVERSED
ENDNOTES
1. Initially, state charges were filed against Lopez but those
charges were dropped due to the federal prosecution. What
Lopez did has been a felony under Texas law since at least
1974. See Tex. Penal Code § 46.04(a) (whoever "with a
firearm . . . goes . . . on the premises of a school or an
educational institution, whether public or private "); §
46.04(c) (third degree felony).
2. Section 922(q) became law November 29, 1990, as section
1702 of the Crime Control Act of 1990, P.L. 101-647, 101st
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Cong. 2d Sess., 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45. Its effective date
was sixty days later. P.L. 101-647, § 1702(b)(4).
3. The Act defines a school zone as follows: "(A) in, or on
the grounds of, a public, parochial or private school; or (B)
within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public,
parochial or private school." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25).
"School" is defined as "a school which provides elementary
or secondary education under State law." Section 921 (a)(26).
Lopez stipulated that Edison High School was and is a school
zone.
4. Section 922(q)(1)(B) provides:
"(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to
the possession of a firearm -
(i) on private property not part
of school grounds;
(ii) if the individual possessing
the firearm is licensed to do so by the
State in which the school zone is located
or a political subdivision of the State, and
the law of the State or political
subdivision requires that, before an
individual obtain such a license, the law
enforcement authorities of the State or
political subdivision verify that the
individual is qualified under law to
receive the license;
(iii) which is -
(I) not loaded; and
(ll) in a locked container, or a
locked firearms rack which is
on a motor vehicle;
(iv) by an individual for use in a program
approved by a school in the school zone;
(v) by an individual in accordance with a
contract entered into between a school in
the school zone and the individual or an
employer of the individual;
(vi) by a law enforcement officer acting in his
or her official capacity; or
(vii) that is unloaded and is possessed by an
individual while traversing school premises
for the purpose of gaining access to public
or private lands open to hunting, if the
entry on school premises is authorized by
school authorities."
Thus, section 922(q)(1), together with section 922(a)(25) &
(26) (note 3, supra), makes it a federal offense to carry an
unloaded firearm in an unlocked suitcase on a public sidewalk
in front of one's residence, so long as that part of the
sidewalk is within one thousand feet - two or three city
blocks - of the boundary of the grounds of any public or
private school anywhere in the United States, regardless of
whether it is during the school year or the school is in
session. In Texas, at least, a tiny church kindergarten would
be included. See United States v. Echevaria, 995 F.2d 562,
563 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1993); Tex. Ed. Code Ann. §21.797
(Vernon Supp. 1993).
5. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const.,
Amend. X.
6. "The Congress shall have Power . To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8,
cl. 3.
7. "Congress hereby finds and declares that the receipt,
possession, or transportation of a firearm by felons . . .
constitutes - - (1) a burden on commerce or threat affecting
the free flow of commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1201. See Bass, 92
S. Ct. at 521 n.14.
8. See also Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 96 S. Ct.
498, 46 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1976) (same under 18 U.S.C. §
922(h) as to felon's receipt of firearm previously transported
in interstate commerce).
9. It does not seem surprising that those who choose to hold
a federal license, or to deal with federal licensees, may be
required in reference to the activities licensed to conform to
federal requirements. See, e.g., Westfall v. United States,
274 U.S. 256, 47 S. Ct. 629, 71 L. Ed. 1036 (1957)
(defrauding a state bank that is voluntarily a member of the
Federal Reserve System may be made a federal offense
because of that membership); United States v. Dunham, 995
F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1993) (robbery of federally insured state
bank); United States v. Hand, 497 F.2d 929, 934-5 (5th Cir.
1974), adhered to en banc, 516 F.2d 472, 477 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 953, 47 L. Ed. 2d 359, 96 S.
Ct. 1427 (1976) (status as federally chartered institution
supports federal jurisdiction); United States v. Fitzpatrick,
581 F.2d 1221, 1223 (5th Cir. 1978) (federal chartering or
federal insurance may each support federal jurisdiction). See
also United States v. Mize, 756 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1985).
10. We lay to one side, as irrelevant to our inquiry, diverse
federal legislation enhancing the penalty for use or possession
of a firearm in the commission of some other federal offense.
The jurisdictional basis of such legislation is obviously that
applicable to the underlying federal offense, and the
legislation is properly seen as a regulation of the latter. The
same reasoning applies even where, as in the case of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c), the firearms provision is treated as a
separate offense (rather than a mere sentence enhancement),
as its jurisdictional basis is still that of the other federal
offense. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 996 F.2d 59, 61
(5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Young, 936 F.2d 1050,
1054-55 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dumas, 934 F.2d
1387, 1390 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 641
(1991); United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 572
(9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 911, 111 S. Ct. 1119,
113 L. Ed. 2d 227 (1991); United States v. Thornton, 901
F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1990). Section 9 22(q), with which we
are here concerned, is not tied or related to any other federal
offense. Also put to one side is legislation dealing solely with
specific matters such as national defense, foreign relations,
foreign commerce, federal facilities, and use of the mails,
none of which are related to section 9 22(q).
11. See also former 26 U.S.C. § 1132(a); United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S. Ct. 816, 816, 83 L. Ed. 1206
n.1 (1939); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 88 S. Ct.
722, 725, 19 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1968); United States v.
Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248, 1250 (5th Cir. 1989).
12. One might speculate that the 1968 repeal of the Federal
Firearms Act and the concomitant incorporation of its
proscriptions, as then broadened, into the newly enacted
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chapter 44 of Title 18, as discussed in detail in the text infra,
were prompted by the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in
Haynes, which partially invalidated the National Firearms Act
on Fifth Amendment, self-incrimination grounds. However,
the congressional committee reports on the 1968 legislation do
not reflect such a connection, except in respect to Title II of
the Gun Control Act of 1968, which amended the National
Firearms Act itself to meet the concerns of Haynes. P.L.
90-618, § 201, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 1956, 90 Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426, 4434-35. In 1971 in Freed the Supreme
Court sustained the thus amended National Firearms Act,
holding that the Haynes problems had been cured.
13. Fugitive from justice was defined to mean one who had
fled any state to avoid felony prosecution or testifying in a
criminal proceeding. Id. § 901(b).
14. An analogous presumption applied to possession of a
firearm with an altered or removed serial number. Id. §
902(i).
15. The presumption considered in Tot was dropped, as was
the analogous presumption concerning altered serial numbers
(see note 14, supra).
16. See also id. at 2206 (discussing new section 923(a) "The
licensing requirements of the present Federal Firearms Act,
15 U.S.C. § 903(a), are based upon dealers and
manufacturers (includes importers) shipping or receiving
firearms in interstate or foreign commerce. Here, the
requirement is on engaging in business and would also include
one engaging in such a business in intrastate commerce").
17. Other findings in section 901 of P.L. 90-351 include the
following from section 901(a):
"(2) that the ease with which any person can
acquire firearms other than a rifle or shotgun (including
criminals, juveniles without the knowledge or consent
of their parents or guardians, narcotics addicts, mental
defectives, armed groups who would supplant the
functions of duly constituted public authorities, and
others whose possession of such weapons is similarly
contrary to the public interest) is a signficant factor in
the prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the
United States;
(4) that the acquistiion on a mail-order basis of
firearms other than a rifle or shotgun by nonlicensed
individuals, from a place other than their State of
residence, has materially tended to thwart the
effectiveness of State laws and regulations, and local
ordinances;
(5) that the sale or other disposition of
concealable weapons by importers, manufacturers, and
dealers holding Federal licenses, to nonresidents of the
State in which the licensees' places of business are
located, has tended to make ineffective the laws,
regulations, and ordinances in the several States and
local jurisdictions regarding such firearms;
(6) that there is a causal relationship between the
easy availability of firearms other than a rifle or
shotgun and juvenile and youthful criminal behavior,
and that such firearms have been widely sold by
federally licensed importers and dealers to emotionally
immature, or thrill-bent juveniles and minors prone to
criminal behavior;
(8) that the lack of adequate federal control over
interstate and foreign commerce in highly destructive
weapons (such as bazookas, mortars, antitank guns, and
so forth, and destructive devices such as explosive or
incendiary grenades, bombs, missiles, and so forth) has
allowed such weapons and devices to fall into the hands
of lawless persons, including armed groups who would
supplant lawful authority, thus creating a problem of
national concern; .... "
Findings in section 901(b) are as follows:
"(b) The Congress further hereby declares that the
purpose of this title is to cope with the conditions
referred to in the foregoing subsection, and that it is not
the purpose of this title to place any undue or
unnecessary Federal restrictions or burdens on
law-abiding citizens with respect to the acquisition,
possession, or use of firearms appropriate to the
purpose of hunting, trap shooting, target shooting,
personal protection, or any other lawful activity, and
that this title is not intended to discourage or eliminate
the private ownership or use of firearms by law-abiding
citizens for lawful purposes, or provide for the
imposition by Federal regulations of any procedures or
requirements other than those reasonably necessary to
implement and effectuate the provisions of this title."
18. Nelson upheld a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6)
proscribing false statements to a licensed dealer in acquiring
a firearm from the dealer if "material to the lawfulness of the
sale" under chapter 44; the false statement was that the
defendant had not been convicted of a felony, which was
"material to the lawfulness of the sale" in that 18 U.S.C. §
922(d)(1) made it unlawful for a licensed dealer to sell a
firearm to a felon, regardless of whether the particular sale
had a nexus to interstate commerce. Id. at 557-58.
19. The Federal Firearms Act provisions against felons (or
indictees or fugitives) shipping or transporting firearms in
interstate commerce, 15 U.S.C. § 902(e), against felons (or
fugitives) receiving any firearm "which has been shipped in
interstate commerce," id. § 902(f), and against any person
shipping or transporting stolen firearms in interstate
commerce or shipping, transporting, or receiving in interstate
commerce firearms with altered or obliterated serial numbers,
id. §§ 902(g) & (i), were carried forward without alteration
of the interstate nexus, though with slight other alterations,
into respectively 18 U.S.C. § 922(e), 922(f) (persons under
felony indictment added; presumption removed); 9 22(g) and
922(i) (presumption removed). The character of ammunition
covered was restricted to that used in destructive devices,
such as rockets, bombs, or the like. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4),(16). The provision of the Federal Firearms Act against
licensed dealers or manufacturers shipping or transporting in
interstate commerce to other than licensed dealers or
manufacturers where the recipient was required to but did not
have a local license, 15 U.S.C. § 902(c), was retained but
altered in 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2) so that it did not apply to
rifles or shotguns but did prohibit almost all interstate
shipments by licensed dealers or manufacturers to those who
were not licensed dealers or manufacturers.
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20. Added Title 18 provisions with an express interstate
commerce nexus include: section 922(a)(3) proscribing
transportation or receipt by any non-licensee into or within his
state of residence of any firearm "obtained by him outside
that State" (except for a shotgun or rifle that he could
lawfully possess in his state of residence); section 922(a)(4)
forbidding any unlicensed person to "transport in interstate or
foreign commerce" any "destructive device" (such as a bomb,
missile, or rocket, section 921(a)(4)), machine gun, or "sawed
off" shotgun or rifle; section 922(a)(5) forbidding transfer or
delivery by a person resident in one state to a person (other
than a licensed dealer or manufacturer) resident in a different
state of any firearm (other than a rifle or shotgun proper
under the laws of the latter state); section 924(b) denouncing
whoever "ships, transports, or receives a firearm in interstate
or foreign commerce" with intent to commit therewith a
felony or knowing or with cause to believe a felony is to be
committed therewith.
Added Title 18 provisions with an express nexus to
federally licensed dealers or manufacturers include: section
922(b) proscribing firearms transfers by licensed dealers or
manufacturers to minors (except for shotguns or rifles) (1), or
where local law in the state of transfer forbids possession by
the transferee (2), or where the transferee resides in another
state (except for shotguns or rifles) (3), or of "destructive
devices" (bombs, missiles, etc.) or machine guns or
"sawed-off" shotguns or rifles (4), in all cases except for
transfers to other licensed dealers or manufacturers; section
922(a)(6) forbidding false statements to licensed dealers in
acquisition of firearms that are material to the lawfulness
under chapter 44 of the acquisition; and section 922(c)
forbidding transfer by a licensed dealer or manufacturer to a
felon, fugitive from justice, or one under felony indictment.
21. Title II of P.L. 90-618 amended the National Firearms
Act at least in part to eliminate the Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination problems that the Supreme Court had found
in Haynes. See note 12, supra.
22. As enacted by Title IV of P.L. 90-351, section 922(c)
prohibited a licensee from selling or disposing of a firearm to
a felon, fugitive, or indictee, section 922(e) prohibited any
such individual (felon, etc.) from shipping or transporting a
firearm in interstate or foreign commerce and section 922(f)
denounced any such individual (felon, etc.) who received any
firearm that had been shipped or transported in interstate
commerce. Title I of P.L. 90-618 shifted these sections to,
respectively, section 922(d), (g), and (h), and added to the
disqualified individuals adjudicated mental defectives and
unlawful users or addicts of various federally controlled
drugs. No change was made in the provisions for nexus to
interstate or foreign commerce or to a federal licensee.
23. As enacted by P.L. 90-351, section 922(a)(3) prohibited
transport or receipt by a non-licensee into or within his state
of residence of any firearm (except for a shotgun or rifle he
could lawfully possess in his state of residence) "obtained by
him outside that state." P.L. 90-618 revised section 922(a)(3)
to narrow the shotgun or rifle exception and to add an
exception for firearms acquired by testate or intestate
succession. As enacted by P.L. 90-351, section 922(a)(5)
prohibited non-licensees from transferring any firearm (other
than a rifle or shotgun) to a non-licensee resident "in any
State other than that in which the transferor resides." P.L.
90-618 revised section 922(a)(5) to eliminate the shotgun or
rifle exception and to add exceptions for transfers by testate
or intestate succession and for temporary loans "for lawful
sporting purposes." In both section 922(a)(3) and section
922(a)(5) the revisions of P.L. 90-618 retained the
jurisdictional basis of the prior sections, namely out-of-state
acquisition or disposition to a resident of a different state.
24. An exception to this was the addition by P.L. 90-618 of
a new section 924(c) (and the concomitant renumbering of the
former section 924(c)) enacted by P.L. 90-351 as section
924(d)) providing that any person who used a firearm to
commit (or unlawfully carried a firearm during the
commission of) "any felony which may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States" "shall be sentenced to" one to ten
years' imprisonment. While this did not rely for jurisdictional
purposes on either interstate commerce or the involvement of
a federally licensed party, it was obviously based on the same
federal jurisdictional footing as that on which the underlying
felony rested. See note 10, supra.
25. As observed in Note 24, supra, there was in section
924(c) (using or carrying a firearm in a federal felony) the
separate jurisdictional basis of the underlying federal offense.
In 1984, section 924(c) was amended to make the penalty
additional to that for the underlying federal offense, to
eliminate the element of "unlawfully" from the carrying
branch of the offense, and to describe the underlying federal
offense as "any crime of violence" (instead of "any felony")
"for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States." P.L. 98-473, § 1005, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 98 Stat.
1837, 2138-39. At the same time 18 U.S.C. § 929(a) was
enacted providing enhanced punishment for whoever uses or
carries a "handgun" loaded with "armor piercing ammunition"
during or in relation to "the commission of a crime of
violence . . . for which he may be prosecuted in a court of
the United States." P.L. 98-473, § 1006, 98 Stat. 2139.
In 1986, in the Firearms Owners' Protection Act, P.L.
99-308, §§ 104(a)(2) & 108, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 Stat.
449, 456-57, 460, §§ 924(c) and 929(a) were amended to add
to "crime of violence" any "drug trafficking crime" as
occasions on which use of a firearm was prohibited;
nevertheless, the offense still had to be one (as it does today)
"for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States" (§ 924(c)(1); § 929(a)(1)). Also, "drug trafficking
crime" was (and is) defined so as to limit it to federal felonies
(§ 924(c)(2); § 929(a)(2)); and "crime of violence" was (and
is) defined, but its definition did not itself require a federal
element (§ 924(c)(3)).
Later in 1986, in P.L. 99-408, § 8, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., 100 Stat. 920, 921, the "handgun" reference in section
929(a) was changed to "firearm," but the jurisdictional basis
("for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States") of section 929(a) was not altered.
26. This portion of the BATF assessment reads in full:
"2. Sales to Prohibited Persons. This bill makes it
unlawful for any person, not only licensees, to sell or
otherwise dispose of firearms to certain prohibited
categories of persons, e.g., a convicted felon. Under
existing law it is only unlawful for a licensee to sell or
otherwise dispose of firearms knowing or having
reasonable cause to believe that such a person is in a
prohibited category. This proposal would close an
existing loophole whereby qualified purchasers have
acquired firearms from licensees on behalf of prohibited
persons." Id.
This amendment to section 922(d) also added to the list of
disqualified persons illegal aliens and those who had been
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dishonorably discharged or had renounced United States
citizenship.
27. The full text of P.L. 99-308 § 1, 100 Stat. 449, is as
follows:
"(a) SHORT TITLE. - This Act may be cited as the
'Firearms Owners' Protection Act'.
(b) CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS. -The Congress
finds that -
(1) the rights of citizens -
(A) to keep and bear arms under the
second amendment to the United
States Constitution;
(B) to security against illegal and
unreasonable searches and seizures
under the fourth amendment;
(C) against uncompensated taking of
property, double jeopardy, and
assurance of due process of law
under the fifth amendment; and
(D) against unconstitutional exercise of
authority under the ninth and tenth
amendments; require additional
legislation to correct existing firearms
statutes and enforcement policies; and
(2) additional legislation is required to reaffirm
the intent of the Congress, as expressed in
section 101 of the Gun Control Act of
1968, that 'it is not the purpose of this title
to place any undue or unnecessary Federal
restrictions or burdens on law-abiding
citizens with respect to the acquisition,
possession, or use of firearms appropriate
to the purpose of hunting, trap-shooting,
target shooting, personal protection, or any
other lawful activity, and that this title is
not intended to discourage or eliminate the
private ownership or use of firearms by
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes'."
28. As previously observed, these amendments repealed
former 18 U.S.C. § 1202 and incorporated the provisions of
former section 1202 into sections 922(g) and (n). Prior to the
amendment, sections 922(g) and (h) had not applied to
possession as such, but had included those under felony
indictment, while section 1202(a) included possession "in
commerce or affecting commerce" but did not include those
under felony indictment.
29. The grandfather clause in section 922(o)(2)(B) applies
only to machine guns "lawfully" possessed before enactment;
nevertheless, with respect to those possessed earlier but
unlawfully there would be a jurisdictional nexus in the federal
law making that earlier possession unlawful, such as the
National Firearms Act or various provisions of chapter 44 of
Title 18.
30. Farmer did not address the validity of section 922(o).
31. Hale also states: "When it first enacted section 922,
Congress found facts indicating a nexus between the
regulation of firearms and the commerce power. See Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L. No.
90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 225 (1968)." Id. 978 F.2d at 1018. The
citation given is to the findings in section 901(a) of P.L.
90-351, in connection with Title IV thereof. As previously
discussed, those findings (set out in note 17 and
accompanying text, supra), and that enactment, with one
exception, do no more than speak to the need to regulate both
interstate (and foreign) commerce in firearms and federally
licensed dealers; the one exception is the finding that for this
purpose it is necessary to require intrastate, as well as
interstate, dealers to be federally licensed. There is nothing
to suggest any finding that mere private party intrastate
possession of firearms that have not moved in interstate
commerce has any effect on interstate commerce or must be
regulated in order to effectively regulate interstate commerce.
In Evans the court stated:
"Congress specifically found that at least 750,000
people had been killed in the United States by firearms
between the turn of the century and the time of the
Act's enactment. It was thus reasonable for Congress to
conclude that the possession of firearms affects the
national economy, if only through the insurance
industry. Since Evans does not contend that any specific
Constitutional rights are implicated, this rather tenuous
nexus between the activity regulated and interstate
commerce is sufficient." Id. 928 F.2d at 862.
The Congressional finding alluded to is not contained in the
Firearms Owners' Protection Act, and the only similar finding
we can locate is that contained in H.Rep. No. 1577 in
reference to H.R. 17735, which became the Gun Control Act
of 1968. See H.Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410 at 4411-15. We have
quoted this language in the text, supra, in our discussion of
that legislation. Nothing in this committee report mentions
insurance or suggests that mere intrastate possession of
firearms that have not moved in interstate commerce has any
affect on interstate commerce or must be regulated in order
to effectively regulate interstate commerce. The committee
states that "the proposed legislation imposes much needed
restrictions on interstate firearms traffic," id. at 4415
(emphasis added), and that there is "a need to strengthen
Federal regulation of interstate firearms traffic." Id. at 4412
(emphasis added). This is consistent with what the legislation
did, and it did not (apart from continuing the requirement of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act that
intrastate, as well as interstate, dealers be federally licensed)
purport to regulate mere private party possession of firearms
that had not moved in interstate commerce.
We thus disagree with the general statements in Hale
and Evans respecting the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 and the Gun Control Act of 1968.
32. Moreover, section 922(p) applies only to nondetectable
firearms manufactured in or imported into the United States
after its November 10, 1988, enactment, which is suggestive
of a closer relation to commerce than mere possession of any
firearm whenever and wherever made. Section 922(p)(6). The
cited committee report also observes that "No firearms
currently manufactured in the United States are known to be
subject to the proposed prohibitions." Id. 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5359 at 5363.
33. P.L. 100-690, § 6212, 102 Stat. 4360.
34. The 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. states respecting the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988 that "No Senate or House Report was
submitted with this legislation." Id. at 5937. New section
924(g) was applied in a "crime of violence" context in United
States v. Callaway, 938 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1991), which
observes that it "was designed to curb the supply of firearms
used in the commission of drug related and violent crimes,"
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but cites no legislative history. Id. at 909. Callaway does not
address the validity of section 924(g), its relationship to the
regulation of interstate commerce, or any express or implied
Congressional findings related thereto, nor whether the
offense there had an interstate or other jurisdictional nexus
(though the facts recited suggest none).
35. Nor to section 929(a)(1) denouncing possession of armor
piercing ammunition during or in relation to "a crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which he may be
prosecuted in a court of the United States."
36. Senior Judge, We also observe that the other additions to
chapter 44 of Title 18 made by subtitle G of Title VI of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 expressly provided for an
interstate commerce or other federal nexus. Thus, new section
924(f), P.L. 100-960, § 6211, 102 Stat. 4359, denounces
whoever "travels from any State or foreign country into any
other State" and acquires or transfers "a firearm in such other
State" with the purpose of engaging in conduct constituting
any of various offenses including "a crime of violence (as
defined in subsection (c)(3))." New section 930, P.L.
100-960, § 6215, 102 Stat. 4361, denounces "whoever
knowingly possesses or causes to be present a firearm or
other dangerous weapon in a Federal facility."
37. Section 1702 also added to section 921(a) new subsections
(25), (26), and (27) defining terms used in new section 922(q)
("school zone," "school," and "motor vehicle") and added to
section 924(a) new subsection (4) fixing the penalty for
violation of new section 922(q).
38. Public Law 101-647 § 2201 amended section 922(a)(5),
which formerly proscribed (with exceptions) transfer of a
firearm by a nonlicensee to a nonlicensee who "resides in any
state other than that in which the transferor resides" (or that
in which the place of business of the transferor, if a business
entity, is located) so that it proscribed (with the same
exceptions) such a transfer if the nonlicensee transferee "does
not reside in (or if the person is a corporation or other
business entity, does not maintain a place of business in) the
State in which the transferor resides." The purpose of this
was apparently to include among disqualified transferees "an
alien or transient who does not reside in the State in which
the transferor resides." H.Rep. No. 101-681(1), 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., at 106, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472 at
6510. It also appears to have the effect of clarifying section
922(a)(5) by removing its otherwise arguable prohibition of
transfer to a nonlicensee business entity having a place of
business in the transferor's state of residence but existing
under the laws of and having its principal place of business in
a different state.
Also, Public Law 101-647 § 2202(a) amended section
922(j), which prohibited any person from receiving,
concealing, disposing of, pledging, or accepting as security
any stolen firearm "moving as, which is a part of, or which
constitutes, interstate or foreign commerce," by expanding it
to also cover any stolen firearm "which has been shipped or
transported in, interstate or foreign commerce." H.Rep. No.
101-681(i), supra, explains that the amendment will "permit
prosecution . . . where the firearms have already moved in
interstate or foreign commerce." Id. at 106, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6510.
Further, Public Law 101-647 § 2202(b) amended
section 922(k), which made it unlawful "to transport, ship or
receive, in interstate or foreign commerce" any firearm whose
serial number had been removed, altered, or obliterated, by
expanding it to also make it unlawful "to possess or receive"
any such firearm that "has, at any time, been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce."
And, Section 2204 of P.L. 101-647 added section 922(r)
making it "unlawful for any person to assemble from
imported parts" any rifle or shotgun "identical" to any
"prohibited from importation under section 925(d)(3)." House
Report 101-68(I), supra, reflects that this amendment "is to
prevent the circumvention of the importation restrictions by
persons who would simply import the firearms in a
disassembled form and then reassemble them in the United
States." Id. at 107, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6511.
Finally, section 2205 of P.L. 101-647 amended section
930, which denounced possession of firearms "in a Federal
facility," so that an enhanced penalty would be applicable if
the possession were "in a Federal court facility."
39. Rep. William Hughes, the Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee, made the same
point in a colloquy with Richard Cook, the Chief of the
BATF's Firearms Division, during the hearings on H.R.
3757:
"Mr. Hughes. This would be a major change, would it
not, in Federal jurisdiction, in that basically, we've
played a supportive role in endorsement of gun laws
throughout the country, supportive of local and State
efforts to attempt to license and, as a matter of fact, to
restrict and punish. This would, it seems to me, put us
in the position of, for the first time, playing a direct
role in the enforcement of a particular Federal law - a
gun law - at the local level, the school district level.
Mr. Cook. ATF has always been involved with
supporting State and local people in their prosecutions.
Mr. Hughes. I say that's been our role - as supportive.
Does this give us the original jurisdiction?
Mr. Cook. In this particular instance, this legislation
would give us original Federal jurisdiction, which
would -
Mr. Hughes: That would be a major departure from
basically what has been the practice of the past.
Mr. Cook. As far as schools as concerned, yes, it is.
Mr. Hughes. A major departure from a traditional
federalism concept which basically defers to State and
local units of government to enforce their laws.
Mr. Cook. Yes."
House Hearings, supra, at 14.
40. See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964),
where the Court noted that the "discriminatory practices" the
regulation of which it sustained were "now found substantially
to affect interstate commerce," id. at 355 (emphasis added),
and that under the Commerce Clause Congress' regulatory
powers extend to "local activities . . . which might have a
substantial and harmful effect upon" interstate "commerce."
Id. at 358 (emphasis added).
41. Perez does contain the statement that: "We have
mentioned in detail the economic, financial, and social setting
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of the problem as revealed to Congress. We do so not to infer
that Congress need make particularized findings in order to
legislate." Id. at 1362. No citation of authority is given, nor
is the meaning of the second sentence entirely clear.
However, the opinion as a whole shows extensive
consideration of and reliance on not only the evidence before
Congress and the legislative history, but also the formal
Congressional findings, which the Court had already observed
were "quite adequate" to sustain the act. Id.
42. Similarly, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258
(1964), the Court upheld the same act "as applied here to a
motel which concededly serves interstate travelers." Id. at
360. The Court noted that the act, by its express terms,
applied to an establishment "if its operations affect
commerce," which was defined to include "any inn, hotel,
motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to
transient guests." Id. at 352-53. It observed that statute was
"carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and
substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people,
except where state action is involved." Id. at 355. In
sustaining the act as applied the Court stated:
"While the Act as adopted carried no congressional
findings the record of its passage through each house is
replete with evidence of the burdens that discrimination
by race or color places upon interstate commerce. See
Hearings before Senate Committee on Commerce on S.
1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.; S.Rep. No. 872, supra;
Hearings before Senate Committee on the Judiciary on
S. 1731, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.; Hearings before House
Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on the Judiciary
on miscellaneous proposals regarding Civil Rights, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4; H.R.Rep. No. 914, supra. . .
. We shall not burden this opinion with further details
since the voluminous testimony presents overwhelming
evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels
impedes interstate travel" Id. at 355.
43. We know of no Supreme Court decision in the last half
century that has set aside such a finding as without rational
basis. However, the Court has never renounced responsibility
to invalidate legislation as beyond the scope of the Commerce
Clause. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 88 S.
Ct. 2017, 2025, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (1968) ("This Court has
examined and will continue to examine federal statutes to
determine whether there is a rational basis for regarding them
as regulations of commerce among the states."). Nor may we
renounce that duty.
44. Conceivably, a purely informational void could be filled
by evidence in court of the same general kind that might have
been presented to a Congressional committee or the like
concerning any relationship between the legislation and
interstate commerce. However, in such a situation the court
could only guess at what Congress' determination would have
been. In any event, there is no such evidence here.
45. We recognize that "the constitutionality of action taken by
Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it
undertakes to exercise." Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333
U.S. 138, 68 S. Ct. 421, 424, 92 L. Ed. 596 (1948). But in
that case, the Court went on immediately to say: "Here it is
plain from the legislative history that Congress was invoking
its war power to cope with a current condition of which the
war was a direct and immediate cause." Id. (footnote
omitted). See also id. at 423 ("The legislative history of the
present Act makes absolutely clear that there has not yet been
eliminated the deficit in housing which in considerable
measure was caused by the heavy demobilization of veterans
and by the cessation or reduction in residential construction
during the period of hostilities due to the allocation of
building materials to military projects"; footnote omitted).
The Court proceeded to sustain the legislation under the war
power. Here, by contrast, the legislative history does not
show that Congress, in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones
Act, was invoking the Commerce Clause.
46. It is also conceivable that some applications of section
922(q) might raise Second Amendment concerns. Lopez does
not raise the Second Amendment and thus we do not now
consider it. Nevertheless, this orphan of the Bill of Rights
may be something of a brooding omnipresence here. For an
argument that the Second Amendment should be taken
seriously, see Levinson, The Embarrassing Second
Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637 (1989).
47. As we have observed (note 42, supra), in Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13
L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964), the Court upheld section 201(b)(1) &
(c) of Title 11 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, respecting
hotels, motels, and inns, as a proper exercise of the
commerce power, relying on the wording of the statute and
its legislative history. The Court distinguished the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883),
which had stricken down the Civil Rights Act of 1875. The
Heart of Atlanta opinion observes that the opinion in Civil
Rights Cases "specifically . . . noted that the Act was not
conceived in terms of the commerce power." Heart of
Atlanta, 85 S. Ct. at 354. The Heart of Atlanta opinion also
in this connection contrasts the 1875 and 1964 acts:
"Unlike Title II of the present legislation, the 1875 Act
broadly proscribed discrimination in 'inns, public
conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other
places of public amusement,' without limiting the
categories of affected businesses to those impinging
upon interstate commerce. In contrast, the applicability
of Title II is carefully limited to enterprises having a
direct and substantial relation to the interstate flow of
goods and people, except where state action is
involved." Id. at 354.
The suggestion is that it is questionable whether an act which
has neither an express or facial commerce nexus nor
legislative history demonstrating such a nexus may be
sustained as an exercise of the commerce power.
In a similar vein, we note that in Woods v. Cloyd
Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 68 S. Ct. 421, 92 L. Ed. 596
(1946), the Supreme Court, relying on legislative history (see
note 43, supra), sustained the Housing and Rent Act of 1947,
which essentially contained a form of nationwide federal rent
control, on the basis of the war power. The legislation did not
expressly invoke the war power, but the Court sustained it on
that basis, relying on legislative history, despite the Court's
recognition that this principle should not extend long after the
end of hostilities, as if it did "it may not only swallow up all
other powers of Congress but largely obliterate the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments as well." Id. at 424. Significantly, the
Court never mentioned the Commerce Clause. Moreover, the
Court's referenced concern seems to implicitly assume that
the Commerce Clause would not reach so far.
48. The Court then quoted extensively from Will v. Michigan
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L.
Ed. 2d 45 (1989). The Will Court had stated:
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"If Congress intends to alter the 'usual constitutional
balance between the States and the Federal
Government,' it must make its intention to do so
'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.'
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
242, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3147, 87 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1985);
. . . Atascadero was an Eleventh Amendment case, but
a similar approach is applied in other contexts.
Congress should make its intention 'clear and manifest'
if it intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the
States, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L. Ed. 1447 (1947), or
if it intends to impose a condition on the grant of
federal moneys, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1539, 67
L. Ed. 2d 694 (1981); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203, 207, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 2795, 97 L. Ed. 2d 171
(1987). 'In traditionally sensitive areas, such as
legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement
of clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact
faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical
matters involved in the judicial decision.' United States
v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349, 92 S. Ct. 515, 523, 30 L.
Ed. 2d 488 (1971)." Id. at 2308-09.
49. Thus, we are not faced with a situation such as that
addressed by Justice Powell in his concurrence in Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 65 L. Ed. 2d 902
(1980). See id. at 2787 (Powell, J., concurring) ("After
Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national
concern, its Members gain experience that may reduce the
need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congress
again considers action in that area.").
See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1989)
(plurality opinion), in which the Court held unconstitutional
Richmond's plan requiring thirty percent of public
subcontracting work to be given to minority-owned business,
in part because of the city's failure adequately to supports its
"finding" that past discrimination necessitated race-conscious
remedial action. Specifically, the Court rejected the city's
reliance upon findings made by Congress (and used by the
Court to sustain a similar federal racial set-aside in Fullilove)
that there had been nationwide discrimination against blacks
in the construction industry, saying that "the probative value
of these findings for demonstrating the existence of
discrimination in Richmond is extremely limited." Id. at 727.
Further, the Court saw "absolutely no evidence of past
discrimination against Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian,
Eskimo, or Aleut persons in any aspect of the Richmond
construction industry." Id. at 728 (original emphasis).
50. We reject two related arguments by the government in
this connection. First it urges that section 922(q) "is not
fundamentally different from the 'schoolyard statute,' 21
U.S.C. § 860, which provides greater punishment for drug
offenses occurring within 1000 feet of a school." However,
this statement ignores the fundamental difference that all drug
trafficking, intrastate as well as interstate, has been held
properly subject to federal regulation on the basis of detailed
Congressional findings that such was necessary to regulate
interstate trafficking. See United States v. Lopez, 459 F.2d
949, 951-53 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Llerena v.
United States, 409 U.S. 878, 93 S. Ct. 130, 34 L. Ed. 2d
131 (1972). Thus, section 860 is not a regulation of schools
but of drugs, and its jurisdictional foundation is the now
unchallenged federal authority over intrastate as well as
interstate narcotics trafficking. See cases cited in note 10,
supra.
Second, the government urged the district court that
"the federal government has provided thousands and
thousands of dollars in federal educational grant moneys to
the San Antonio Independent School District . . The
federal government is entitled to protect its investment in
education . " We reject this contention. Although
Congress may attach conditions to the receipt of federal
funds, it must do so unambiguously. See South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 2796, 97 L. Ed. 2d
171 (1987); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1540, 67 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1981).
We cannot view section 922(q) as a condition meant to
"protect the federal investment in schools," as the government
puts it, because Congress has in no way tied section 922(q) to
federal funding. Section 922(q), which expressly extends to
"private" and "parochial" as well as "public" schools, does
not even mention federal funding, and applies whether or not
such funding is received.
51. The government also urges that we have sustained the
prohibition of all simple narcotics possession. See United
States v. Lopez, 461 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
However, there we relied on our decision in the earlier,
different Lopez case, 459 F.2d 949, where we in turn relied
on Congressional findings that such was necessary to
effectively regulate the interstate trafficking in narcotics. The
possession proscription was a necessary means to regulate the
interstate commercial trafficking in narcotics. There is
nothing analogous in the present case. Section 922(q) is not
related (either in terms or by legislative findings or history)
to the regulation of interstate trafficking in firearms or to any
scheme for such purpose, and there has been no general
outlawing of the possession of ordinary firearms by ordinary
citizens. Moreover, firearms do not have the fungible and
untraceable characteristics of narcotics.
52. No other basis for section 922(q) has been suggested.
53. Cf. Heart of Atlanta, 85 S. Ct. at 360 ("We, therefore,
conclude that the action of the Congress in the adoption of the
Act as applied here to a motel which concededly serves
interstate travelers is within the power granted it by the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.") (emphasis added).
However, the "as applied" issue has not been briefed or
argued with respect to section 922(q) and, as noted, we
expressly do not resolve it.
54. Because we reverse Lopez's conviction, we do not reach
the challenge he raises to his sentence.
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